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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis employs Chalmers’ (1996) hard problem of consciousness in an attempt to 
highlight the fundamental issues with the physicalist zeitgeist that has predominated 
much of contemporary philosophical thought, before championing an alternative 
metaphysic, predicated upon a form of monistic property dualism, which may hold the 
potential to solve the mystery of consciousness without falling foul to the issues faced 
by physicalism.  I begin my inquiry with an explication of those physicalist strategies 
which have attempted to maintain their metaphysic in light of the hard problem, with 
a particular focus upon Dennett’s (1991) eliminativism, the reductive 
representationalism held by Dretske (1996) and Tye (2000), and the phenomenal 
concept strategy established by Loar (1990/9) and Balog (2009/12), before attempting 
to explicate how all such physicalist strategies are forced to warp our conception of 
what conscious experience actually is in order to maintain their metaphysic, and 
contending that, due to the intractable nature of the ontological gap underpinning the 
hard problem, the contemporary anti-physicalists are right to appeal to a form of 
ontological dualism that posits consciousness as a fundamental constituent of our 
reality. From here, I explore the anti-physicalist contentions that have seen the most 
success in the contemporary literature, and contrast the strengths of substance 
dualism (Swinburne 1986-2013), panpsychism (Strawson 2006) and a naturalized, or 
monistic, property dualism (Chalmers 1996), before concluding that, ultimately, both 
substance dualism and panpsychism contravene upon our understanding of natural 
laws in such a way that either fractures our evolutionarily constituted worldview 
(substance dualism), or contradicts our understanding of thermodynamic theory 
(panpsychism). Thus, I argue, monistic property dualism reveals itself to be the 
metaphysical framework with the potential to encompass the most explanatorily 
robust, and metaphysically coherent, solution to the hard problem.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 ii	
Contents 
 
 
Introduction 1 
Chapter 1  
The Intractability of the Hard Problem 11 
1.1 Formulating the foundations of the problem: the failings of Reductivism 11 
1.2 Strong and Weak Emergence 22 
1.3.  New Mysterianism 29 
Chapter 2  
A further problem: epistemic justification without phenomenal experience 35 
2.1 The fundamental problem and three potential physicalist solutions 55 
Chapter 3  
Dennett’s Illusionism 59 
Chapter 4  
Reductive Representationalism 76 
Chapter 5  
The Phenomenal Concept Strategy 100 
Chapter 6  
Towards a paradigm shift: supplanting monistic physicalism with ontological 
dualism 124 
6.1 Swinburne’s Substance Dualism 127 
6.2 Monistic Property Dualism and Panpsychism: towards a potential solution to 
the Hard Problem 142 
Conclusion 168 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 iii	
Acknowledgments 
I wish to express my earnest gratitude for the patience and guidance provided by my 
supervisor James Tartaglia, whose wisdom has left a lasting impact upon both this 
thesis and myself. I would also like to thank my partner, Jodie, and my parents, 
Alison & Philip, for their steadfast love, support, and, most of all, for having endured 
me amidst long days entrenched in contemplation of being.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	 1	
Introduction 
 
Sitting here at this point in space-time, I feel the chair beneath me, I feel the soft 
indentation of my fingers upon the keyboard, I see the letters cascade upon the screen, 
and I breathe meaning into these letters as I formulate them into words. All of this 
occurs simultaneously, as a beautiful symphony orchestrated and unified by this ‘I’ as 
a subject of experience. These experiences culminate to form the subjective 
phenomenal character of ‘what it is like’ (Nagel 1974, p. 442) for me as this subject of 
experience, and it is the fact that there is ‘something it is like’ (ibid., p. 442) for me to 
subjectively undergo experiential states that typifies my existence most indubitably, 
for this is the singular phenomenon that is realized with such visceral immediacy that 
it seems impossible to doubt. Yet, all attempts to employ the physical abrasiveness of 
quantitative science as a medium from which to reconcile this seemingly 
unquantifiable phenomenal character have proven redundant. This is the dilemma 
posed to the physicalist metaphysic. As, upon establishing the brain as a purely 
structural or functional physical system, physicalism is left incapable of explaining 
how and why this culmination of physical matter should give rise to my abounding, 
inner phenomenal experience.  This is what Chalmers (1996) terms the ‘hard’ 
problem of consciousness1, and exemplifies a contemporary formulation of a long 
established ‘fundamental problem’ with the physicalist metaphysic. 
 
The foundation of this problem can be traced back as far as ancient Greece, and 
typifies the divide between idealists (see Plato 380 BC, Berkeley 1710) who 
																																																								
1 Consciousness in this context is concerned with subjective, phenomenal experience. Throughout I 
shall be referencing consciousness with this in mind, whilst also employing the concept of ‘qualia’ to 
denote the subjective, phenomenal properties of experience.  
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champion the non-physical ‘spirit’ or ‘subjectively experiential mind’ as the 
fundamental property from which all further properties grow2, and physicalists (see 
Dennett 1991) that subscribe to what Husserl (1913) references as our ‘natural 
attitude’ (p. 57).  This natural attitude foregoes the fundamental nature of the mind, 
and instead proceeds as if the information made available via our phenomenal 
experience presents external reality as it is in actuality. Husserl (1913) outlines this 
view as follows: 
 
‘I find the actuality as a factually existent actuality and also accept it as it presents 
itself to me as factually existing. No doubt about or rejection of data belonging to the 
natural world alters in any respect the general positing which characterizes the 
natural attitude. The world is always there as an actuality.’ (p. 57) 
 
For Husserl (1936), this natural attitude stood in contrast to the ‘phenomenological 
attitude’ adopted by the idealists, who posited that our capacity to ‘stand above the 
world’ and reduce everything to mental ‘phenomenon’ (p. 152) stood as evidence for 
phenomenological experience being the only indubitable actuality.  Thus, whilst 
idealism seemed to stifle epistemic progression3 via upholding the claim that only 
consciousness indubitably exists, Husserl’s (1913/36) depiction of our ‘natural 
attitude’ describes a framework capable of epistemic advancement, via allowing for 
‘lifeworldy objects’ to contain their own spatially extended ‘material realities’ 
(Overgaard 2004, p. 20), and exist in a state of physical actuality that is, in itself, 
more ‘factually existent’ than the non-physical mind. Over time, the epistemic and 																																																								
2 Although in the case of Berkeley (1710) this extends only so far as transcendental idealism, in which 
one only doubts one’s epistemic capacity to know properties beyond the mental.  
3 Here I am employing the concept of epistemic stagnation to denote a state in which an epistemic 
framework presupposes its own limits, and, as such, inevitably stagnates. 
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metaphysical commitments of this natural attitude coalesced to form the metaphysic 
of monistic physicalism, which now dominates the fields of philosophy and natural 
science. This metaphysic adopts the contention that those phenomena which are 
spatially and physically quantifiable are more ‘factually existent’ than their non-
physical counterparts, whilst maintaining that, as we only have evidence for the 
existence of those properties that contain their own ‘material realities’, we should 
appeal to an ontological monism, and conclude that our reality only contains one type 
of thing: the physical. So that the brain, for example, just is a spatially extended 
physical substance, encompassing a set of underlying materials and functions, but 
withholding no further non-physical ‘spirit’ or ‘mental property’ beyond that of which 
can be physically quantified (this is Dennett’s 1991 stance). As such, this physicalist 
‘natural attitude’ simultaneously avoided the epistemic stagnation inherent within 
idealism, whilst appealing to our intuitive inclination to describe phenomenon 
presented to us in our sense data as encompassing actually existent physical identities 
that are ontologically independent of the mind. So, as the antithesis of idealism, this 
‘natural attitude’ became rooted in a monistic physicalism, which posited physical, 
quantifiable identities as the only ‘factually existent actuality’, and allowed us to 
meaningfully communicate about the world by adopting a purportedly 
‘commonsense’ ontological commitment that facilitated physical quantifications and 
avoided epistemic stagnation.   
 
Thus, the strength of this ontological commitment has been grounded within its 
capacity to facilitate epistemic advancement, as upon dethroning the mind from the 
epistemic pedestal championed by the idealists, and embracing our ‘natural attitude’, 
monistic physicalism creates a metaphysic, rooted in the contention that only 
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physically quantifiable phenomena can be said to exist, that allows for the 
quantification of physical information, and, in turn, provides grounding for all the 
natural sciences we know today. Indeed, it is the scientific and evidential consistency 
of this metaphysic that has strengthened the contemporary move to denounce 
idealism, in favor of the reductive, monistic physicalism that now predominates the 
current philosophical, and scientific, zeitgeist.  
 
Physicalism, then, presents a robust narrative, and purportedly provides a 
metaphysical ‘key’ from which to explain, via causally closed scientific quantification 
and reduction, all observable, physical substances to further observable, physical 
substances. However, whilst the metaphysical framework that underpins the natural 
sciences has undeniably advanced our understanding of the physical, upon employing 
this same framework in an attempt to explain phenomenal experience, we find 
ourselves no better equipped than the ancient Greeks.  So, natural science, for the 
most part, has avoided any attempt to reconcile the experiential mind and, as a result, 
we are confronted with neat, contemporary formulations of this ‘hard’ problem that, 
in truth, has plagued our epistemic framework from the very beginning.   
 
The disparity that now lies at the heart of this problem is that the physical sciences, 
which act as our most championed means of epistemic enquiry, tend to 
simultaneously rely upon and disregard conscious experience. As, whilst phenomenal 
experience seems to be epistemologically antecedent to science by grounding our 
capacity for experiential observation, science’s adherence to the physicalist ‘natural 
attitude’ often results in the non-quantifiable, or non-physical being denied outright. 
So, phenomenal consciousness, as an experiential phenomenon, becomes difficult to 
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reconcile with a philosophical or scientific method underpinned by a physicalist 
metaphysic that can only affirm the existence of the quantifiable structures or 
functions of physical phenomena. By means of recompense, physical science either 
commits itself to the patent absurdity of denying the existence of phenomenal 
experience entirely (see chapter 3), or attempts to find a means from which to 
incorporate the phenomenal identity of subjective experience into a framework that 
begins with physical phenomenon (see chapters 4, 5). These responses all massage the 
identity of consciousness, in an attempt to physically explain (or eliminate) 
experience, so that the identity of phenomenal experience is reduced to a given 
structure or function, which is, in itself, fundamentally physical. As such, these 
physicalists effectively attempt to deny the import of the problem of consciousness, 
for if any one of these iterations can show that physicalism is capable of integrating 
phenomenology (properly defined as an experiential awareness of ‘what it is like’) 
into the physicalist metaphysic, then the coherence and metaphysical completeness of 
science remains unchallenged. 
 
These attempts to maintain the coherence of physicalism shall act as the primary 
focus of this thesis. I endeavor to highlight the fundamental inadequacies with the 
physicalist appeal to a ‘bottom up’ approach, in which the definition of subjective 
conscious experience is massaged to suit a physicalist framework, and this ‘quasi-
consciousness’ is somehow posited as an emergent feature of a framework that 
necessarily begins with physical laws (Dennett 1991 seems particularly susceptible to 
this). My contention throughout shall be that these attempts to massage our definition 
of phenomenal consciousness result in ‘solutions’ that fail to truly address the 
fundamentals of the problem. Further, I shall contend that any future purported 
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physicalist solution to the problem of consciousness shall face the same fate, as a 
scientific framework that begins with physical phenomenon will forever remain 
incapable of employing observation to achieve an understanding of that which makes 
observation possible. So, just as we do not expect a measuring tool, for example a 
ruler, to effectively measure itself; we should not rely upon physical observation to 
effectively explain itself. Instead, we must begin with the mental property that makes 
observation and explanation possible, and posit this phenomenon as fundamental. 
Thus, I contend we must allow for further, ontologically fundamental mental 
phenomena that exist beyond physical phenomena, so that we may glean a means of 
explaining the property that is simultaneously so fundamental and intractable to 
science.   
 
As a result, and in line with one kind of contemporary anti-physicalist stance (see 
Chalmers 1996, Strawson 2006, Nagel 2012, Swinburne 1986-2013), I fall in favour 
of bridging the gap between idealism and physicalism, so as to posit a metaphysic that 
allows for consciousness as a fundamental phenomenon, without discounting 
physicalism entirely. As such, whilst I shall be maintaining that reductive, physical 
science and phenomenological consciousness seem to encompass contrary 
metaphysical commitments, it is my contention (along with the contentions of 
contemporary anti-physicalists, such as Nagel 2012 and Chalmers 2010) that in order 
to maintain the coherency of our epistemic and metaphysical frameworks, we must 
integrate experiential, subjective phenomenology into our understanding of the 
physical brain. Without this integration, we risk either undermining the scientific 
methods that have had such evidential success in illuminating the existence of the 
natural laws underpinning our reality, or foregoing the fundamental nature of the 
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consciousness that antecedes this scientific understanding, and, in so doing, advancing 
a worldview that necessarily fails to explain that which is most epistemologically 
fundamental: experience. The problem the physical sciences face, however, is 
precisely the ‘hard’ problem iterated by Chalmers (1996), as such a reconciliation 
seems impossible whilst employing a physicalist metaphysic so constrained by the 
claim that nothing exists beyond the observable; leaving the physical sciences wholly 
unequipped to investigate the subjective phenomenology of experience, and resulting 
in the experiential consciousness that is epistemologically so fundamental to science 
being discounted. Thus, in the course of this thesis, I shall uphold the central claim 
that, in order to maintain a coherent worldview, we must cease to exclude 
phenomenology from our epistemic framework, and, as such, must investigate 
metaphysical frameworks beyond that of physicalism, that may allow for the 
reconciliation of the physical brain with the subjective character of experience.  
 
In order to uphold an appeal to shift the contemporary zeitgeist, I must first address 
the physicalist theses that deny the import of the problem of consciousness; for, in 
order for my thesis to stand, it must be shown that current physicalist attempts to 
reconcile consciousness are flawed. In chapter 1, I ground the ‘hard’ problem, and 
employ the contentions of ‘new mysterianism’ (see McGinn 1989) as a means to 
explicate the deeper issues underpinning any attempt to employ physical science as a 
means from which to explain consciousness. In chapter 2, I employ these contentions 
to unravel an epistemic vacuity that, potentially, permeates the entirety of the 
physicalist framework. From here, I move on to challenge the most robust of the 
physicalist attempts to maintain their metaphysic via either eliminating phenomenal 
consciousness, positing it as reducible to physical phenomena, or one that supervenes 
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on such phenomena. Here I focus upon eliminativism, representationalism and the 
phenomenal concept strategy (see chapter 3, 4, 5), in the hope that, upon delineating 
the deficiencies within these frameworks, I may show that phenomenal consciousness 
cannot be eliminated, posited as an intentional, physical interaction between the brain 
and its environment, or reduced to a conceptual ‘trick’ that occurs upon the brain 
referencing itself. In chapter 3, I highlight the self-defeating nature of Dennett’s 
(1991) attempts to discount phenomenal experience entirely.  Within chapter 4, I 
focus upon Tye’s (2000) PANIC thesis as a means from which to typify the broader 
representationalist contentions, before advancing an argument for the incompatibility 
of phenomenal character with the externalism that underpins representational 
accounts such as Tye’s. Whilst chapter 5 formulates the current debates and motives 
underlying an appeal to the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’, before falling firmly in 
line with the contention that a formation of this kind is doomed to fall back on 
ontological dualism. By the close of chapter 5, I hope to have outlined the current 
motives and articulations underlying the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism, whilst 
also advancing arguments capable of explicating the fundamental flaws inherent 
within current attempts to employ physicalism as a means from which to solve the 
‘hard’ problem.  
 
With chapters 3, 4 and 5 as grounding, I move on to assert that if physicalism 
demands that we disregard conscious experience entirely (eliminativism), posit 
phenomenal content as one and the same as the properties of external, physical objects 
(representationalism), or posit that any notion of an ontological gap is essentially just 
a conceptual misunderstanding that occurs upon the brain referencing itself 
(phenomenal concept strategy), then the cogency of physicalism lies precariously 
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upon a series of empirically unfounded, highly counter-intuitive propositions. With 
the problems inherent to the physicalist metaphysic highlighted, within chapter 6 I 
investigate the contentions of contemporary anti-physicalists, who have attempted to 
advance a paradigm shift away from the physicalist zeitgeist that has so predominated 
modern metaphysics. In the hope that, by investigating these competing metaphysical 
doctrines, we may unravel a framework with the potential to resolve the problem of 
consciousness in a manner that both coherently captures phenomenal experience in 
entirety and remains coherent with our otherwise robust worldview. This resolution, 
the anti-physicalists contend, is found upon denouncing the monism of physicalism, 
and positing mental phenomenon as an irreducible property or substance that exists 
alongside physical properties as a fundamental constituent of the universe. With 
particular focus upon Swinburne’s (1986-2013) substance dualism, Strawson’s (2006) 
panpsychism, and the monistic property dualism endorsed by Chalmers (1996), I 
articulate the current debates underpinning these metaphysical doctrines, before 
presenting a novel case for the inability of both substance dualism and panpsychism 
to be reconciled with the natural laws underpinning our known reality, and, 
ultimately, championing a form of monistic property dualism, of the kind upheld by 
Chalmers (1996), which is capable of providing a solution to the hard problem whilst 
remaining entirely consistent with said laws.  
 
Thus, I conclude that upon positing a neutral monism that leads to property dualism, 
we reveal a metaphysical framework with the potential to unify the phenomenal 
character of experience with the physical brain, and, in so doing, provide a means 
from which to save philosophical enquiry from the intractability of consciousness. 
Thus, I posit that a potential ‘solution’ to the problem of consciousness is found upon 
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establishing mental properties as a fundamental kind of property, and contend that, 
without a metaphysical solution of this ilk, experience shall forever remain beyond 
reconciliation with our physical understanding. In order to reach this conclusion, 
however, it seems judicious to first address the underlying propositions that have 
resulted in the contemporary preoccupation with this ‘hard’ problem.  
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Chapter 1 
The Intractability of the Hard Problem 
1.1 Formulating the foundations of the problem: the failings of reductivism 
 
Why should a physical system, no matter how complex and well organized, give rise 
to experience at all? Why is it that all this processing does not go on ‘in the dark’, 
without any subjective quality? Right now, nobody has good answers to these 
questions. This is the phenomenon that makes consciousness a real mystery. 
Chalmers (1996, p. 359) 
 
Upon posing this question, Chalmers (1996) effectively reignited the age-old 
philosophical inquiry into the failings of physicalist metaphysics. As, with deft 
simplicity, Chalmers highlights that the same physicalist metaphysic we employ to 
achieve scientific success is incapable of explaining the phenomenal feel of ‘what it is 
like’ that appeals to our most visceral intuition. Thus, in formulating his ‘hard’ 
problem, Chalmers rekindled the divide between idealism and the scientific natural 
attitude, via charging physicalism with an explanation for our seemingly indubitable 
phenomenal experiences.  
 
The intricacies of Chalmers’ formulation take foundation in the failings of physical 
reductivism, which asserts that phenomenon ‘Q’ can be explained, via causal 
reduction, by the more fundamental phenomenon ‘P’, ‘so that P = Q’ (Blamauer 2011, 
p. 100). The issue, Chalmers (1996) purports, is the incapacity to identify conscious 
experience in the same manner used to identify physically reductive properties. Such 
that, whilst the reduction of water (Q) to the physical properties of H2O (P) is 
possible, a similar reduction cannot be employed to account for conscious experience 
	 12	
(Q) within the physical properties of a neurologically constituted brain-state (P). 
Chalmers (2003) contends this issue arises because reductive explanations of physical 
phenomenon are only capable of accounting for the ‘structure and function’ 
(Chalmers 2003, p. 103) of physical properties, without ever addressing the 
phenomenal feel of ‘what it is like’ to have an experience. Thus, the scientific ‘natural 
attitude’, in its adherence to quantifiable objectification, fails to physically explain the 
experiential identity that lies at the heart of what it means to be this human subject.   
 
Chalmers (2003) appeals to a conceivability argument in order to compound his point, 
in which he highlights that, if we uphold the physicalist notion that experience can be 
accounted for within the identity of physical structures or functions, then a physically 
identical subject to me must necessarily share my phenomenological state. As Kripke 
(1971) attests: ‘for any objects x and y, if x is y, then it is necessary that x is y’ (p. 
137). So, if physicalism attempts to reduce phenomenal experience to a physical 
phenomenon, it must hold that phenomenal experience necessarily shares the identity 
of the lower-order physical phenomenon to which it is causally reducible. However, 
as Chalmers (2003) highlights, it is not difficult to conceive of my physical clone not 
having the phenomenal ‘feel’ of what it is like, but instead existing as nothing beyond 
a functioning, physically structured substance occupying a certain spatiotemporal 
point (p. 105). Hence, whilst we could not conceive of water being anything other 
than H20 without changing our definition of ‘water’ (Putnam 1973, p. 701), we can 
conceive of a ‘philosophical zombie’ (Chalmers 2003, p. 105) withholding our exact 
physiological makeup, but being devoid of the phenomenon we reference as 
phenomenal consciousness. The problem becomes that, if this is at least conceivable, 
there can be no necessity in the relationship between the identities of 
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phenomenological consciousness and the physical brain, as we can conceive of one 
occurring without the other. So, whilst the conceptual identity of water employed on 
planet earth can never not be H20, we can hold the concept of a brain not withholding 
consciousness, and, as such, we can posit a distinction between the identities of 
phenomenal consciousness and the physical brain. Thus, Chalmers (2003) concludes 
that if we were to posit ‘P’ as the ‘conjunction of all microphysical truths about the 
universe’ (p.106), in which every ‘fundamental feature of every fundamental 
microphysical entity’ (p. 106) was specified, we would still be left with the problem 
of explaining the truth that we hold phenomenal consciousness (Q), because if we can 
conceive of a non-phenomenal ‘philosophical zombie’, then P&~Q is conceivable, 
and, therefore, it is metaphysically possible for Q to exist as an ontological identity 
that is irreducible to P.  As such, if this is conceivable and therefore (metaphysically) 
possible, the physicalist notion that, by a matter of metaphysical necessity, all 
phenomena is reducible to a more fundamental microphysical truth, is rendered false 
by virtue of a phenomenal truth (Q) that presents an ontological identity beyond the 
scope of microphysical truths.   
 
The physicalist retorts to this line of argument are abundant (see Dennett 1998, Yablo 
1993, Ashwell 2003), with all presenting categorical rejections of Chalmers’ inference 
from conceivability to (metaphysical) possibility, and, in turn, presenting a case for an 
outright rejection of Chalmers’ (1996/2003) original, more simplistic, formulation of 
his conceivability argument, which is articulated as follows: 
 
(1) P&~Q is conceivable 
(2) If P&~Q is conceivable, P&~Q is metaphysically possible 
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(3) If P&~Q is metaphysically possible, materialism is false. 
(4) Materialism is false. 
 
These responses hinge on the notion that Chalmers’ formulation presumes the validity 
of either the epistemic thesis of what can be conceived as expressed in premise 1 
(Dennett 1998, Ashwell 2003), or the leap from epistemic conceivability to modal 
possibility as evidenced in premise 2 (Yablo 1993).  Whilst the former attempts to 
deny our capacity to even conceive of (or imagine) philosophical zombies by 
maintaining that those philosophers who claim zombies are conceivable ‘invariably 
underestimate the task of conception (or imagination)’ (Dennett 1998, p. 172), the 
latter endeavors to mount a direct attack upon the Humean (1968) notion ‘that nothing 
we imagine is absolutely (metaphysically) impossible’ (p. 32). With this in mind, 
Chalmers (2010) attempts to explain away the issue highlighted by Dennett (1998), 
and address the stronger argument that denies the move from conceivability to 
metaphysical possibility. In order to achieve this, Chalmers (2010) extrapolates a 
more robust conceivability argument by way of delineating between the prima facie 
conceivability of a hypothesis that is plausible by mere initial consideration or a priori 
reasoning, but is directly ‘tied to a subject’s contingent cognitive limitations’ (p. 143), 
and the ‘ideal conceivability’ of a hypothesis that cannot be denied even upon 
employing an ‘ideal rational reflection’ (p. 144), which ‘abstracts away from those 
(cognitive) limitations’ (p. 229). Chalmers (2010) attempts to clarify this distinction 
by employing the following examples: 
 
‘(1) '2+2=5' is neither prima facie conceivable nor ideally conceivable;  
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(2) Where S is a highly complex but provable mathematical truth, ~S will be prima 
facie conceivable for most subjects, but it is not ideally conceivable;  
 
(3) Where S is 'There is a flying pig', S is prima facie conceivable, and is almost 
certainly ideally conceivable.’ (p. 143) 
 
With these examples in mind, we can simplify this distinction as follows: prima facie 
conceivability occurs upon a subject imagining a case in which the initial hypothesis 
for S’s existence is taken to be coherent, whilst ideal conceivability occurs when this 
initial prima facie conceivability cannot be logically shown to contradict upon 
employing ‘ideal rational reflection’ (Chalmers 2010, p. 144). Yablo (2008) provides 
some explanatory weight to this distinction by classifying, what Chalmers (2010) 
might term, prima facie conceivability as indicative of a ‘believability sense’ (p. 50), 
and ‘ideal conceivability’ as a sense in which we are able to present ‘the appearance 
of possibility’ (p. 50). Such that, in the case of Chalmers’ highly complex but 
provable mathematical theorem S, we may be able to hypothesize using prima facie 
conceivability that we believe ~S to be the case, but upon employing ideal rational 
reflection, we reduce the possibility of ~S being true to such an extent that we render 
our prima facie belief redundant, and employ ideal conceivability to affirm S’s 
existence indubitably. In this example, what Chalmers terms a ‘ideal negative 
conceivability’ (p. 144) is employed, in which the conception of S is established and 
deductive logic leads us to the impossibility of ~S. However, Chalmers (2010) also 
posits its opposite, what he terms an ‘ideal positive conceivability’ (p. 144), in which 
the conception of, for example, philosophical zombies (Z) is established, and 
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deductive logic leads us to affirm the (metaphysical) possibility of Z, because the 
prima facie belief can not be ‘defeated upon ideal rational reflection’ (p. 144)4.  
 
Chalmers (2010) argues that critics (see Dennett 1998, Ashwell 2003), who contend 
that the ideal positive conception of zombies is inconceivable on the grounds that 
imagining an amalgamation of the brain’s physical processes also involves imagining 
conscious processes, are flawed by virtue of their over-reliance upon the prima facie 
belief that conscious and physical processes are necessarily intertwined.  Indeed, as 
Chalmers (2010) argues, whilst a prima facie belief about the relation between 
phenomenal and physical processes may lead the physicalist to deny the notion of 
prima facie zombie conceivability, it remains perfectly possible for the physicalist to 
employ ideal rational reflection in order to ideally and positively conceive of cases in 
which the absence of this relation is a metaphysical possibility, and so why should the 
physicalist face a difficulty in imagining the metaphysical possibility of a case in 
which the extrinsic, functional or spatial properties of physical processes are absent of 
intrinsic phenomenal properties? And, as we can conceive of this (regardless of our 
prima facie beliefs)5, the question now becomes whether or not this ideal conception 
is itself enough to ground metaphysical possibility.  
 
Chalmers (2010) argues that this is the case, and highlights that instances in which the 
leap from conceivability to (metaphysical) possibility is denied (See Yablo 1993) 
																																																								
4 ‘Where S is 'There is a flying pig', S is prima facie rational conceivable, and is almost certainly 
ideally conceivable.’ (p.  143) would be an example of this, as we cannot employ ideal reflection to 
indubitably affirm that the hypothesis is (metaphysically) impossible (in all possible worlds).  
5 Worley (2003) denies this claim by contending that ideal rational reflection would imply a greater 
breadth of scientific and logical reasoning than that of which we are currently privy to, and so 
concludes that an ideal conception of zombies is impossible. However, Chalmers (2010) refutes this by 
highlighting that, in order for zombies to be beyond the scope of ideal reflection, phenomenal concepts 
must be functional concepts, and, as shall be explored in chapter 5, this seems difficult to establish.  	
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correctly focus upon the difficulty of leaping from prima facie conceivability to 
(metaphysical) possibility, whilst failing to account for the inference from ideal 
positive conceivability to metaphysical possibility.  Chalmers frames this argument by 
establishing a distinction between primary and secondary conceivability, in the hope 
of avoiding Putnam’s (1975) dismissal of a posteriori conceivability arguments on the 
grounds that just because ‘we can perfectly well imagine having experiences that 
would convince us (and that would make it rational to believe) that water is not H20’ 
(p. 233), it does not mean that this is metaphysically possible, as ‘once we have 
discovered that water (in the actual world) is H20, nothing counts as a possible world 
in which water isn’t H20’ (p. 233) . The argument follows that whilst secondary 
conceivability is achieved from a posteriori, empirical factors, which entrench us in 
prima facie beliefs and leave us open to Putnam’s objection; primary conceivability is 
achieved by way of pure a priori, ideal reasoning, and, as a result, avoids Putnam’s 
dismissal of a posteriori conceivability. Such that, whilst Chalmers concedes that the 
physicalist can deny the possibility of zombies ‘on the grounds of an a posteriori 
identity between phenomenal and physical properties’ (Chalmers 2010, p. 308), he 
maintains that we must detach ourselves from the limitations of our prima facie 
beliefs gleaned by way of empirical factors, and, as such, urges that we must place 
impetus unto the possibility of ideal, a priori, primary conceivability leading to 
metaphysical possibility. 
 
In order to establish how this may be so, Chalmers (2010) maintains that upon 
employing ideal, primary conceivability to, for example, imagine that water is not 
H20, we are in fact distancing ourselves from the prima facie belief that ‘water is 
H20’ by employing the primary concept of ‘water’ to denote any referent with ‘water-
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like’ qualities, and it is this primary conceivability that allows us to imagine the 
metaphysical possibility of a Twin-Earth in which oceans and lakes are comprised of 
XYZ. Upon employing this ideal, primary conception of ‘water’, Chalmers (2010) 
argues that ‘our conceiving involves access to a possible world’ (p. 146), in which 
there is ‘a link between primary conceivability and metaphysical possibility’ (p. 146), 
because, whilst ‘water is not H2O’ is not secondarily conceivable, or a posteriori true, 
for us as centered beings at this point in space-time on Earth, it is secondarily 
conceivable, and a posteriori true, for our opposite centered at this point in space-time 
on a possible Twin-Earth. This is because, upon employing the primary intension of 
‘water’, we are a priori referencing stuff with water-like qualities in all possible 
worlds; such that the truth of the concept is not limited to the world, but is instead 
limited only by the beliefs of the individual centered in said world. Meaning that 
whilst the employment of the a posteriori, secondary intension of water as H20 leads 
us to reference water on Earth, we are still able to detach ourselves from this a 
posteriori, prima facie understanding of ‘water’ in order to infer that, if our primary 
intension of ‘water’ is simply picking out any referent with watery qualities, then 
‘water’ picks this out regardless of where we are centered. As Kallestrup (2012) 
points out: ‘only when the microstructure of water was discovered did ‘water’ become 
a natural kind term expressing a natural kind concept. The mistake is to impose 
scientific intuitions about concept individuation on those who possess concepts pre-
scientifically’, such that If H20 is simply the ‘watery stuff’ on earth, then ‘water’ 
picks out H20, if XYZ is the ‘watery stuff’ on Twin-Earth, then ‘water’ picks out 
XYZ (p. 67). Similarly, whilst there may be an a posteriori link between physical and 
phenomenal properties on earth, if the primary intention of ‘phenomenal property’ is 
simply picking out a referent with phenomenal qualities, then it is conceivable that 
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there exists a possible world in which there is no such link. With this established, 
Chalmers (2010) argues: 
 
‘We can say that when the primary intension of S is true at some centred world (i.e., 
when some centred world verifies S), S is primarily possible, or 1-possible. When the 
secondary intension of S is true at some world (i.e., when some world satisfies 
S), S is secondarily possible, or 2-possible. Then 'water is not H2O' is not 2-possible, 
but it is 1-possible.’ (p. 147) 
 
With this as his grounding, Chalmers (2010) now offers a reformulation of his 
conceivability argument, in the hope of avoiding the more simplistic physicalist 
arguments against the inference from conceivability to (metaphysical) possibility:  
 
‘(1) P&~Q is conceivable 
(2) If P&~Q is conceivable, then P&~Q is 1-possible 
(3) If P&~Q is 1-possible, then P&~Q is 2-possible or Russellian monism is true. 
(4) If P&~Q is 2-possible, materialism is false. 
(5) Materialism is false or Russellian monism6 is true.’ (p. 152) 
 
Thus, as we can conceive of the conjunction of microphysical truths (P) without 
phenomenal experience (Q), it is primarily conceivable that P&~Q is primarily 
possible in some possible world. If it is primarily possible, it is therefore secondarily 																																																								
6 Russel’s (1927) Russelian Monism can be construed as a form of monistic physicalism that is closely 
related to both property dualism as well as panprotopsychism, and simply affirms: (1) Perception and 
science exclusively denote the structure or function of physical entities without picking our their 
intrinstic nature, and (2) An explanation of phenomenal consciousness will only be achieved upon 
understanding the intrinsic nature of physical entities, and so, as we can not achieve this by empirical 
means, we can, at best, only speculate about the intrinsic nature of microphysical properties.  
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possible that some possible world empirically satisfies the existence of philosophical 
zombies, and, therefore, physicalism is false. Or, the a posteriori, empirical, scientific 
approaches that have led us to embrace physicalism on this possible world are simply 
ineffective means of delineating the ‘special nature’ of the microphysical properties 
that are ‘tied to consciousness’ (Chalmers 2010, p. 152) in all possible worlds, and, 
therefore, Russelian Monism7 is true.  
 
The consequence of this argument is, therefore, twofold: either physicalism is 
rendered false by virtue of our capacity to primarily conceive of philosophical 
zombies, or physicalism is shown to over-exert its explanatory power by virtue of 
inviting the modal fallacy that occurs upon relying on the empirical facts in this 
possible world to infer the intrinsic nature of microphysical properties in all possible 
worlds. Thus, according to Chalmers, physicalism, and, in turn, the scientific ‘natural 
attitude’, in its adherence to quantifiable objectification, fails to account for, or 
presumes the non-existence of, the experiential identity that lies at the heart of what it 
means to be this human subject.   
 
As such, I contend that the really important question that Chalmers’ appeal to 
philosophical zombies highlights is: how can physicalism, whilst employing the 
scientific method, delineate the intrinsic nature of microphysical properties in all 
possible worlds in such a way that explains why philosophical zombies are 
impossible? As, it now seems clear that upon defining physical properties as 
																																																								
7 I note here, in line with Chalmers (2010), that whilst Russelian Monism may be construed as a form 
of physicalism, ‘it relies on speculation about the special nature of the fundamental properties in 
microphysics’, and so ‘has much in common with the property dualism that physicalists will want to 
reject’ (p.152). 	
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encompassing a set identity, which exclusively explains their quantifiable function, 
structure or position in space-time, the onus of proof lies with the physicalist to 
explain how these purely physical properties may account for the experiential identity 
of consciousness, so as to elucidate, in a manner consistent with physicalism, an 
explanation for both how a physicalist theory of consciousness may account for our 
seeming to contain non-physical, experiential properties that account for our being 
experientially conscious, and why such a theory necessarily precludes the possibility 
of philosophical zombies. I argue an explanation of this kind must be found within the 
physicalist theories themselves, and so, in the subsequent chapters (see 3, 4, 5), I look 
to these frameworks to establish a theory of consciousness capable of physically 
accounting for experiential identities.   
 
The inevitable problem faced by these theories is one of reconciling experiential 
identities with the physical observations employed by physicalism. This is because, as 
Jackson’s (2003) infamous knowledge argument highlights, experiential information 
remains epistemologically distinct from (and inexplicable with) physical information, 
as any a priori accumulation of physical information pertaining to the functions or 
structures of ‘redness’, for example, will forever remain incapable of accounting for 
the new a posteriori knowledge gained upon learning ‘what it is like’ to 
phenomenally experience ‘redness’ for the first time. As such, it seems physicalism, 
in its attempts to ‘observe’ consciousness by appealing to physically quantifiable 
neurological structures and functions of the brain, must first provide an account 
capable of fully explaining the experiential, phenomenal information that underlies 
our capacity for observation. Thus, as physical reductivism sticks strictly to the 
schema ‘all entities are nothing over and above physical entities’ (Wilson 2005, p. 
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426), the notion of conscious experience charges physicalism with a metaphysical and 
epistemic quandary, which seems to appear insolvable without either: denying that 
this phenomenon contains the experiential identity we have ascribed to it (see chapters 
3, 4, 5), denying the monism of physicalism by positing the existence of an 
experiential property that is ontologically irreducible to physical substances or 
properties, (see chapter 6), or finding a means from which to explain this property that 
is seemingly ‘over and above physical entities’ without foregoing the fundamental 
nature of physical substances.  
 
1.2 Strong and Weak Emergence 
 
 
Emergentism arose as one such attempt to explain experience without foregoing the 
physicalist paradigm completely. This framework aims to explain how novel 
properties, such as consciousness, may emerge from underlying, purely physical, 
correlates. The concept of emergence can be articulated in two distinct forms: ‘strong 
emergence’ of the kind upheld by Alexander (1920), and ‘weak emergence’ of the 
kind upheld by Searle (1992). In what follows, I explicate what is meant by these 
concepts, before addressing the distinction between these two forms of emergentism, 
and, ultimately, concluding that both forms fail to explain the emergence of 
phenomenal experience.  
 
Chalmers (2008) defines the distinction between these two concepts as follows: 
 
Strong Emergence:  ‘A high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to a 
low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, 
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but truths concerning that phenomenon are not deducible even in principle from 
truths in the low-level domain.’ (p. 244) 
 
Weak Emergence: ‘A high-level phenomenon is weakly emergent with respect to a 
low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, 
but truths concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing 
the low-level domain.’ (p. 244) 
 
As such, both notions of emergence are predicated upon the notion that an emergent 
property X is individuated as having a property of something new, such that this 
property confers a ‘new identity on the thing that has it’ (Wyss 2004, p. 3). 
However, whilst strong emergence entails that the novel phenomenon ‘X’ may 
emerge from the low-level phenomenon ‘Y’ even if the type or token identity of X is 
in no way ‘downwardly’ causally deducible from the identity Y, weak emergence 
entails that the novel phenomenon X may emerge from low-level phenomenon Y only 
if the identity of X can be deduced from the underlying identity of Y. Thus, simply, 
whilst, in the case of strong emergence, we could not deduce the emergence of X 
from Y, we could, in the case of weak emergence, deduce that X may emerge from Y.  
 
This notion of weak emergence was championed by the likes of Searle (1992), who 
likened the novel property of ‘liquidity’, which emerges upon combining 2 hydrogen 
atoms with 1 oxygen atom so as to form water molecules, and then loosely bonding 
these molecules, at a certain temperature, so that they may ‘slide past one another’ 
(Strawson 2008, p. 18), to the phenomenal feel of experience that emerges from the 
underlying neuronal structure of the brain. Thus, just as the individual atoms that 
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make up water do not account for its liquidity, Searle argues that consciousness 
cannot be accounted for by individual neurons. Instead, consciousness can only be 
accounted for by the structuring of said neurons, so that consciousness becomes a 
‘higher-level or emergent property of the brain’, just as ‘liquidity is a higher-level 
emergent property of H2O molecules when they are, roughly speaking, rolling around 
on each other (water)’ (Searle 1992, p. 14). As such, Searle’s formation posits 
consciousness as a ‘causally emergent system feature’ of micro-level substances 
(neurons) interacting in such a manner so as to produce a macro-level physical 
substance (the brain) capable of accounting for the ‘higher-level emergent property’ 
of consciousness (Searle 1992, p. 111). However, Searle is careful to explain that 
whilst the causal interaction between consciousness and the macro-level brain is 
explicable; we would need ‘some additional account of the causal relations’ at a 
micro-level in order calculate consciousness using the physical structures of neurons 
(Searle 1992, p. 112).   
 
Herein lies the issue with both weak emergentism and Searle’s formation, as whilst 
the liquidity of water can be deduced from the identity of the atoms underlying H20, 
such that we may logically predict the emergence of liquidity from these atoms, it 
remains clear that ‘neurons are incapable of predicting the property of consciousness’ 
(Havlik 2012, p. 41). As such, Searle seems to be relying upon the extrinsic, 
interactional, or, in this case, behavioural properties of neurons to account for the 
causal relations between them, and, in turn, account for the emergence of 
consciousness. However, it seems very difficult to maintain an appeal to weak 
emergence whilst upholding the claim that the physical behaviour of neurons 
produces the experiential sensation of ‘what it is like’ to undergo such behaviour, as 
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the behaviour itself remains bound to the physical properties of neurons. Indeed, it 
seems impossible to explain why the behaviour of a certain structure of neurons, 
containing a strictly non-experiential physical identity, should give rise to the 
subjective experiential quality of ‘what it is like’, because, unlike the physically 
quantifiable and deducible interaction between H20 and liquidity, the experiential 
identity of consciousness is not reducible to or deducible from either the physical 
identity, or the physical structures and/or behaviours of neurons (this particular 
problem typifies Levine’s 1983 ‘Explanatory Gap’). In turn, Searle’s argument for 
weak emergence seems flawed. As, whilst we can employ a weak downward 
causation to deduce that the novel emergence of the physical, macro-level 
phenomenon of liquidity is likely to arise from the physical, micro-level atoms of 
H20, which do not, in themselves, contain the identity of liquidity, we can not employ 
the same weak downward causation to deduce the novel emergence of a non-physical 
macro-level phenomenon, such as phenomenal experience, from a purely physically 
constituted, neurological micro-level substance. Strawson (2008) exemplifies this 
point as follows: 
 
‘We can easily make intuitive sense of the idea that certain sorts of molecules are so 
constituted that they don’t bind together in a tight lattice but slide past or off each 
other (in accordance with van de Waals molecular interaction laws) in a way that 
gives rise to—is—the phenomenon of liquidity…We [start] in a small set of 
conceptually homogeneous shape-size-mass-charge-number-position-motion-
involving physics notions with no sense of puzzlement…. [And] using the notion of 
reduction in a familiar loose way, we can say that the phenomena of liquidity reduce 
without remainder to shape-size-mass-charge-etc.’ (p. 61) 
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Hence, unlike phenomenal experience, liquidity is still a fundamentally physical 
phenomenon, which is non-mysteriously explained by virtue of micro-level physical 
properties, of a particular physical shape, size or mass, ‘sliding past’ one another so as 
to create the physical phenomenon we reference as ‘liquidity’. This is quite distinct 
from phenomenal experience, as the physical identity of neurons (X) is such that we 
cannot, in any way, deduce the novel emergence of a non-physical experiential 
identity (Y) arising from the low-level properties of X. Thus, as Benovsky (2015) 
formulates: the crucial distinction is that ‘liquidity of water is explained by the 
features H2O molecules do have, [so that] it is wholly dependent on these non-liquid 
features, in a non-mysterious way’ (p. 344), however, the experiential consciousness 
of the brain is not explained by the underlying physical properties of neurons, and so 
consciousness seems to be dependent upon these non-phenomenal properties in a way 
that is entirely mysterious. As such, the crucial point here is that in order for us to 
deduce non-physical, phenomenal experience Y emerging from physical neurons X, 
we must infer that the physical identity of X is entirely non-mysteriously essential to 
the non-physical identity of Y in the same way that the physical identity of H20 is 
entirely non-mysteriously essential to the physical identity of liquidity. However, it 
remains clear that this is not the case in regards to conscious experience, and, as a 
result, it remains clear that we cannot rely upon a form of weak downward causation 
to account for the emergence of experience. As Strawson (2008) attests: 
 
‘For Y truly to [weakly] emerge from X is for Y to arise from or out of X or be given 
in or with Y given how X is. Y must arise out of or be given in X in some essentially 
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non-arbitrary and indeed wholly non-arbitrary way. X has to have something – 
indeed everything – to do with it.’ (p. 66) 
 
Under this strict definition of weak emergence, we witness that, unlike in the case of 
liquidity, in which the physical identity of the atoms of H2O have everything do with 
the physical identity of this emergent phenomena; in the case of phenomenal 
consciousness (Y), it becomes very difficult to explain how the underlying, entirely 
non-phenomenal, physical identity of neurons (X) had anything at all to do with the 
entirely non-physical, phenomenal identity of the emergent property Y. Thus, whilst, 
in the case of liquidity, we are still discussing a physical identity, such that the 
physical identity of the emergent property is deducible from the underlying physical 
identity of atoms; in the case of phenomenal experience, the emergent, experiential 
identity is novel, and, apparently - unless a physical theory can show otherwise -
entirely non-physical, and therefore, non-deducible from the underlying physical 
identity of neurons.  Indeed,  ‘given how X is’, it seems entirely logical to infer that 
we may never have deduced Y from X. At this stage, it seems the weak emergentist 
must either discount the purely physical identity of X so as to accommodate for the 
emergence of Y (and in turn discount physicalism via positing a fundamental 
experiential property capable of accounting for the novel emergence of Y, see chapter 
6 for an explication of this strategy), or fall back onto a notion of strong emergence, 
which is capable of accounting for novel properties, such as Y, emerging from 
underlying low-order phenomenon X, in a manner that does not require the identity of 
X to in any way explain the existence of a novel emergent identity Y.  
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Thus, the physical emergentist must appeal to a more radical form of ‘strong’ 
emergentism, in which notions of ‘weak downward causation9’ (Chalmers 2008, p. 
250) are modified, and consciousness is said to emerge as a novel property, which is 
neither deducible from, nor ontologically reducible to, the physical properties from 
which it ostensibly emerged. This is the stance established by the British emergentists 
(see Mill 1872, Morgan 1923, Alexander 1920 and Broad 1925), and suggests that 
emergent properties are not deducible from their underlying physical system. This 
stance clearly avoids the issues of weak emergentism, as it does not require the 
underlying physical system to account for the formation of novel identities, and 
instead employs a ‘strong downward causation’, in which ‘the causal impact of a 
high-level phenomenon on low-level processes is not deducible even in principle from 
initial conditions and low-level laws’ (Chalmers 2008, p. 250). Thus, low-level 
properties do not causally or conceptually necessitate high-level properties and, as 
such, are not required to explain novel emergence. This, I contend, simply represents 
a clumsy means of escaping the problem faced by Searle, as the strong emergentist is 
demanding that we not only accept the possibility of non-experiential physical 
properties spontaneously producing experiential properties, but that we also accept 
that the underlying lower-order physical properties should not be held accountable for 
an explanation of how this is possible. Thus, I agree with Strawson (2008) that strong 
emergentism of this kind seems to demand that we accept the ‘brute’, impossible 
occurrence of something spontaneously emerging from nothing, and in so doing, 
seems to rely upon a ‘magic passage across the experiential/non-experiential divide’ 
(Strawson 2008, p. 70). 																																																								
9 A ‘weak’ downward causation of this kind is the sort that weak emergentism employs, and is defined 
as: ‘a causal impact of the high-level phenomenon is deducible in principle, but is nevertheless 
unexpected’ (Chalmers 2008, p. 249). 	
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As a result, we are left incapable of reconciling the place of consciousness within a 
conceptual framework so entrenched in the physicalist metaphysic. As it seems, in 
order to account for experience, the physicalist must either warp the experiential 
identity of consciousness to meet a framework that can only account for structural, 
functional identity, or rely upon a miracle to explain how non-experiential properties 
spontaneously produce experiential properties capable of accounting for the 
phenomenal ‘what it is like’ to be a physical system.  Thus, the real problem is that 
experience represents something that we know exists, but cannot place within our 
current explanation of the world (Tartaglia 2015, p. 84), and so we are left either 
attempting to adapt our metaphysical framework to accommodate (see Chapter 6) for 
experiential properties, or relying upon the same ‘natural attitude’ that arguably could 
be blamed for the problem in the first place (see chapters 3, 4, 5). Although, as shall 
be exemplified in the subsequent section, in this latter case, the problem of attempting 
to employ observation to explain itself seems truly intractable.  
 
1.3.  New Mysterianism  
 
‘There is no guarantee that our cognitive powers permit the solution of every problem 
we can recognize.’ 
(McGinn 1989, p. 353) 
 
Throughout history this ‘hard’ problem has been iterated in a variety of formulations 
(for examples see Leibniz 1714, Locke 1690), but, simply, as articulated in the 
previous section, it is the problem of explaining how a distinct experiential identity 
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‘Q’, replete with the quality of phenomenal ‘feelings’, may arise as a result of a 
physical, non-experiential, ‘feelingless’ identity ‘P’.  Whilst this articulation certainly 
exemplifies the ‘hardness’ of the ‘hard’ problem, ‘New Mysterians’, such as McGinn 
(1989/95), attest that the intractability that lies at the heart of this problem derives 
from our inability to explain how  ‘something essentially non-spatial emerged from 
something purely spatial’ (McGinn 1995, p. 101). Arguably, explaining this divide is 
the fundamental difficulty faced by those confronting the hard problem, and has 
caused this sub-group of philosophers to deny the possibility of the human species 
ever having the cognitive capacity to explain experience (these are the contentions 
that underpin the ‘New Mysterian’ movement see McGinn 1989/1995, Fodor 2001, 
James 1896).  
 
The problem, according to these philosophers, is that our preoccupation with a science 
that only explains spatial phenomena leaves any notion of non-spatial phenomena 
looking ‘more like magic than a predictable unfolding of the natural law’ (McGinn 
1995, p. 101). Thus, McGinn (1995) argues for the need to formulate a ‘new 
conception of space that can overcome the impossibility of finding a place for 
consciousness in it’ (p. 107), but contends that a conception of this kind will forever 
elude us as it demands a ‘adequate articulation of consciousness’ (p. 160) that is 
beyond the scope of human knowledge. As such, McGinn (1995) contends that whilst 
space can accommodate for consciousness, the human mind is not capable of the 
same accommodation. Thus, the hard problem is not a problem that exists beyond the 
confines of human reasoning; it is, instead, a natural consequence of a species devoid 
of the ‘epistemic tools’ (Northoff 2014, p. 220) required to grasp the fundamental 
nature of reality. This, according to McGinn (1995), occurs because our 
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understanding of experiential phenomena is limited by our capacity for observation, 
meaning that any attempt to employ observation to explain itself will fail to confront 
the ‘inner constitution’ (p. 108) of consciousness. In this sentiment, I am in agreement 
with McGinn, as it seems clear that just as a measuring implement fails in effectively 
measuring itself, I will forever remain incapable of employing observation to explain 
the phenomenal, subjective ‘feel’ of ‘what it is like’, as ‘any observation that I might 
care to make is itself that which was supposed to be observed’ (Searle 1992, p. 99).  
 
Whilst such sentiments serve in typifying the difficulties faced by a physicalist 
solution to the ‘hard’ problem, as it seems clear that a metaphysical framework 
predicated on spatial observations shall forever remain incapable of advancing our 
understanding of the experiential, non-spatial property of consciousness.  My point of 
departure with McGinn (1989) rests in his jump from the intractability of observation 
employing observation to explain itself, to his formulation of our purported complete 
‘cognitive closure’ to this particular problem, which states:  
 
‘A type of mind M is cognitively closed with respect to a property P (or a theory T) if 
and only if the concept-forming procedures at M's disposal cannot extend to a grasp 
of P (or an understanding of T).’ (p. 350) 
 
Here, McGinn is not simply contending that a physicalist metaphysic reliant upon 
spatial, physical observations will never explain our capacity for experiential 
observation (as is my thesis), but instead that a complete understanding of the causal 
origins of consciousness is cognitively closed to us.  The core of this cognitive 
closure, according to McGinn (1995), rests upon the distinction between our 
	 32	
introspective, non-spatial concept-forming capacities, which reveal consciousness 
‘from the inside’ (p. 100), and our spatial, perceptual concept-forming qualities, 
which attempt to observe consciousness from the outside. Thus, McGinn does not 
uphold the dubious contention that introspective consciousness is unknowable to the 
mind, but instead is contending that an understanding of the causal origins underlying 
conscious property ‘P’ would require a reconciliation of these seemingly non-spatial 
introspective concept-forming capacities alongside our spatial, perceptual concept-
forming strategies, so as to unite introspective concepts, which internally capture 
consciousness, with perceptual concepts, which attempt to externally locate 
consciousness. The problem with this, according to McGinn, is that the understanding 
conferred by introspective concepts cannot be brought in line with the understanding 
conferred by perceptual concepts, as we are devoid of the cognitive tools required to 
simultaneously reconcile introspective consciousness ‘from the inside’ whilst 
employing perceptual concepts to capture consciousness ‘from the outside’. Indeed, 
whilst we can form introspective concepts about consciousness, we cannot employ 
spatial concepts to simultaneously ‘articulate the natural constitution of what we are 
thinking about’ (McGinn 1995, p. 107) and so, in this respect, perceptual and 
introspective concepts seem entirely cognitively isolated. As such, McGinn concludes 
that the mind is incapable of shedding light unto the causal origins of non-spatial 
property (P), because, in order to achieve this, we would need concept-forming 
capacities that are simultaneously introspective and perceptual, and as a matter of 
natural fact, we lack such capacities. Hence, McGinn (1989/1995) foregoes any 
notion that the problem is ‘hard’ but potentially solvable, and instead maintains that 
the problem cannot be solved due to our epistemic incapacity to even grasp non-
spatial concepts in a manner that connects them with spatial concepts. 
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The difficulty McGinn (1989/95) faces, however, is it seems clear that upon 
successfully forming the ‘hard’ problem, we employ an accurate conceptual 
formulation of this non-spatial property, which seems to necessarily simultaneously 
unite our understanding of spatial concepts with our understanding of introspective 
concepts; indeed, it is precisely this unified conceptual formation that underpins our 
understanding of the ‘hard’ problem, and, arguably, makes it so ‘hard’. Kriegel (2003) 
seems to acknowledge this upon asking: ‘How could we formulate the problem 
without employing the missing concept?’ (p. 186). So, as Kriegel typifies, in forming 
an understanding of the problems pertaining to the concept of property P (the non-
spatial property of experiential consciousness), McGinn (1989/95) seems to 
necessarily presuppose a connected, simultaneous understanding of introspective and 
perceptual concepts, and, as this conceptual unity seems to act as the prerequisite for 
both McGinn’s arguments and Chalmers’s (1996) formulation of the ‘hard’ problem, 
it seems McGinn must contend that just as a formulation of the problem of 
consciousness is not causally closed to us, nor is a potential solution10. 
 
Thus, whilst it seems clear that such a solution will not magically present itself by 
employing spatial observation, it is precisely our capacity to understand the special 
nature of the concept underpinning the problem that proves the efficacy of our 
‘epistemic tools’, and hints at our potential to produce solutions (see chapter 6). As 
such, far from resigning ourselves to the deficiencies of our epistemic equipment, we 
must find a way to accommodate such non-spatial equipment into our metaphysical 																																																								
10 I note here that McGinn (1989) does consider this objection amidst his formulation of ‘Humean 
minds’ (p. 365). However, for my purposes in this paper, I do not deem it necessary to devote any more 
time to McGinn. Instead, I maintain that the formulation of the ‘hard’ problem and its potential 
solutions explicated herein are themselves evidence for the contention that we do hold the concept-
forming capacities required to understand the non-spatial property ‘P’.  
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framework. As, without this accommodation, we bring the entirety of both our 
metaphysical, and, as shall be explored in chapter 2, epistemic presuppositions into 
question.   
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Chapter 2 
A further problem: epistemic justification without phenomenal 
experience 
 
That all our knowledge begins with experience there can be no doubt. For how is it 
possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than 
by means of objects which affect our senses, and partly of themselves produce 
representation … to compare, to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the 
raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called 
experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to 
experience, but begins with it.  
(Kant 1781, p. 37) 
 
Picture the scenario outlined within the introductory paragraph of this thesis: I, this 
subject of experience, softly indent the keyboard and play witness to the letters 
formed upon the screen. Subsequently, and by virtue of repeated phenomenal 
experiences of this kind, I gain the knowledge (defined as justified belief11) over the 
causal interaction between the screen, the keyboard and myself that allows me to 
efficaciously interact with my surroundings so as to produce this thesis. This scenario 
typifies the causal relationship between experience and knowledge that is widely held 
by non-philosophical communities. Firstly, light refracts off the screen and keyboard, 
before entering my cornea to produce a phenomenal, visual experience. From here, I 
place my hand upon that which I see, and my somatosensory neurons respond to the 
external keyboard, creating the phenomenal sensation of ‘touch’ that causally links 																																																								
11 This depiction is in line Plato’s (380BC) definition, and typifies the widely held interpretation of 
knowledge as justified true belief.	 
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me to my surroundings. Finally, my visual experience of the letters upon the screen 
changes upon my having this sensation of touch, and, as a result, I form a belief 
pertaining to the causal relationship between the screen and my sensory, phenomenal 
experience of touching the keyboard. Thus, we present a formation that seems highly 
intuitive: we hold phenomenal, ‘what it is like’ experiences that, over time, provide 
justification for our beliefs and, eventually, confer knowledge.  
The issue, however, is that if the contentions within chapter 1 are upheld, this intuitive 
relationship between experience and knowledge acquisition presents a damning 
problem for physicalism, as the phenomenal experience that acts as our most 
fundamental epistemic tool (what Sellars 1956 terms the ’given’, p. 128) and forms 
the foundation for all our epistemic justifications, is not explained by the spatial 
observations employed by physicalist metaphysics. Thus, if this problem holds, the 
entirety of the physicalist epistemic framework collapses, by virtue of failing to 
explain the non-spatial, phenomenally experiential property that predicates and 
justifies all physical knowledge.  
 
Historically, philosophers have attempted to save physicalism from this charge of 
epistemic vacuity (see Ryle 1949, Rorty 1979, Sellars 1963 and Davidson 1986) by 
denying the relevance of this purported ‘problem’ altogether; instead upholding the 
contention that phenomenal experience is distinct from the concepts and beliefs that 
inform our understanding of the world, and, as such, holds no relevance to 
epistemology. As a result, Chalmers (1995) attempted to distinguish the ‘easy’ 
problems of explaining ‘the integration of information by a cognitive system’ and our 
‘ability to discriminate, categorise, and react to environment stimuli’ (p. 201) (or the 
problems of how we come to know the world, henceforth referenced as the problem 
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of epistemic justification), from the ‘hard’ problem of explaining our ‘what it is like’ 
experience. Thus, philosophers commonly maintain that the problem of epistemic 
justification is potentially explainable using physicalist metaphysics, and, in line with 
Chalmers (1995), tend to uphold the divorce of this ‘easy’ problem from the ‘hard’ 
problem of experience.   
 
In this chapter, I attempt to explicate the underlying contentions implicit to 
philosophers of this kind, before arguing in favour of the contemporary movement 
(see Brewer 1999, McDowell 1996 and Pryor 2000, Smithies 2014), which has arisen 
as an attempt to highlight the relationship between epistemic justification and 
phenomenal consciousness, and close the divide between this purportedly ‘easy’ 
problem and our ‘hard’ problem of experience. From here, I highlight that, if this 
contemporary movement is correct, physicalist metaphysics must concede that 
phenomenal experience plays an implicit role within our epistemic justifications, and, 
as such, physicalism must face a further epistemic issue that any purported ‘solution’ 
to the hard problem must address.  
 
By means of explication for the thesis that denies the link between experience and 
epistemic justification, let us return to the depiction of knowledge acquisition outlined 
at the beginning of this section, in which my phenomenal experience of the causal 
interaction between myself, the keyboard and the screen acts as justification for all 
further beliefs related to my interactions with these environmental stimuli. The 
problem with this, as Davidson (1986) highlights, is: 
‘The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations are 
not beliefs or other propositional attitudes. What then is the relation? The answer is, I 
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think, obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs and in this sense 
are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation of a belief does not 
show how or why the belief is justified.’ (p. 229) 
 
Thus, whilst it seems judicious to argue that my belief in the existence of this 
keyboard is justified by the experience inherent within my subjective ‘what it is like’ 
visual sensation that occurs upon light refracting from this object, Davidson (1986) 
highlights that whilst my phenomenal experiences may indeed prove to be the causal 
grounding for my beliefs about keyboards, we face a difficulty upon attempting to 
glean objective justification for such beliefs whilst employing experience alone.  This 
line of argument seems to typify the philosophical contentions underpinning all those 
who appeal to the divide between the phenomenal experiences ‘which are presented 
or given to the mind’, and the epistemic ‘constructions or justifications’ which occur 
as a consequence (Lewis 1929, p. 52), and it is this divide that acts as a grounding for 
what Sellars (1963) terms the ‘myth of the given’.  
 
Thus, Sellars upholds Lewis’s (1929) appeal to divorce experiential sense data from 
the justifications I bring to this data, contending that ‘all awareness of sorts, 
resemblances, facts…all awareness of abstract entities – indeed, all awareness even of 
particulars – is a linguistic affair’ (Sellars 1963, p. 29). Meaning, one can only be 
justified in a belief about ‘greenness’, for example, if one already holds the 
conceptual and linguistic knowledge pertaining to ‘greenness’, as ‘the concept 
of looking green, the ability to recognize that something looks green, presupposes the 
concept of being green’ (Sellars 1963, p. 146). Hence, the purported ‘givenness’ of 
our sense data is indeed a myth, according to Sellars, as any knowledge inferred by 
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experience is not justified, or ‘given’, by virtue purely of itself, but instead occurs 
only as a result of the conceptual justifications that reasoning instils upon this 
underlying data. Thus, for Sellars, my experience of this keyboard is not evidence of 
the keyboard in and of itself; instead, I must first have learnt the concepts underlying 
the object in order to notice that the object in front of me is indeed a keyboard. As 
such, sense data is an insufficient means to glean knowledge, as ‘instead of coming to 
have a concept of something because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have the 
ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing and 
cannot account for it’ (Sellars 1963, p. 176). Simply, then, Sellars’ argument presents 
a polemic against the mental realists and empiricists, who had attempted to posit 
experience as the ‘given’ that acts as our ‘epistemic bedrock’ (McGrew 2007, p. 57), 
and is predicated upon an attempt to deny the notion that knowledge is rooted within 
experience, via upholding the central claim that we must divorce the sense data 
inherent within experiential states, from the state of justified ‘knowledge’ that occurs 
upon performing the conceptualisations that place this sense data into the ‘logical 
space of reasons’ (Sellars 1963, p. 36).  
 
The foundation of Sellars’ (1963) contentions can be deconstructed into two opposing 
arguments of varying intensity: the former is a weaker attack on empiricism, which is 
predicated upon the notion that experience is entirely superfluous to the process of 
epistemologically justifying inferences to the external world, whilst the latter 
maintains that, even if experience is in some way implicit to the process of epistemic 
justification, it can not be justified without appeal to concepts and, therefore, cannot 
act as the ‘given’. In what follows, I present attacks on both arguments, before 
concluding that, ultimately, even Sellars’ (1963) stronger argument must, at present, 
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rely upon phenomenal experience to explain our capacity for concept formation, and, 
as such, I maintain that Sellars cannot easily substantiate his claim that phenomenal 
experience is not, in some sense, the ‘given’. I begin with an elucidation of the 
problem associated with Sellars’ ‘weaker’ attack on empiricism.  
 
The most immediate problem with this weaker argument, which attempts to entirely 
disentwine experience from the process of epistemic justification, is that, in any 
conceivable account of knowledge acquisition, the perceptual experience associated 
with sense data remains inherent to the process of achieving justification for our 
inferences to an external world. This sentiment seems to be shared by McDowell 
(1996), who argues that if we did entirely renounce empiricism as Sellars (1963) and 
Davidson (1986) suggest we must, our justification for beliefs or inferences to the 
objective world become epistemologically ‘blind’ (p. 66), by virtue of removing the 
empiricism which accounts for our relationship to the world as an existent ‘actuality’ 
independent of thought, and resigning ourselves to, what McDowell (1996) terms, a 
‘frictionless’ (p. 66) stream of unjustified thought that foregoes the distinction 
between thought and world. Thus rendering redundant both any attempt to justify 
thoughts pertaining to the external world, and any attempt to justify a belief in the 
content of thought A over the content of thought B. Here, McDowell (1996) is 
employing the Kantian (1781/87) sentiment that ‘thoughts without intuitions are 
empty; intuitions without thoughts are blind’ (A51/B75), and highlights that, if the 
prima facie, non-conceptual, intuitive content derived from the perceptual experiences 
that account for our ‘immediate relation…to objects’ (Kant 1781/87, A19/B34) is 
removed, our thoughts are stripped not just of the content required to justify 
inferences to an external world, but are stripped of all content, so as to become a 
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stream of ‘empty thoughts’ that exist as nothing beyond ‘frictionless spinning in a 
void’ (McDowell 1996, p. 11).  
 
Thus, McDowell (1996) highlights that if experience is entirely removed from the 
process of epistemic justification, we lose the content that acts as the epistemic 
‘friction’ required to transition our inferences from a potential perpetual stream of 
unjustified, contentless beliefs about how the world may be, to justified, content-rich, 
beliefs about how the world is in actuality.  As such, McDowell (1996) convincingly 
argues that experience must be, at least partially, implicit to the process of epistemic 
justification, and, in line with Crane (2013), maintains that ‘it is not clear what 
remains of the Sellarsian attack on the given’ (Crane 2013, p. 232), as justification is 
only gleaned upon employing our capacity for perceptual experience so as to bring 
‘concepts to bear on what you see’ (Crane 2013, p. 232). 
 
Whilst McDowell’s (1996) and Crane’s (2013) arguments are simply employed to 
highlight that the epistemic justification for beliefs, or inferences, pertaining to the 
external world is not found within a contentless, frictionless relation between various 
concepts or beliefs, but is instead found within the relation of these concepts to the 
epistemic friction that arises from content-rich perceptual experiences. My proposal, 
in line with Smithies (2014) and Pryor (2000), is that if concepts cannot be justified 
without plotting said concepts alongside that which one sees in a perceptual 
experience, and one cannot gain knowledge over what one sees without first having 
the phenomenal experience (See Jackson 2003), then we may infer that the 
phenomenal properties that constitute this experience are themselves, at least partially, 
responsible for the process of forming justified beliefs about the external world. As 
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such, I argue that regardless of whether one agrees with McDowell (2008) & Pryor 
(2000), who argue that unified, experiential sense data provides immediate 
justification for beliefs, or Sellars (1963) & Davidson (1987) who argue that sense 
data only provides justification upon being brought into the realms of reason, one 
must either address the issue of epistemic ‘blankness’ that arises from attempting to 
establish justification without employing any experiential content (as highlighted by 
McDowell 1996 and Kant 1781/87), or accept that phenomenal experience is, at least 
partially, implicit to the process of epistemic justification.  
 
Whilst this line of argument seems difficult to refute, and is arguably successful in 
showing that the experience implicit to our having sense data is in some way equally 
implicit to epistemic justification (and for the purposes of this thesis this claim is 
arguably enough, as this alone seems to bind the easy problem of epistemic 
justification to the hard problem of experience), it does not, however, refute Sellars’ 
(1963) stronger claim pertaining to the non-inferential nature of experience. This 
stronger argument does not fall foul to the problems of the weaker argument, and 
instead maintains that whilst experience may play a role in epistemic justification, it is 
not immediately justified, or a ‘given’, as, ultimately, it is still nothing beyond sense 
data that must be moulded and brought in line with reason in order to be justified. 
This line of argument proves beneficial to anti-realists about the mental, as it 
maintains that an explanation of the ‘given’ involves the easy problem of explaining 
our capacity for conceptualisation and reason, and thus distances our ‘epistemic 
bedrock’, or Sellarsian ‘given’, from the hard problem of explaining phenomenal 
experience.  
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This, however, fails to convincingly avoid similar issues to those erected against 
Sellars’ weaker claim that experience plays no role whatsoever in justifying beliefs. 
As, if we uphold the intuitive, and widely endorsed, notion that concept formation 
consists in the ‘ability to compare what is represented in one experience with what is 
represented in others’ (Smith 2016, p. 88), then, as I shall endeavour to argue, the 
currently championed theories of physically constituted concept acquisition must 
inevitably confront the problem of accounting for how concepts are initially formed 
without relying upon forms of innatism or externalism, and, in so doing, must either 
(potentially) erroneously place absolute faith in the some future scientific 
breakthrough to explain how concepts are initially formed non-experientially, or rely 
upon phenomenal experience to solve this ‘concept grounding problem’ (Dorrfner and 
Prem 1993). If this can be shown, I argue that as, at present, our best solution to this 
grounding problem is found upon positing phenomenal properties, we cannot easily 
divorce the ‘hard’ problem from the ‘easy’ problems of ‘the integration of information 
by a cognitive system’, or our ‘ability to discriminate, categorise, and react to 
environment stimuli’ (Chalmers 1995, p. 201), and maintain that, without an 
adequately unified physical solution to these problems, Sellars potentially remains 
reliant upon phenomenal properties to ground the concepts employed within his 
process of epistemic justification, and therefore cannot easily substantiate the claim 
that phenomenal experience is not, in some sense, the ‘given’. In order to establish 
this, I begin with an outline of Papineau’s (1993/2002) theory of concept acquisition, 
before using this as a platform from which to ground a phenomenally constituted 
theory of concept acquisition that advances an alternative model with the potential to 
reveal the weaknesses in Papineau’s theory, Sellars’s stronger argument, and broader 
theories of physically constituted concept acquisition.  
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In order to elucidate the deficiencies of Papineau’s theory of concept acquisition, it is 
prudent to first delineate the conditions a successful theory of concept acquisition 
must avoid in order to not ‘beg the question’ by presupposing the existence of the 
very thing it is attempting to explain. Floridi (2012) demarcates these two conditions 
as follows: 
  
a. ‘No form of innatism is allowed; no semantic [or conceptual] resources (some 
virtus semantica) should be magically presupposed as already pre-installed; 
and 
b. No form of externalism is allowed; no semantic [or conceptual] resources 
should be uploaded form the ‘outside’ by some deus ex machine already 
semantically proficient.’ (Floridi 2012, p. 137)  
 
With these conditions in mind, we are in a position to elucidate Papineau’s (1993) 
theory of concept acquisition. This theory maintains that, during the act of forming 
concepts, we are attentive to a given stimuli, and a purely physical mechanism in our 
brain occupies a relation to both present and past iterations of this particular stimuli 
‘wherein incoming stimuli are compared with some stored pattern, and a match 
between them is registered’ (Papineau 1993, p. 120). In this model, our capacity to 
form concepts is constituted upon a disposition to form and recognise relations 
between disparate experiential, neural, or perceptual states.  Papineau (1993) argues 
that this relational power is entirely reducible to our physical brain’s capacity to 
recognise distinct, or similar, neural configurations, and maintains that, in the case of 
Jackson’s (2003) Mary argument (see section 1.2 of this thesis), in which the subject, 
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Mary, experiences ‘redness’ for the first time, ‘Mary simply acquires a 
[neurologically constituted] “non-conceptual template” which can be compared 
directly to further experiences so as to cause Mary to believe that she is experiencing 
red again’ (Papineau 1993, p. 110). Papineau (1993) is careful to note here that ‘she 
(Mary) doesn’t arrive at this belief by noting that the experience has property P, and 
concluding that is an experience of seeing red.  [Instead] there is simply a [purely 
physical] mechanism in her brain which compares the experience with the template 
which yields this belief directly’ (p. 110). So, we have a model of concept formation 
that rests upon, what Papineau (2002) terms, the ‘underlying power of perceiving as’ 
(p. 108), which can be exercised so as to ‘form concepts which enter into fully 
fledged judgments’ (p. 108), but remains, in itself ‘perceptual rather than judgmental’ 
(p. 108), and wholly reliant upon the brain’s capacity to store templates of a 
perceptual experience so that our neural patterns ‘resonate with incoming signals’ 
(Papineau 2002, p. 120).  
 
With this framework articulated, we witness that the immediate problem with this 
particular theory of concept acquisition is that, as Floridi (2012) articulates, it seems 
to face the hurdle of establishing precisely how a neurological mechanism may pick 
out a neurological pattern, so as to form a concept, without first relying upon a form 
of innatism to gift the brain with a pre-installed conceptual resource. As, if Papineau’s 
brain mechanism is capable of producing concepts by matching, or interpreting, a 
neurological pattern ‘red’ to be one and the same as a previous neurological pattern, 
we are left asking precisely how this initial capacity to match neurological pattern red 
1 (NPR1) to neurological pattern red 2 (NPR2) occurred without the brain already 
holding the concept of red? Indeed, if, as Papineau’s formation demands, the 
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neurological pattern for red is non-conceptual initially, and the brain notices a 
repeated pattern so as to pick this referent out as ‘red’, then, in this process of 
noticing, matching, or interpreting, Papineau seems to grant the brain a pre-encoded 
concept of redness that is employed within this process of matching, or interpreting12. 
Simply, in Papineau’s account of concept formation, we are left with no adequate 
explanation for how concepts are initially formed, and worse, the explanatory success 
of his framework seems reliant upon the presupposition of the very thing he is 
attempting to explain.  
 
This reliance upon an innate, pre-installed conceptual resource to account for the 
brain’s capacity to conceptualise is not unique to Papineau’s theory, and arguably 
afflicts all theories of purely physically constituted concept acquisition, in which the 
purely physical-functional properties of a neural mechanism are said to account, in 
entirety, for our capacity to compare our initial neural configuration for red alongside 
subsequent red neural configurations, in a manner that produces concepts by ‘picking 
out’, or ‘matching/identifying two or more subsequent patterns with the original one’ 
(Smith 2016, p. 86). This is a problem, because in order to establish how such 
physical properties achieved this disposition to ‘pick out’ distinct referential types, it 
seems that the neural mechanism must either be pre-installed with a conceptual 
resource (and thus face Papineau’s issue of violating one of Floridi’s conditions), or 
be equipped with the disposition to initially form concepts by non-conceptually, and 
non-experientially, ‘picking out’ the informational differences between, for example, 
the content of referent ‘red’ (R), and the content of referents ~ R in a manner that 
produces new conceptual information about the nature of these referents. Yet, in this 
																																																								
12	Smith (2016) employs a similar objection against Papineau (1993). 
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latter case, the physicalist is left with no adequate explanation for what this neural 
mechanism might look like, and, as such, remains reliant upon some future scientific 
breakthrough to account for both precisely where in the brain the neural mechanism 
that is capable of unifying the informational content of R and ~ R is located, and, 
further, precisely how this unifying neural mechanism is capable of non-experientially 
achieving the disposition to ‘pick out’ the informational disparities between 
competing referents so as to produce concepts (this particular problem is referred to 
by Floridi (2012) as the ‘symbol grounding problem’)13. 
 
Indeed, whilst various physicalist theories of concept acquisition have attempted to 
delineate the nature of this unifying neural mechanism (see Schnur et al 2009, 
Garagnani et al 2008, Freedman et al 2001), no theory has been able to advance a 
convincing solution to the problems of how this neural mechanism unifies the 
informational content of disparate referents, and how this neural mechanism achieves 
the disposition to pick out, or ‘ground’, competing, or similar, informational content14. 
As such, even if we were to accept that perhaps one of the physicalist theories of 
concept formation has articulated the physical locus in which distinct neural patterns, 
and in turn informational content, are unified, we would still be left in search of an 
																																																								
13	Floridi (2012) demarcates this as the problem of accounting for ‘precisely how a system can 
autonomously elaborate its own semantics for the symbols (data) it manipulates and do so from 
scratch, by interacting with its environment and other formal symbol systems’ (p. 136). 
14 The most promising areas of research in this area maintain that the unifying neural pattern may be 
found in the anterior temporal lobe (Garagnani et al 2008), or the prefrontal cortex (Schnur et al 2009), 
or, more broadly, temporal lobe structures with highly selective responses to objects (Freedman et al 
2001). However, all such areas offer competing, but equally vague, solutions to a problem that, at 
present, seems to over-exert the explanatory power of physicalism. Indeed, whilst these physicalist 
solutions rest upon the assertion that perhaps we may, at some point, infer that these brain regions are, 
in some way, implicit to concept formation, we are, at present, still left in search of an explanation for 
precisely how these neural patterns acquire the disposition to distinguish between two or more 
referential types, and remain in need of an explanation for why, as Kiefer & Pulvermuller (2012) attest, 
‘several lines of evidence clearly indicate experience-dependent formation of cell assemblies in sensory 
and motor areas, which code conceptual features in a modality-specific fashion’ (p. 816).  		
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explanation for how the purely physical properties of this neural mechanism achieved 
the disposition to non-experientially ‘pick out’ the differences, or similarities, 
between this informational content, in a manner that produces new, conceptual 
information.  
 
Many philosophers maintain that this particular problem shall be short-lived, as a 
‘computational’, or purely physical-functional explanation will eventually be 
produced. However, as Searle’s (1980) Chinese room argument articulates, both a 
functional computer and a human subject may theoretically employ a computational 
programme to ‘pick out’ symbols in a manner that passes a Turing test being held in 
the Chinese language, without the human subject holding any conceptual 
understanding, or semantic information, over the symbols being picked out.  Thus, as 
the human subject is not knowingly ‘picking out’ the disparities between these 
symbols in a manner that may lead to, or infer, a conceptual understanding, we may 
surmise that the physical-functional computer is itself not knowingly ‘picking out’ 
such disparities in a manner that may lead to, or infer, a conceptual understanding. As, 
if it were, then this conceptual understanding would be contained explicitly within the 
same computational programme employed by the human subject, and, the human 
subject would hold an understanding of such concepts that would allow them to 
knowingly ‘pick out’ the differences and/or similarities between the symbols. As a 
result, Searle (1980 maintains that (1) concepts are not grounded externally, and (2) 
the purely physical-functional computations of the brain are not enough to 
meaningfully ground concepts, and, as such, there must be some additional property, 
or mechanism, in the brain that allows us to initially acquire, or form, concepts 
(Harnad 2001). Indeed, as Harnaad (1990) articulates, the fundamental problem is one 
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of accounting for how the semantic, or conceptual, content of a formal symbol system 
be made intrinsic to the system, ‘rather than just parasitic on the meanings in our 
heads’ (p. 336), or, more explicitly, how are concepts initially be formed by a brain 
that, if Searle’s thought experiment is correct, cannot necessarily rely upon purely 
physical-functional computations to ‘pick out’ the informational differences that 
initially lead to the formation of meaningful, conceptual information15.  
 
The best current theory of how this new, conceptual information may be produced, or 
‘grounded’, non-experientially, is found within Floridi (2012), and asserts that the 
informational content inherent within machines 1 & 2 potentially becomes new, 
semantic information when integrated within an additional functional machine (see 
Floridi 2012, p. 169-172). However, this is not a convincing solution to the ‘concept 
grounding problem’ for physicalism, as if we take the information contained within 
the neural patterns 1 & 2, and then add further information contained within an 
additional neural mechanism, it seems we have acquired no new conceptual 
information, and instead have simply achieved a conglomeration of the pre-existing 
informational content contained within the initial neural patterns ‘1’, ‘2’, and the 
neural mechanism ‘3’. Yet, as established, this is not enough for concept acquisition, 
as the neural mechanism must not simply add to the total informational content by 
acting as a locus for information, but instead must be able to reduce the potential 
entropy of this information by unifying it in such a manner that new information is 
produced by virtue of delineating the differences, or similarities, between the 
informational content of ‘1’ and ‘2’. In this regard, it is not enough to simply add an 																																																								
15	Horgan (2013) furthers this notion by highlighting that ‘the real moral of Searle's Chinese room 
thought experiment is that genuine original intentionality requires the presence of internal states with 
intrinsic phenomenal character that is inherently intentional’ (p. 233). 	
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extra neural pattern, or an ‘Artificial Agent’ (AA) of the type employed by Floridi 
(2012, p. 170), so as to simply amalgamate the informational content of neural 
patterns ‘1’, ‘2’ within neural mechanism ‘3’, but instead we must imbue the neural 
mechanism, or AA, with a further disposition that allows it to act as a unifying locus 
‘X’, which is capable of both binding the potentially disparate informational content 
1, 2 in such a way that the content is unified so as to become 1X, 2X, and then non-
computationally ‘picking out’ the differences, or similarities, between the 
informational content of 1X and 2X when unified in this manner. However, as 
Searle’s (1980) argument highlights, and Floridi (2012) himself notes, this disposition 
to ‘learn how to use associated symbols [informational data] or internal states’ (p. 
173) so as to ‘pick out’ the differences to produce concepts is difficult to account for 
physically, and, as such, we witness frameworks, such as Papineau’s (1993-2002), 
which seem to presuppose a capacity for concept formation, and, in so doing, 
invariably ‘beg the question’ (Floridi 2012, p. 173). Indeed, as articulated, there is 
currently no convincing articulation for how this neural mechanism might achieve the 
disposition necessary to unify the informational content in this way, and, as such, we 
are left turning to a phenomenally constituted notion of concept acquisition to explain 
how we initially produced the information necessary to form the concepts employed 
by physicalist metaphysicians.  
 
This phenomenal, or experience-dependent (see Kiefer & Pulvermuller 2012), model 
of concept acquisition may best be articulated in terms of an experientially constituted 
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‘Maxwell’s Demon’16, which may be most eloquently articulated by the use of the 
following diagram:  
 
 
 
As can be inferred, in the initial diagram (top left), the demon has an experience of the 
informational content inherent within blue particles, and stores the experience of this 
informational content within memory, or, what Papineau (1993) terms, a neural 
pattern. From here (top right), the demon experiences the informational content 
inherent within red particles, and the same process of neural storage occurs. At this 
stage, the demon is able to employ his experiential token, or ‘stored pattern’ 
(Papineau 1993) for red and blue experiences, and ‘pick out’ the experiential 
differences between them. Thus, in the middle two diagrams, we witness the demon 
having perceptual experiences, instantly demarcating these experiences as either an 
experience of ‘red’ or ‘blue’, and, finally, in the bottom diagram, we witness the 
demon reducing the informational entropy of the red and blue particles by segregating 
them into two distinct experiential types. All of this occurs by virtue of the demon’s 
capacity to extract the information that occurs between ‘the gaps’, or differences, in 
red and blue experiential types. Meaning that, at foundation, the demon works by 																																																								
16 Maxwell’s demon was initially constructed by Maxwell (1871) as a thought experiment in the 
philosophy of physics, and was designed to reveal how the second law of thermodynamics may 
potentially be violated by the integration of an intelligent agent.  
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virtue of understanding what it means to experience red as distinct from what it means 
to experience blue, and so, at this stage, we may infer that the demon has a perceptual 
understanding of what red and blue are, which, under Papineau’s model of concept 
acquisition, could be ‘exercised… to form concepts which enter into fully fledged 
judgments’ (Papineau 1993, p. 108).  
 
Thus, using this model, we highlight that the only implicit difference between a 
phenomenal, or experiential, model of concept formation, and a physicalist theory of 
the type articulated in Papineau’s model, is that Papineau places absolute impetus 
upon the purely physical, functional properties of the demon’s brain to accommodate 
for the power to delineate, or pick out, distinct neural, or perceptual types, and, in 
turn, produce concepts (and faces the inevitable difficulty of accounting for this 
power without presupposing concepts). Where as the phenomenal, or ‘experience-
dependent’ (Kiefer & Pulvermuller 2012), model asserts that the demon’s brain holds 
phenomenal, experiential properties, which subsume into a conjoint phenomenology 
for a singular experiential subject, so as to imbue the demon with the disposition to 
delineate between experiential types, and, in turn, the disposition to encode new 
neural patterns that may represent the information necessary for concepts.  In this 
latter model, upon experiencing the red particles, the experiential type is mapped to 
the demon’s memory as a neurologically constituted pattern that denotes a token 
experience of the red experiential type, and the demon experientially demarcates 
incoming particles as holding an experiential type that matches, or does not match, his 
memory of the experiential type of red particles. Enabling the demon to contrast the 
differences in his experiences of red and blue, and extract this information so as to 
form a new neurological pattern, which contains some semantic, conceptual 
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information about the properties of red/blue particles, and facilitates the process of 
experiential segregation. Conversely, in physicalist models such as Papineau’s, upon 
interacting with the particles, the brain encodes a neural pattern that denotes the 
distinct informational content of red or blue particle, and is subsequently (somehow) 
able to match incoming stimuli to a particular pattern so as to segregate the particles. 
 
As a result of the implicit difficulties involved in explaining precisely how the purely 
physical-functional brain achieves this capacity to match, or ‘pick out’ similarities 
between neural patterns and incoming stimuli, it should come as no surprise that 
Papineau presupposes concepts in order to avoid the inevitable difficulty of 
accounting for how the informational disparities that give rise to concepts may be 
recognised by the non-experiential brain. Indeed, it seems that the central problem 
with all physicalist accounts of concept formation, as Papineau’s framework 
exemplifies, is that they leave little room for delineating a dispositional locus from 
which differences between referents may be realised, and so face the inevitable issue 
of accounting for how the easy problems of ‘the integration of information by a 
cognitive system’ (Chalmers 1995, p. 201), or our ability to discriminate between the 
informational differences necessary to form concepts, may be solved within a model 
of a purely physical, functional brain that cannot, at present, account for the 
neurologically unified mechanism that initially picks out, or produces, the information 
necessary for concepts. In order to achieve this solution, it seems we remain reliant 
upon positing phenomenal properties as implicit experiential qualities of the brain’s 
neurological patterns, and, from here, establishing that such ‘experiential parts’ 
subsume so as to constitute our experientially unified phenomenal states, in which the 
token, or type, experience of red is experientially evident to the same phenomenally 
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experiential subject as the type, or token, experience of blue, and the concept of red 
arises as a natural corollary of the informational content inherent within the 
differences between these distinct experiential types when presented to one 
phenomenally experiential subject.  
 
At this stage, the physicalist may suggest that this phenomenal mode of concept 
formation is itself reliant upon an explanation for how phenomenal properties may 
produce experiential unity. To this, in line with Chalmers & Bayne (2003), I would 
argue that if phenomenal properties inhere within the physical brain in such a way that 
each neural pattern is an experiential part of a wider whole, then, upon these 
experiences occurring simultaneously within one consciousness, they become 
subsumed into a wider experiential whole that exemplifies ‘a conjoint phenomenology 
for both states’ (Chalmers & Bayne 2003, p. 37). Such that, for example, upon the 
neurological pattern for ‘blueness’ occurring simultaneously with the neurological 
pattern for ‘redness’, these experiential parts will be unified and subsumed into one 
experiential subject, for whom “there is something it is like to be in two states 
simultaneously” (Chalmers & Bayne 2003, p 32). Whilst this in itself is not a wholly 
convincing articulation of how the unified subject of experience arises initially, I 
argue that this particular explanatory gap (what James 1896 terms the culmination 
problem) is not enough to save the physicalist from the difficulties faced by a purely 
physical explanation for concept formation. As a result, I maintain that the physicalist 
must cease to assume that the ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ problems are wholly distinct, and 
instead must conclude that because our best current explanations for how conceptual 
frameworks are formed are experience-dependent, a physical explanation for the 
‘easy’ problems must simultaneously address the ‘hard’ problem by explaining away 
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our seeming reliance upon phenomenal experience to ground (and justify) concepts, 
whilst non-computationally and non-experientially accounting for the disposition to 
‘pick out’ the informational differences that are necessary to form the 
conceptualisations that hold our epistemic framework together.  Without this 
explanation, the physicalist strategies that attempt to entirely disentwine phenomenal 
experience from our epistemic bedrock must accommodate for the possibility that a 
purely physical solution to the symbol grounding problem will not be articulated, and, 
in so doing, must address the fact that a solution predicated upon the existence of 
phenomenal properties is simply far more parsimonious than a solution predicated 
upon the non-existence of such properties.   
 
As such, I have highlighted that Sellars’ weaker argument must address the issue of 
accounting for the epistemic ‘blankness’ that arises upon denouncing empiricism 
entirely, and, from here, have maintained that those who endorse Sellars’ stronger 
argument, which attempts to entirely disentwine the ‘hard’ problem of explaining 
experience from the ‘easy’ problems (Chalmers 1995, p. 201), must first provide a 
fitting non-experiential solution for these easy problems, which is capable of 
explaining away our seeming reliance upon phenomenally constituted experiential 
unity to ground the concepts employed within epistemic justifications.  
 
2.1 The fundamental problem and three potential physicalist solutions 
 
 
In sum, even if the ‘symbol grounding problem’ is one day convincingly physically 
solved, it remains difficult to refute that experiential sense data is, even if only 
partially, implicit to the process of epistemic justification, as the accuracy of a 
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concept is only known by virtue of its relationship with sense data.  Thus, the 
physicalist cannot avoid the problem posed at the beginning of this chapter, as a 
failure to physically solve the ‘hard’ problem would result in epistemic justification 
being gleaned from a non-physical experiential property that is both inexplicable, and 
entirely inconsistent with, the monism of physicalist metaphysics. The fundamentals 
of this issue can be exemplified as follows: If we cannot account for sense data 
without appealing to phenomenal experience (Q), and sense data is implicit to the 
epistemic justifications that act as the foundation for our understanding of physicalism 
(P), then physicalism must be either A) self-refuting by virtue of allowing for this 
non-physical experiential property, or B) epistemologically vacuous by virtue of 
gleaning justification from a non-physical property (Q) that is incommensurable to the 
physical quantifications underpinning the physicalist epistemic framework.   
 
So, if physicalism denies the unified, experiential identity ‘Q’, it loses the property 
from which it gleans epistemic justification, yet if it accepts that Q exists as an 
experiential identity, it becomes self-refuting by virtue of allowing for a non-physical 
property - unless, of course, it can explain that experiential properties are physical. 
The issue becomes that: as it can be shown that the experiential identity Q is required 
in order to justify knowledge, and, therefore, that Q acts as justification for the 
observations and quantifications that underpin physicalism (P), then physicalism risks 
being shown to be epistemologically bankrupt by virtue of gleaning epistemic 
justification from an experiential property that acts as the physically incommensurable 
antithesis to a monistic physicalist metaphysic that can only affirm the existence of 
quantifiable, spatial structures or functions. As a result, it seems, the physicalist is left 
with little choice but to accept that Q is, in some way, implicit to the epistemic 
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justifications that underpin physicalism (P), and, further, as Q seems to present an 
experiential identity that is beyond reconciliation with P, it seems the physicalist must 
also accept that the implicit link between epistemic justification and the experiential 
identity of Q risks collapsing the entirety of the physicalist epistemic framework into 
the realms of epistemic vacuity, due to P gleaning epistemic justification only by 
virtue of the non-physical, experiential identity, which, according to physicalism, does 
not exist. Meaning that the hard problem cannot be divorced from the purportedly 
‘easy’ problem of epistemic justification, if, as I have attempted to argue, the 
seemingly physically unquantifiable phenomenal identity of Q is, even if only 
partially, implicit to epistemic justification.  
The ontological gap that underpins this argument seems truly damning to physicalism, 
and, as a result, the most efficacious physicalist solutions attempt to rectify the 
property that lies at the heart of the hard problem via denying the existence of Q as an 
experiential, non-physical identity, whilst simultaneously providing a physical 
framework capable of explaining our capacity for knowledge. The physicalist 
‘solutions’ that purportedly provide an account of this kind begin by either denying 
the experiential identity of Q entirely (Dennett 1991), positing a means from which to 
massage the identity of Q so as to reduce our phenomenal experiences to the brains 
veridical representation of external content (Tye 2000, Dretske 1996), or contending 
that the experiential identity of Q is, at foundation, reducible to a conceptual 
misunderstanding that occurs upon the brain trying to reference itself (Loar 1990/9, 
Balog 2009/12). It is these attempts to massage or deny the troublesome identity of Q 
that exemplify physicalism’s best means of maintaining its metaphysical and 
epistemic frameworks, and, as such, the following three chapters shall be devoted to 
an examination of these physicalist solutions. 
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Thus, within chapters 1 and 2, I have highlighted that the epistemic gap presented by 
the hard problem is predicated upon a deeper ontological gap, between the identities 
of consciousness and physical substances, which presents a deep issue for a 
physicalist metaphysic predicated upon spatial observations. From here, I have 
explicated how this ontological gap leads to an epistemic gap that, if not 
accommodated for, produces a vacuity that is not applicable solely to consciousness, 
but instead, potentially tarnishes the entirety of the physicalist epistemic framework. 
Finally, I have highlighted the three most efficacious physicalist solutions to the hard 
problem. The first of which, Dennett’s (1991) illusionism, shall be explored in the 
subsequent chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Dennett’s Illusionism 
 
Dennett’s (1991-2017) illusionism represents an attempt to dissolve the ontological 
gap underpinning the hard problem, and in turn dissolve the problems inherent within 
gleaning epistemic justification from a non-spatial property, via eliminating the 
existence of non-physical, experiential properties entirely. In line with other 
illusionists (see Humphrey 2011, Frankish 2016, Blackmore 2003), Dennett employs 
a similar notion to the Husserlian ‘natural attitude’ (outlined in the introduction of this 
thesis), claiming that the objective quantifications employed by physicalism represent 
what is reliable and trustworthy (Dennett 1991 p. 85), and, as a result, any judgements 
we make pertaining to phenomenal experiences that are incommensurable to the 
physical sciences must be identified as both illusory and epistemologically unreliable. 
Thus, Dennett’s fundamental aim is to employ a ‘heterophenomenological’ method, 
which he champions as ‘the scientific method applied to the phenomena of 
consciousness’ (2001, section. 1, para. 8), in an attempt to posit that: if first-person 
reports of phenomenal consciousness are shown to be physically unquantifiable, we 
must conclude that such accounts are expressing nothing beyond the ‘mistaken belief’ 
(Dennett 1991, p. 85) that phenomenal experiences exist as anything more than an 
illusion. This chapter aims to erect an attack upon Dennett’s claims for illusionism, 
via highlighting the absurdity of a heterophenomenological method that is 
underpinned by the very experiential property it is attempting to eliminate, in the hope 
that, upon debunking the foundation of his enquiry, I may simultaneously remove the 
foundation from which Dennett posits his eliminativism, and, in so doing, reveal how 
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Dennett is left incapable of avoiding the same problems erected against Sellars (1963) 
in chapter 2. 
 
Dennett’s heterophenomenological method is touted as the “the bridge between the 
subjectivity of human consciousness and the natural sciences” (Dennett 2007, p. 249), 
and attempts to provide a means from which to neutrally and objectively plot the ‘real 
goings-on in people’s brain’ (Dennett 1991, p. 85) alongside the first-person reports 
of what is believed to be the ‘real goings-on’. Thus, Dennett’s heterophenomenology 
is predicated upon a need to remain ‘agnostic’ (Piccinni 2010, p. 87) about the 
epistemic efficacy of first-person reports, so that we may develop a: 
 
‘Cautious, controlled way of taking subjects seriously, as seriously as they could 
possibly be taken without granting them something akin to papal infallibility, while 
maintaining (contrary to everyday communicative practise) a deliberate bracketing of 
the issue of whether what they are saying is literally true, metaphorically true, true 
under-an-imposed interpretation, or systematically false in a way we must explain.’ 
(Dennett 2007, p. 252) 
 
Thus, Dennett advances the central claim that, contrary to the Cartesian notion that we 
indubitably know subjective ‘first-person’ experiential states prior to knowing 
anything else, these first-person reports pertaining to ‘what it is like’ to undergo a 
given phenomenal experience are not infallible, and, as such, should be taken as 
nothing beyond raw, informational data that may be plotted alongside the less fallible, 
scientifically quantifiable goings on within the physical brain, so as to produce an 
objective, ‘third person approach to consciousness’ (Dennett 1991, p. 98). Thus, 
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Dennett employs this heterophenomenological framework as a means to propose that 
it is only upon mapping these ‘fallible’ first-person reports to the ‘real goings-on’ 
(Dennett 1991, p. 85) within the objectively quantifiable physical brain that we may 
come to understand the efficacy of an individual’s beliefs pertaining to their 
subjective, experiential states. Further, Dennett (1991) contends that if we find that 
there is a disparity between these fallible first-person reports and our reliable 
quantifications of the physical brain, then we would be justified in questioning the 
reliability of the first-person report. The core of this argument is exemplified as 
follows: 
 
‘If we were to find real goings-on in people’s brain that had enough of the ‘defining’ 
properties of the items that populate their heterophenomenological worlds (i.e. the 
subjective worlds projected by what people say in describing their own minds), we 
could reasonably propose that we had discovered what they were really talking about. 
And if we discovered that the real goings-on bore only a minor resemblance to the 
heterophenomenological items, we could reasonably declare that people were just 
mistaken in the beliefs they expressed.’ (Dennett 1991, p.  85) 
 
This argument represents the foundation from which Dennett constructs his 
illusionism, as the heterophenomenological method purportedly highlights that whilst 
the raw data inherent within first-person reports of intentional states does correspond 
to the ‘real goings-on’ in the physically quantifiable brain, and should, as such, be 
deemed to be scientifically reliable; there is no such correlation to be found within 
reports of phenomenal states. Thus, Dennett (2016) proposes that, whilst beliefs in 
physically quantifiable ‘intentional objects’ (p. 71) are accountable upon mapping 
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these objects to the representational ‘encoding of features of a stimulus’ (Frankish 
2016, p. 19) in our somatosensory cortex; there is no such means of accounting for 
phenomenal states. Meaning that whilst my belief that ‘I am holding a blue coffee 
mug’ is explicable by virtue of the physically quantifiable existence of both the 
intentional object and my neurologically traceable representational reaction, so that 
‘[I] am caused to believe in the existence of that mug by the mug itself’ (Dennett 
2016, p. 72), the first-person belief that I am internally holding a phenomenal ‘what it 
is like’ experience, which acts as an intermediary between the coffee mug and myself, 
cannot be wholly accounted for either neurologically or by the intentional object.  
Thus, Dennett posits that as such scientifically unreliable first-person reports cannot 
be brought in line with our more reliable understanding of the physical brain, any 
notion of a unified, phenomenally experiencing ‘I, on the inside’ must ‘turn out to be 
something rather like a benign user illusion’ (Dennett 1998, p. 357).  
 
Using this purported disparity between the unreliable, first-person evidence for 
phenomenal experience, and the reliable third-person neurological quantifications in 
the brain, Dennett attempts to construct an alternative ‘multiple drafts model’ that he 
proposes as a solution to, what he terms to be, the unreliable, ‘illusory’ dualism 
evident within ‘Cartesian Materialism’, which posits that there is one unified, 
experiential seat of consciousness, in which disparate neurological states ‘all come 
together’ (Dennett 1991, p. 107). So, at foundation, Dennett’s (1991) appeal to his 
heterophenomenology method acts as a means to deconstruct the ‘ persuasive imagery 
of the Cartesian Theater’ (p. 107), for which he blames our illusion that we exist as 
unified selves with phenomenal ‘what it is like’ experiences, in favour of a physically 
quantifiable ‘multiple drafts model’, which is predicated upon an attempt to show that 
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‘there is no reality of conscious experience independent of the effects of various 
vehicles of content on subsequent action’ (p. 132). This model purports to eliminate 
notions of a non-spatial locus of phenomenal experience, and, in order to achieve this, 
relies upon Dawkins’s (1982) theory of memetics in an attempt to show how ‘human 
consciousness is itself a (non-local) huge collection of memes17 that can be best 
understood as the operation of a Von Neumanesque virtual machine implemented in 
the parallel architecture of a brain’ (Dennett 1991, p. 210). 
 
So, in line with his scientism, Dennett falls back on computational and evolutionary 
theory as a means from which to explain our purported ‘illusion’ of unified 
phenomenal experience. Contending that somehow the illusion of a locus of 
experience arises due to self-replicating cultural and evolutionary ‘memes’, which 
represent informational intentional states that ‘physically reside in the brain’ 
(Dawkins 1982, p. 109), competing, by virtue of natural selection, ‘for replication by 
human hosts’ (Blackmore 2003, p. 19). These memes are defined by Dennett (2017) 
as a: 
 
																																																									
17	The concept of ‘memes’ was coined by Dawkins (1982) and is defined as follows: "The gene, the 
DNA molecule, happens to be the replicating entity that prevails on our own planet. There may be 
others. If there are, provided certain other conditions are met, they will almost inevitably become the 
basis for an evolutionary process…I think that a new kind of replicator has recently emerged on this 
very planet. It is staring us in the face. It is still in its infancy, still drifting clumsily about in its 
primeval soup, but already it is achieving evolutionary change at a rate that leaves the old gene panting 
far behind. The new soup is the soup of human culture. We need a name for the new replicator, a noun 
that conveys the idea of a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation. 'Mimeme' comes from a 
suitable Greek root, but I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit like 'gene'. I hope my classicist friends 
will forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to meme." (Dawkins 1982, p. 192) 	
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‘Kind of way of behaving (roughly) that can be copied, transmitted, remembered, 
taught, shunned, denounced, brandished, ridiculed, parodied, censored, hallowed.’ 
(p. 206) 
 
Such ‘ways of behaving’ encompass every instance of cultural imitation one can 
conceive of, and are passed from one system to the next by virtue of language, which 
Dennett (2017) signifies as the ‘lifeblood of cultural evolution (p. 179), and it is this 
process of informational dissemination that Dennett (1991-2017) has employed to 
explain the illusion of phenomenal experience. By means of an analogy for Dennett’s 
thesis, let us consider the software that accompanies the physical hardware of the 
computer I am employing to write this thesis. The software itself exists as a means to 
optimise the functionality of the hardware, but remains free to be transferred from one 
computer to the next, as the computational advances in hardware ensure that all 
modern computers are optimised to accommodate for advances in software. These 
contemporary proponents of memetic theory (see Dawkins, Blackmore 2003, Dennett 
1991) propose that the physical brain is best understood in relation to the hardware of 
a computer, with cultural ‘memes’ best understood as the software that transitions 
from one physical brain to the next by virtue of evolution’s tendency to produce 
physical brains (hardware) capable of effectively assimilating and disseminating this 
software. So, cultural memes that are effective at optimising the functionality of the 
brain are passed from one brain to the next and, over time, the species becomes driven 
by its capacity to optimise its imitation of these successful memetic structures.   
 
Using this model, Dennett (1991) argues that any notion of a phenomenally unified 
self is explained away as the user-illusion that accompanies the interaction between 
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physical, intentional content and the memetic, cultural structures that are most 
conducive to survival, so that the memes involved in classifying oneself as a unified 
‘I’ survive not because there really is ‘something it is like’ to be a given a subject, but 
because the memes involved in this behaviour are evolutionary advantageous. 
Meaning that, at foundation, this illusion of phenomenal experience is nothing more 
than an evolutionary optimised process made up of ‘thousands of memes, mostly 
borne by language, but also by wordless “images” and other data structures, taking up 
residence in an individual brain, shaping its tendencies and thereby turning it into a 
mind’ (Dennett 1991, p. 254).  
 
Whilst the core of this argument is ultimately predicated upon a contemporary 
evolutionary theory of memetics that is beyond the scope of this thesis, the 
fundamental notion is that the brain encompasses nothing beyond purely physical, 
intentional states that self-replicate due to the virtues of their cultural and evolutionary 
successes. In Dennett’s (1991) case, these self-replicating processes are most evident 
within our language, and it is the tendency for language to self-replicate in the face of 
natural selection that, Dennett argues, creates the formation of an ‘I’, that eventually 
leads to further memetic structures such as ‘I think’ or  ‘I want’ that unite our memes 
with external, intentional objects. Further, over time, Dennett argues that these 
simplistic memes coalesce with intentional objects so as to form even broader, more 
complex memetic structures that account for the beliefs, desires and judgements, 
which Blackmore (2003) argues explains our illusion of having a ‘selfplex’, and 
Dennett (1991) argues accounts for our illusory experience of having an inner 
phenomenally experiential ‘mind’. Thus, contrary to the Cartesian framework, 
Dennett (1991) describes ‘a world, the subject’s heterophenomenological world, in 
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which are found various objects (intentional objects)…which self-replicate to form a 
narrative, so that (the self) is a fictional object, and so are the objects described, 
named, mentioned by the heterophenomenologist’ (p. 95). Meaning that, at 
foundation, we are nothing beyond a culmination of disparate intentional content, 
underpinned by memetic structures that have coalesced into an illusory, unified fiction 
we reference as the ‘self’, so that whilst there certainly seem to be ‘what it is like’ 
experiences, these are ultimately accountable upon bringing physical, intentional 
content in line with the evolutionarily optimised memetic structures that form this 
illusion of being a unified, phenomenally experiencing ‘self’.  Thus, Dennett (1991) 
advances the claim that:  
 
‘The self constructed by normal human brains is part of the extended human 
phenotype: humans brains are born with the default expectation that their 
environment will contain millions of mostly word-borne memes, which they can 
automatically ‘weave’ into a narrative, a coherent sequence, that defines the self.’ 
(Zawidzki 2007, p. 94) 
 
As such, Dennett appeals to the primacy of intentionality. Contending that the 
memetic structures that underpin intentional content explain conscious experience 
without relying upon any of the properties that are special ‘in the ways qualia have 
supposed to be special’ (Dennett 1993 p. 43). Hence, Dennett employs his 
heterophenomenological method to dispense of notions relating to a unified, inner, 
phenomenal ‘raw feel’, and instead posits an intentional, physical depiction of 
consciousness as ‘a kind of mental content, almost a matter of programming’ (Brook 
& Ross 20002, p. 8). In so doing, Dennett attempts to prove that all illusions of 
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phenomenal experience are accountable upon bringing ‘outer’ physically intentional 
content in line with his notion of self-replicating memetic structures which, over time, 
form a fictional ‘self’ that forms the ‘centre of our narrative gravity’ (Dennett 1992, p. 
103). Thus, we see that whilst Dennett’s explanation of consciousness provides a 
relatively robust framework, which is capable of accounting for intentional content 
and our illusory beliefs that we exist as unified subjects with ‘what it is like’ 
experiences, it, ultimately, remains predicated upon his heterophenomenological 
method, which ambiguously ‘explains away’ or ‘ignores’ (Carruthers 2005, p. 247) 
the hard problem of phenomenal experience, via simply defining qualitative content 
as nothing beyond an illusion that may be accounted for physically.  
 
So, the success of Dennett’s framework is reliant upon the success of this 
heterophenomenological method, which has allowed him to explain a variety of ‘easy’ 
problems whilst avoiding a confrontation with the intractable nature of the truly hard 
problem. However, akin to modern science, Dennett’s success with these ‘easy’ 
problems seems predicated upon the principle of ‘give us one free miracle, and we’ll 
explain the rest’ (Sheldrake 2009, p. 2), as whilst science constructs itself upon the 
‘free miracle’ of something from nothing, Dennett’s entire physicalist framework on 
consciousness seems to be constructed upon the ‘free miracle’ that we deny the 
efficacy of our own first-person accounts, and accept the illusory nature of the 
seemingly indubitable phenomenal experiences we know prior to all else. So, whilst 
science is postulated upon the free miracle that there just is something, Dennett’s 
framework is postulated upon the free miracle that experience just is an illusion. 
However, unlike science’s promise to eventually explain this one free miracle, 
Dennett seems adamant that we must ignore phenomenal consciousness entirely, and 
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instead focus upon how the memetic structures of the brain coalesced to form this 
illusion. As Frankish (2016) explains: 
 
‘Illusionism replaces the hard problem with the illusion problem — the problem of 
explaining how the illusion of phenomenality arises and why it is so powerful. This 
problem is not easy but not impossibly hard either. The method is to form hypotheses 
about the underlying cognitive mechanisms and their bases in neurophysiology and 
neuroanatomy, drawing on evidence from across the cognitive sciences.’ (p. 37) 
 
So, whilst illusionism seems an attractive prospect, and Dennett’s contributions to this 
area are robust, it seems clear that, prior to addressing the problems of explaining the 
‘illusion of phenomenality’, any movement to replace the hard problem with 
illusionism must be predicated upon a framework that is capable of providing reasons 
to accept the problems of illusionism over the problems of phenomenal 
consciousness. In Dennett’s case, these reasons rest entirely upon his 
heterophenomenological method, and this in itself seems to rest upon his 
aforementioned  ‘free miracle’ that we forego first person accounts and accept the 
illusory nature of that which is known with most immediacy. Hence, I posit that if 
Dennett’s ‘free miracle’ is denied, then the illusionism that Dennett employs to 
‘replace’ the hard problem collapses, and we extricate ourselves from Dennett’s 
eliminativism.  
 
With this in mind, I posit two problems with Dennett’s heterophenomenology, the 
first being Dennett’s difficulties in maintaining the internal coherence of a method 
that simultaneously relies upon and denies the efficacy of first person accounts, and 
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the second being the issue of this aforementioned ‘free miracle’. So, prior to an 
exploration of Dennett’s free miracle, I begin with an examination of his 
heteophenomenological method, and put forth my contention that the fundamental 
problem with Dennett’s (1991-2017) entire oeuvre on consciousness is one of 
establishing the epistemic foundation for his method. For, it seems difficult to 
establish how Dennett (1991) constructed his ‘third person’, objective enquiry into the 
phenomenon of consciousness without first employing the ‘first person’, purportedly 
‘illusory’ phenomenal experiences that he is attempting to deny.  
 
Dennett places impetus in the efficacy of the intentional stance, which purportedly 
provides grounding from which to supplant the epistemic fragility of first-person 
reports with the more robust notion of third-person evidence. By employing this, 
Dennett seems to infer that we solve the problem of ‘how to combine the perspective 
of a particular person inside the world with an objective view of that same world, the 
person and his viewpoint included’ (Nagel 1986, p. 118), via relying upon his 
heterophenomenological method to provide an objective ‘account of that point of 
view which is not itself given from that point of view’ (Williams 1986, p. 6). The 
problem with this is that Dennett describes the heterophenomenological method as 
follows: 
 
‘From the recorded verbal utterances, we get transcripts, from which in turn we 
devise interpretations of the subject’s speech acts, which we thus get to treat as 
expressions of their beliefs, on all topics. Thus, using the intentional stance, we 
construct therefrom the subject’s heterophenomenological world. We move, that is, 
from raw data to interpreted data.’ (Dennett, 2001, section. 1, para. 3) 
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Here, the explanatory and interpretive work is contained within the ‘intentional 
stance’, which takes the raw data and infers an interpretation as a consequence. Whilst 
Dennett seems content to favour third-person interpretations over first-person reports, 
I argue that, if this is case, Dennett’s heterophenomenology must necessarily extricate 
itself from the purportedly unreliable first-person biases of both those having the 
experience and those doing the interpreting. And contend that, if these are extricated, 
Dennett (1991) fails to account for all the data pertaining to the phenomena of 
consciousness, and so cannot hope to establish a truly objective explanation for 
conscious experience. This seems clear, as if we begin with ‘raw’ data pertaining to 
person 1’s (P1) judgments and beliefs, and task person 2 (P2) with forming their own 
‘interpretations’ (thus necessarily foregoing Dennett’s neutral ‘intentional stance’ via 
employing their own judgments to interpret the data18) in order to plot P1’s beliefs 
about their phenomenal experience alongside P1’s physically quantifiable brain, one 
must ask: how do we extricate ourselves from the purportedly ‘unreliable’ first-person 
reports of P2? As such, it seems in order to maintain the internal coherence of his 
method and justify his contention that all first-person reports are unreliable, Dennett 
must not only posit that P2’s judgments hold more reliability than P1’s, but that 
somehow P2’s judgments are not first-person, unreliable judgments at all, and, 
instead, inexplicably make the leap from an interpretative, subjective judgment 
inferred from the first-person perspective of the objective ‘raw data’, to an objective 
judgment that is itself not afflicted by the biases of being derived from a first-person 
perspective. Indeed, I argue that if Dennett maintains that those doing the interpreting 
achieve pure objectivity amidst the act of making inferences and judgments upon raw 
																																																								
18 Chalmers (2010, p. 54) and Wah (2007, p.6) make similar claims. 
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data, then he seems to be caught in limbo between an interpretation that is 
simultaneously derived from both the apparent objectivity of the third-person 
intentional stance and the first-person perspectives and subjective interpretations of 
those doing the interpreting. If this is the case (and it seems that it must be), in order 
for Dennett (1991) to maintain the coherence of his purportedly objective, 
scientifically grounded method, he must extricate his method from the unreliability of 
the judgments gleaned from the first-person perspectives of both P1 and P2, but, in so 
doing, Dennett seems to necessarily remove the judgments that underpin his 
heterophenomenological method, and, as such, the method collapses under the weight 
of the first-person, purportedly unreliable, inferences employed during P2’s 
interpretations of the raw data. 
 
This problem becomes more fundamental, however. This is because the necessary 
integration of P2’s judgment seems to leave Dennett reliant upon P2’s ‘user-illusion’ 
that he is a unified, ‘judger’ or ‘interpreter’, withholding a unified, phenomenal 
experience. For, if we maintain that P2 must employ a first-person judgment in order 
to ‘interpret’ P1’s ‘raw data’, and making a justified ‘judgement about what is seen is 
applying one’s concepts to what one sees on the basis of this seeing’ (Crane 2013, p. 
232), then one cannot logically exclude experience from the process of justifying 
one’s judgement. Thus, whilst the heterophenomenological method is reliant upon the 
judgments of P2, P2’s capacity to judge is reliant, at foundation, upon the ‘user-
illusion’ of there being ‘something it is like’ to experience a unified reality that allows 
for conceptualizations and judgments to be brought in line with justification (see 
Chapter 2 for a detailed explication of this point). If Dennett denies this, and 
maintains that all experience is illusory, he faces the issue of explaining how P2’s 
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judgments can be epistemologically justified without falling foul to the illusion of 
having a phenomenal experience in the process of this justification.  Simply, Dennett 
cannot maintain his claim that our experience is ultimately a ‘user-illusion’ without 
first employing this same first-person ‘user-illusion’ of experience to justify his 
judgments, as, without this ‘illusion’, Dennett seems incapable of accounting for our 
capacity to accurately judge, and, in turn, our capacity to justify our judgments. Thus, 
our ‘power to [accurately] judge’ (McDowell 2008, p. 10) seems to be entwined to 
our phenomenal experiences in a manner Dennett (1991) fails to account for, and, in 
this oversight, Dennett’s framework seems to risk becoming reliant upon both the 
very first-person reports that he deems to be unreliable, and the very phenomenal 
experiences that he is attempting to deny.  
 
Further, even if we were to allow for P2’s judgments to somehow avoid falling foul to 
the issues of first-person interpretive bias and/or reliance on phenomenal experience, I 
argue that Dennett’s method would still fail to provide any semblance of a truly 
objective account of conscious phenomena by virtue of necessarily failing to consider 
all of the data contained within the beliefs and judgments of P1. In foregoing the first-
person data in this way, I argue, in line with Nagel (1986), that true objectivity is lost, 
as upon failing to account for P1’s judgment, we fail to achieve a complete account of 
reality (p. 118). Indeed, as Nagel (1986) articulates, in denying the efficacy of first-
person perspective at the outset, the purportedly objective method not only seems to 
betray its own objectivity, but also necessarily leads us to the denial of the existence 
of phenomena that patently exist:  
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‘A great deal is essentially connected with a particular point of view, or type of point 
of view, and the attempt to give a complete account of the world in objective terms 
detached from these perspectives inevitably leads to false reductions or to outright 
denial that certain patently real phenomena exist at all.’  (Nagel 1986, p. 7) 
 
In this respect, I argue that even if we were to forego the issues evident in maintaining 
the internal coherence of Dennett’s method, Dennett still faces the issue of betraying 
his scientific ‘neutrality’ via positing the non-existence, or ‘fictional’ existence, of 
phenomenal experience at the outset (this is a contention shared by Carr 1998). As, in 
espousing the need for this ‘free miracle’, which dictates that as first-person reports 
cannot be reconciled with the scientific evidence, experience just is illusory; Dennett 
(1991) not only foregoes that which is most viscerally immediate, but, in so doing, 
seems to juxtapose the efficacy of our intuitions alongside the efficacy of the science 
that is only made possible by virtue of these intuitions. This is an issue for Dennett’s 
framework, as the most fundamental human intuition does not entail a deep 
understanding of a physical, objective reality underpinned by physics, but instead 
entails a deep, foundational awareness of ‘what it is like’ to be oneself. It is an 
intuition that guides our earliest interactions and informs our later epistemic 
frameworks, and so in positing that because physical science cannot account for 
phenomenal experience we must accept that our deepest intuition just is an illusion, 
Dennett invites the question, which is more illusory: the physical, scientific, 
heterophenomenological method that denies phenomenal experience, or the 
phenomenal experience that makes the scientific method possible to begin with?  
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This question is underpinned by the notion, as outlined in chapter 2 of this thesis, that 
our justifications for inferences to the existence of an objective reality, and in turn 
Dennett’s purportedly objective method, are tightly entwined with our phenomenal 
experiences in such a way that if judgments pertaining to these experiences are 
illusory, and experiences are themselves (even if only partially) the source of our 
epistemic justifications for the concept of both an objective physical reality and an 
objective scientific method, then Dennett (1991) seems to risk plunging his 
framework into the very illusionism he is attempting to explain. As an example, in 
writing this piece, my capacity to continue writing is predicated upon my working 
under, what Dennett (1991) might term, the ‘user-illusion’ of holding an experiential 
unity that contains, and grounds, a multiplex of unified judgments pertaining to my 
beliefs, desires, perceptions, and position in space-time. Yet, if Dennett (1991) 
maintains that the conscious experience that grounds these judgments is illusory, I 
contend that besides the fact that it seems obvious to ask ‘Illusory to whom?’ Dennett 
must also explain how the judgments that are grounded within the illusion of 
consciousness can be employed in the formation of his framework (as he himself 
suggests they are) without plunging the framework itself into an illusionism that 
undermines the efficacy of the scientific methods employed to substantiate his theory? 
As, if our judgments are implicitly contained within our apparently ‘illusory’ capacity 
for phenomenal experience, and Dennett (1991) employs judgments to underpin his 
framework, then every judgment we make becomes equally illusory, and Dennett’s 
heterophenomenological method, contrary to its pursuit of a ‘third person’ neutrally 
objective science, becomes incapable of affirming the reality of anything.  
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Thus, I argue that Dennett cannot circumvent the issues faced by Sellars (1963), as in 
denying phenomenal experience, Dennett foregoes the experiential unity that 
underpins our ‘power to judge’ (McDowell 2008, p. 10), and, in so doing, foregoes 
the efficacy of the foundational, epistemic property that underpins his 
heterophenomenological method. So, it seems in his adamantly upheld conviction that 
conscious experience must be eliminated, Dennett unavoidably also eliminates the 
epistemic foundation of his framework. As a result, it seems Dennett’s case for 
eliminativism collapses under the weight of the epistemic fragility that arises upon 
eliminating phenomenal experience, and so, in chapter 4, I explore the case for 
reductive representationalism, which, instead of eliminating experience, attempts to 
incorporate it into the physicalist framework.  
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Chapter 4 
Reductive Representationalism 
 
Reductive representationalism, or ‘strong’ intentionalism (for proponents see Dretske 
1995, Tye 1995, Byrne 2002, Lycan 1996, Harman 1990) arose as an attempt to 
provide a physicalist framework capable of avoiding the problems inherent within 
eliminativism and mind-brain reductivism, via explaining how phenomenal content 
may be reduced to representational content, and in turn, reduced to the external 
properties of physical, intentional objects20. In contrast to ‘weak’ non-reductive 
intentionalism, of the kind upheld by Crane (2003) and Chalmers (2004), which 
remains firmly entrenched in the ‘hard problem’ via contending that phenomenal 
content is not reducible to represented content, the reductive representionalist 
maintains that the ‘hard’ problem is unequivocally solved upon reductively explaining 
the identity of phenomenal content within the representational content that 
accompanies the intentional interactions between the brain and its environment. An 
analysis of reductive representationalism shall act as the focus of this chapter. I shall 
begin with a brief explication of the theory, before concluding that the reductive 
representationalist’s reliance upon qualia externalism produces two fundamental 
flaws, namely: the issue of explaining differences in phenomenal qualities, and the 
issue of accounting for our subjective, intuitive awareness in purely representational 
terms. Upon having explicated these issues, I shall conclude that the tendency of 
reductive representationalism to massage phenomenal character in order to fit the 																																																								
20 Intentional objects are here defined, in line with Martin (1998), as ‘ordinary existing entities’ 
(p.101), and I shall be using the term intentional objects interchangeably with ‘physical objects’ 
throughout. I also note here that Crane (2001) takes umbrage with this definition, contending that the 
‘intentional object is just the object (for some subject) of an intentional state or act’ (p. 349). However, 
for my purposes in this chapter, it is not necessary to contest this point, as it seems clear that reductive 
representationalism (as a physicalist theory of the mind) is positing such intentional objects as 
‘ordinary existing entities’ that objectively, physically exist independently of the mind. 
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reductive, intentional framework results in an untenable theory of consciousness that, 
ultimately, fails to overcome the problem it purports to solve.  
 
Kriegel (2017) offers a widely applicable and cogent explication of reductive 
representationalism:  
 
‘There is a class of entities E and a type of relation R, such that (i) R is a non-
phenomenal relation and (ii) for every phenomenally conscious state S, what makes S 
the phenomenally conscious state it is, and a phenomenally conscious state at all, is 
that S bears R to the members of E it does, and bears R to members of E at all.’ (p. 4) 
 
This formation is underpinned by the attempts of early reductive representationalists, 
such as Lycan (1996), to reduce the identity of phenomenal experience ‘S’ entirely to 
the brains ‘relation to’ or ‘representation of’ an intentional object ‘E’. So that, if the 
representational content ‘R’ is identical to the phenomenally conscious state ‘S’, and 
‘R’ is entirely reducible to ‘E’, the representationalist is able to reductively explain 
phenomenal experience ‘S’ by appeal to an objective, physical object ‘E’, and, in so 
doing, is purportedly able to provide a reductive account of phenomenal experience 
that avoids the issues of reducing phenomenal content to the brain and the problem of 
outright eliminativism faced by Dennett (1991). So, my experience of being sat atop 
this chair, and my perception of the black letters cascading on the screen as I feel the 
indent of my fingers on the keyboard, are all, under the reductive representational 
framework, experiences that are ultimately nothing beyond my brain’s representation 
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of the content21 contained within physically reductive entities ‘E’. Thus, in this 
example, the keyboard, the chair and the letters, are all physical entities, which my 
brain, upon relating in the right way to these entities, forms a ‘what it is like’ 
sensation that represents the properties of these physical entities. The crucial move in 
the reductive representational account is to posit this ‘what it is like’ sensation as 
nothing beyond the content that occurs upon my brain accurately representing the 
content inherent within physical entities ‘E’. Meaning that, the fundamental aim of 
reductive representationalism is to posit that ‘phenomenal character is one and the 
same as representational content’ (Tye 2000, p. 45), and, consequently, explain how 
phenomenal content is reducible to the external content of physical entities; such that 
any notion of there being ‘something it is like’ for me to experience the blackness of 
these letters on the screen is entirely explained in physically reductive terms by virtue 
of my brain’s capacity to represent the actual black content of these physical entities. 
As such, the strength of this framework lies in its capacity to avoid having to explain 
how the identity of phenomenal content can be reduced to the physical brain, via 
attempting to reductively account for phenomenal qualities in external content.  
 
This move to posit phenomenal experience as representational content, and 
represented content as reducible to the content that is implicit to physical entities is 
most championed in the works of Harman (1990), Tye (1995) and Dretske (1995), 
who employ a ‘transparency thesis’ as a means from which to strengthen their case for 
explaining phenomenal content as the brain’s representation of the content inherent 
																																																								
21 Here I am referencing content as the intentional content that represents the properties contained 
within a given intentional object. In line with my attempt to denounce reductivism, I am here 
referencing intentional objects as physically reducible entities, in line with Martin (1998). However, as 
Crane (2001) explains, such intentional objects need not necessarily be physical or even a property at 
all. 
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within physical properties. Harman (1999) typifies this transparency thesis neatly in 
his contention that: 
 
‘When you see a tree, you do not experience any features as intrinsic features of your 
experience.  Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your 
visual experience.  I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your 
attention to will be features of the presented tree.’  (p. 251) 
 
Thus, according to advocates of this thesis, reductive representationalism is affirmed 
by virtue of my inability to introspectively focus my attention upon an intrinsic 
feature of my experience of the blackness of these words, for example, without first 
focusing upon the content of ‘blackness’ contained within this intentional object. 
Meaning that, any attempt to disentwine my phenomenal experience of ‘blackness’ 
from the physical object itself is impossible, as in separating myself from the 
intentional object, I am no longer truly aware of the experience I am attempting to 
draw my attention to. As such, according to advocates of reductive 
representationalism and the transparency thesis, the black quale accompanying my 
experience of these letters is nothing beyond what my brain represents the content of 
these letters as actually being, meaning that when the representation of the content of 
a physical entity is veridical, my phenomenal experience of ‘blackness’ is entirely 
accounted for by the mind-independent, physically reducible ‘colour-properties’ of 
this intentional object. This argument results in the representationalist contending that 
we ‘see right through it (experience) and onto the objects and properties in the 
external world’ (Batty 2010, p. 103), as ‘in turning one’s mind inward to attend to the 
	 80	
experience, one seems to end up concentrating on what is outside again, on external 
features or properties’ (Tye 1995, p. 30). 
 
This has led certain reductive representationalists, such as Dretske (1995), to 
champion qualia externalism, and deny the import of Nagel’s (1974) notion of 
equating phenomenal experience to an intractable, wholly subjective ‘what it is like’ 
sensation. Instead contending that Nagel’s claims involving the purported 
impossibility for me to know ‘what it is like’ to be a bat are fallacious, as in order to 
know ‘what it is like’, we must look no further than the content of the properties 
inherent within the bats external environment. Dretske (1995) doesn’t directly 
reference Nagel’s bat, but instead employs the notion of a parasite, contending: 
 
‘If you know what it is to be 18 °c, you know how the host feels to the parasite. You 
know what the parasite’s experience is like as it ‘senses’ the host. If knowing what it 
is like to be such a parasite is knowing how things seem to it, how it represents the 
objects it perceives, you do not have to be a parasite to know what it is like to be one. 
All you have to know is what temperature is…To know what it is like for this parasite, 
one looks, not in the parasite, but as what the parasite is ‘looking’ at’- the host.’  
(p. 83) 
 
Thus, Dretske (1995), in line with Tye (1995) and Lycan (1996), attempts to 
disentwine phenomenal content from the physical brain, and instead posit the 
intentional objects inherent within an environment as entirely accountable for the 
brain’s representational, and in turn, phenomenal content. Contending that, if our 
phenomenal experience of heat is 18 °c, we should not look within the brain to 
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distinguish why this is so, but instead should look to the environment in which the 
brain represents this content. Thus, the reductive representationalist removes the need 
to internally explain phenomenal ‘what it is like’ sensations, and instead posits that: as 
phenomenal content is ‘one and the same as representational content’ (Tye 2000, p. 
45), such that to be the subject of ‘a state with a certain felt or phenomenal quality is 
to be the subject of a state that represents a certain external quality’ (Tye 2000, p. 
162), we should posit the content of our phenomenal ‘what it is like’ sensations as 
reducible to the external properties of physical objects. So, on this externalist view, 
the phenomenal character of an experience is not contained within the neurological 
makeup of a given brain state, but is instead indicative of the ‘character of the 
reflectance-type (of the physical properties) which that brain-state tracks’ (Pautz 
2003, p. 7). Employing this reduction of phenomenal content to the content inherent 
within physical properties allows the representationalist to avoid the ‘hard’ problem 
plaguing qualia internalism, whilst reductively explaining phenomenal experience via 
predicating their framework upon the contention that ‘qualia ain’t in the head’ (Tye & 
Byrne 2006, p. 241) 22. 
 
Thus, according to reductive representationalism, the phenomenal experience of 
person 1’s (P1’s) experience is identical to P2’s experience iff they are both 
representing the same perceptible properties of object ‘X’. Meaning that any 
difference in phenomenal experience must be wholly accounted for by a 																																																								
22 Chalmers (2004) posits that this move to externalize qualia is necessary for the reductive 
representationalist, as attempting to provide a reductive representational framework not predicated 
upon externalism would result in, what Chalmers (2004) terms, a ‘inconsistent triad’ (p. 166) of 
simultaneously upholding (i) reductive representationalism (ii) internalism about phenomenal qualities 
and (iii) externalism about content. This means that the representationalist can either advocate 
reductivism alongside externalism or advocate non-reductivism alongside internalism; he or she cannot 
be a representational reductivist whilst maintaining internalism about phenomenal content, without 
risking either advocating a thesis that is not predicated upon representationalism, or no longer 
advancing a reductive theory of the mind.	
	 82	
representational difference that is reducible to a difference in the properties of a given 
object. This, however, seems troublesome, as any move to externalise qualia is 
predicated upon the reductive representationalist making an ontological claim about 
what phenomenal experience actually is, namely: ‘one and the same as 
representational content’, which is, at foundation, ‘one and the same’ as the content 
contained within the properties of intentional objects (Tye 2000, p. 45). In making this 
ontological claim about the externally reducible nature of phenomenal experience, I 
argue that reductive representationalism reveals a platform from which to espouse two 
fundamental arguments against the qualia externalism that underpins its reductivism, 
namely: the problem of explaining differences in phenomenal character arising from 
the same intentional object, and the problem of accounting for the unified, intuitively 
aware locus of experience that seems implicit to phenomenal experience. I contend 
that, if these arguments hold, I provide convincing reasons to doubt the externalism 
underpinning representational reductivism and, in so doing, strengthen the case for the 
irreducibility of phenomenal information.   
 
The first of these arguments is established by Pautz (2006) and Cohen (2009), who 
attempt to posit, what I term, an ‘inverse argument for multiple realizability’, via 
highlighting the difficulty for qualia externalists to explain how different phenomenal 
experiences may arise from a singular intentional object, that, according to the qualia 
externalist, should produce no such disparity in experience. As such, whilst reductive 
representationalism purportedly avoids the standard problem of ‘multiple 
realizability’23 (See Putnam 1967) via explaining how disparate physical organisms 
may produce the same phenomenal content in their veridical representations of the 																																																								
23 Simply, this is the problem of accounting for how distinct physical identities may produce the same 
phenomenal content, and is traditionally espoused as an argument against reductivism.  
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external properties of intentional objects, Pautz (2006) and Cohen (2009) attempt to 
topple the purported strength of the representationalist’s capacity to avoid the problem 
of multiple realizability via inverting the problem entirely. Thus, whilst the standard 
problem is concerned with the problem of distinct physical brains experiencing the 
same phenomenal content, Pautz’s formation is concerned with the problem of 
distinct phenomenal content arising from the same physical object.   
 
As such, Pautz (2006) is contending that if the representational externalist maintains 
their claim that physical properties implicitly contain some informational content that 
wholly constitutes our representational, and in turn, phenomenal content, then we 
should be entirely unable to conceive of a scenario in which distinct phenomenal 
experiences arise from veridical representations of the same physical properties. 
Meaning that: 
 
‘No matter what world you go to, the unitary red brain state tracks the unitary red 
reflectance in the actual world. So, no matter what world you are in, if you are in the 
unitary red brain state, you bear the Rigidified Tracking Relation to the unitary red 
reflectance, and so, given physicalism about Q-properties (phenomenal properties), 
the colour unitary red.’ (Pautz 2006, p. 218) 
 
However, as Pautz (2006) highlights in his ‘Maxwell and Twin-Maxwell’ thought 
experiment, we can conceive of disparate phenomenal experiences arising from the 
same physical properties. This example involves Maxwell (X) as a standard, human 
perceiver in this world, and ‘Twin-Maxwell’ (Y) as an occupant of a twin-world, in 
which colour perception has evolved to produce no less optimal, but slightly different, 
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‘post-receptoral wiring’ (p. 213) to that of X. The argument suggests that, whilst both 
X and Y share identical retinal configurations, their different post-receptoral wiring 
produced disparities in the way in which photoreceptor signals are processed, which 
conceivably results in a representational, and in turn phenomenal, difference in how X 
and Y experience the same intentional object. If this argument is upheld, it presents an 
issue for qualia externalism, which dictates that it is impossible for distinct 
experiences to arise from veridical representations of the same intentional object.  
 
However, in order to understand this, it seems prudent to first briefly outline the 
scientifically accepted explanation for colour vision, so as to elucidate a deeper 
understanding of the consequences of this thought experiment. Simply, upon viewing 
a given intentional object, light energy enters our retina, and is then mapped to a 
series of photoreceptor cells that convert this light energy into electrical signals, 
which are then transmitted ‘to a series of post-receptoral elements which process these 
signals and send them to second order retinal neurons’ (Kremers et al 2016, p. 46). 
So, more simply, light energy is converted into an electrical signal, which is then 
transferred to the brain via a series of nerve fibres. At this stage, the brain’s post-
receptoral processing maps the electrical signal of the nerve fibres to a given 
photoreceptor, and this result is then ‘coded in the train of neural impulses sent by 
retinal ganglion cell axons to the higher visual centres of the human visual system’ 
(Kremers et al 2016, p. 46) which account for our representational, and in turn, 
phenomenal experiences of colour.  This process is eloquently conveyed as follows: 
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Figure 1 A Model for Human colour vision (Source: Kalloniatis & Luu 2007). 
 
So, as the diagram conveys, the ‘receptor stage’ consists of two processes, the first 
involves signals being transmitted from photoreceptors to the brain’s post-receptoral 
‘cones’, and the second involves these post-receptors matching a signal to a given 
neurological output (or channel) so as to produce our experience of colour. Now, 
imagine that our evolutionary cycle had produced post-receptoral wiring that, upon 
processing the electrical signal of ‘445’ (as seen in the diagram above), only mapped 
this signal to one neurological channel, instead of the two depicted in the diagram, so 
that instead of experiencing blue as a particular hue that produces our sensation of 
‘light’ blue, we only experience signal ‘445’ as a blueness devoid of a particular 
brightness or hue. If this is conceivable, it is conceivable that this difference in post-
receptoral wiring has caused a difference in our phenomenal experience of blue, and 
therefore it is equally conceivable that phenomenal content is not contained within 
external objects, but is instead a property of how the brain processes electrical signals. 
With this established, we are in a position to return to the thought experiment 
championed by Cohen (2009) and Pautz (2006). 
 
The key contention is that, if Maxwell and Twin-Maxwell hold distinct post-
receptoral wiring whilst also being evolutionarily optimised, then the functional 
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differences inherent in the way in which they process light will produce phenomenal 
differences in the way they experience colour. With this as a grounding, Pautz’s 
(2006) argument highlights that, according to representational externalism, both X 
and Y should experience identical phenomenal content upon representing the same 
physical properties of a given object ‘E’, however, due to variations within their 
‘post-receptoral’ neurological makeup, it is conceivable that X represents E as 
instantiating a distinct hue that causes a phenomenal experience of ‘orange’, while Y 
represents E as instantiating the colour content of ‘redness’. So that the differences in 
post-receptoral wiring creates differences in how signals are mapped to neurological 
channels, which, in turn, creates differences in phenomenal experience. Allen (2016) 
describes this as follows: 
 
‘In Maxwell’s case a particular retinal response activates just one opponent (neural) 
channel, whereas in Twin Maxwell’s case it activates two opponent channels. So 
Maxwell and Twin Maxwell have phenomenally distinct experiences: an object that 
Maxwell sees as instantiating a unique hue, Twin Maxwell sees as instantiating a 
binary hue.’ (p. 75)  
 
Thus, the representations, and, in turn, phenomenal content gleaned from the 
perceptible properties of object ‘E’ are varied in a manner that seems to contradict the 
notions of representational externalists, which leads Pautz (2010) to contend that 
‘experiential properties are very well correlated with neural properties and very 
poorly correlated with external properties’ (p. 34). Indeed, both Cohen (2009) and 
Pautz (2006/10) take this argument as evidence for the alleged falsity of qualia 
externalism, as our representations and, in turn, phenomenal experiences, seem 
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dependent upon what happens in the brain, not the properties of our external 
environment. This seems intuitive, as qualia externalism’s commitment to 
externalising phenomenal content leaves us unable to account for the conceivable 
contention that, in the case of Maxwell & Twin-Maxwell, there is a disparity in 
phenomenal experience upon representing the same intentional object.   
 
In an attempt to defend qualia externalism, Tye & Byrne (2006) suggest that any 
disparity in represented content is explained by a disparity in the extent to which these 
representations are veridical. Thus, Tye & Byrne deny that there is any need to 
explain cases such as Maxwell/Twin-Maxwell, as Maxwell’s (X) representation of the 
intentional object (E) as withholding orange content is simply a more veridical 
representation of the actual properties of E than that offered by Twin-Maxwell (Y), 
meaning that, ultimately, Y’s phenomenal experiences are illusory in a way X’s are 
not. As such, according to Tye & Byrne (2006), phenomenal content is accounted for 
externally, and any perceived disparity in experience is simply a matter of the brain 
incorrectly representing this external content. So, the crucial move here is an attempt 
to firmly deny the brain’s capacity to internally produce phenomenal content, and 
maintain that any case in which the brain seems to produce this content is a case in 
which the brain is producing nothing beyond a warped, illusory depiction of content 
that is reducible to external, intentional objects. Further, this focus upon the illusory 
nature of Y’s experiences leads Tye & Byrne to question how Pautz (2006) and 
Cohen’s (2009) contentions can be reconciled alongside evolutionary theory, as it 
seems difficult to explain ‘how Twin Maxwell could have evolved so as to 
systematically misrepresent the colours of things’ (Tye & Byrne 2006, p. 253). 
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All such objections, however, seem predicated upon the assumption that Twin-
Maxwell (Y) is necessarily misrepresenting the perceptible properties of the object 
(E); which seems to demand that the evolutionary cycle for Maxwell (X) has 
somehow produced a representational, and evolutionary, optimisation that is not 
reflected in his twin (making X’s representations optimal to survival in a way that Y’s 
are ‘sub-optimal’). These claims seem to either misrepresent Pautz’s arguments or 
misrepresent the Darwinian theory of natural selection, as the thought experiment 
demands that both X and Y epitomise systems that have optimised their capacity for 
survival, which means that, over the course of natural selection, this survival 
optimisation must necessarily have been predicated upon both X and Y consistently 
not misrepresenting their environments.  
 
Hence, far from dismissing Twin-Maxwell’s representations as ‘sub-optimal’ or non-
veridical, we must accept that, if both X and Y are evolutionarily optimised, neither X 
nor Y are truly ‘misrepresenting’ the ‘colours of things’, because the representations 
of X and Y must be equally veridical in terms of survival optimisation, as Pautz 
(2006) contends: ‘the situations of Maxwell and Twin Maxwell are perfectly 
symmetrical…[so] that optimal [survival] conditions obtain in Maxwell’s situation 
and Twin Maxwell’s situations’ (p. 223). If this is upheld, it seems only logical to 
question why exactly the representational externalist believes that Maxwell’s 
representations are any more veridical than those of Twin-Maxwell, because, if both 
are evolutionarily optimised, then our post-receptoral wiring renders any attempt to 
truly know a veridical representation as futile. Meaning that, if it is at least possible 
for two distinct individuals to represent, and in turn, experience the same object 
differently, whilst maintaining identical evolutionary optimisation, then it seems 
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logical to conclude that phenomenal experience is not reducible to external properties 
in a given environment. For, if we can at least conceive of two evolutionarily 
optimised individuals holding distinct phenomenal experiences whilst representing the 
same external content, then we are presented with a good reason to deny qualia 
externalism.  By means of response, Tye & Byrne (2006) seem to fall back on the 
notion that ‘there is no obvious reason to suppose [that the evolutionary optimisation 
of Twin-Maxwell] is metaphysically possible’, as it would be metaphysically 
impossible for a ‘product of natural selection…operating under the same laws as 
Maxwell with a similar kind of visual system’ to produce different representational 
and, in turn, phenomenal content in relation to an object ‘E’ (p. 253). In order to 
substantiate this claim, it seem that Tye & Byrne (2006) must maintain that Twin-
Maxwell is wholly inconceivable. However, this in itself seems difficult to establish, 
as it not difficult to imagine that our twins on another possible world may have 
reached a state of evolutionary optimisation that has provided survival strategies that 
are equivalent to our own, whilst, for example, experiencing the dark blue hue of 
electrical signal ‘445’ as a very slightly lighter blue hue than the experience the 
human species has of signal ‘445’. This minimal conception of a system’s 
evolutionary optimisation (in some possible world) remaining intact upon 
experiencing the hue of a singular electrical signal very slightly differently to those on 
earth is all that is required in order to conceive of Twin-Maxwell, and, as such, I posit 
that there is no coherent reason for Tye & Byrne to maintain that Twin-Maxwell is 
not conceivable. Indeed, if they do persist in this claim, they seem to commit 
themselves to the modal fallacy of leaping from possibility to necessity, by upholding 
the presumptuous inference that the prerequisites for achieving evolutionary 
optimisation in this possible world must necessarily occur in order to achieve 
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evolutionary optimisation in all possible worlds.  With this in mind, I maintain that it 
is important to reiterate Chalmers’ (2010) distinction between an ideal rational 
reflection (or primary conception) that would, in this case, pick out any referent with 
evolutionarily optimized qualities, and a prima facie belief (secondary conception) 
that would assert that a referent’s ‘evolutionary optimization’ necessarily depends 
upon experiencing signal ‘445’ exactly the same as those on earth.  In this case, I 
argue that Tye & Byrne (2006) make the mistake of overemphasising the a posteriori, 
prima facie belief that evolutionary optimisation can only occur upon experiencing 
the signal 445 as a human does, whilst understating our potential to employ ideal, 
primary conceivability to access a possible world in which the concept of 
evolutionary optimization simply picks out any referent with the quality of having 
optimized survival strategies.  Upon employing this ideal, primary, conceivability, I 
argue that Twin-Maxwell is conceivable, and, in line with Chalmers (2010), I 
maintain that, upon conceiving of this, we access a ‘primarily possible’ world in 
which Twin-Maxwell is verified by some centred being, and, in so doing, access a 
‘secondarily possible’ world in which the existence of Twin-Maxwell is satisfied. As 
such, I employ the following adaption of Chalmers’ (2010, p. 144) conceivability 
argument (as has been employed and explicated in detail within chapter 1 of this 
thesis) to account for the leap from the (primary) conceivability of Twin-Maxwell to 
the metaphysical possibility of a possible world in which the existence of Twin-
Maxwell is satisfied24.  
 
1. It is conceivable that Twin-Maxwell achieves evolutionary optimisation whilst 
experiencing the colour content of E slightly differently to Maxwell. 																																																								
24	For a more detailed explication of this particular conceivability argument, see my formation of 
Chalmers’ (2010) reformulated conceivability argument in chapter 1.		
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2. If this is conceivable, the evolutionary optimisation of Twin-Maxwell is 
primarily possible. 
3. If the evolutionary optimisation of Twin-Maxwell is 1-possible, then it is 
secondarily possible. 
4. Therefore, the evolutionary optimisation of Twin-Maxwell is metaphysically 
possible in some possible world. 
 
The first and most damning consequence of this argument is that Tye & Byrne (2006) 
are left incapable of truly explaining phenomenal content. As, if it is conceivable that 
Twin-Maxwell holds a distinct experience alongside a veridical representation of an 
external property, then it seems equally conceivable that phenomenal content contains 
a degree of subjective, experiential awareness that is ontologically irreducible to 
objective, external properties. Meaning that, ultimately, in failing to address why 
Twin-Maxwell is not conceivable, Tye & Byrne (2006) also fail to explain 
phenomenal content in its entirety (this argument shall be returned to shortly). 
Further, if it is conceivable, and therefore metaphysically possible, that both X and Y 
are evolutionarily optimised whilst their neurological makeup produces disparate 
experiences of E, it is relatively easy for Pautz (2006) to defend both his claim that 
internalism is a more cogent theory than externalism (although physicalist internalism 
still seems to inevitably fall foul to the hard problem), and his claim that: if 
representational externalism demands that phenomenal content is externally reducible 
to the properties of a given intentional object, so that X and Y necessarily produce 
identical phenomenal experiences in their veridical representations of object ‘E’, then 
the Maxwell/Twin-Maxwell thought experiment goes some way in proving that 
representational externalism is false, and so too, goes some way in pacifying the 
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attempts of those reductive representationalist who wish to reduce phenomenal 
content to physical content.  
 
Indeed, if Pautz’s argument is upheld, the qualia externalism underpinning 
representational reductivism is shown to be false, and so the entire framework of 
reductive representationalism, of the kind upheld by Tye (1995), Byrne (2002), 
Dretske (1995) and Lycan (1996), collapses. At this stage, reductive 
representationalism finds no relief in somehow aligning representationalism to 
reductive internalism (this is the solution Pautz 2006 seems to champion), because 
externalism arose precisely out of the difficulty of internally accounting for 
phenomenal content in terms of the physical brain; in fact, this is the very foundation 
of Chalmers’s (1996) hard problem (see chapter 1.1/1.2 for an explication of this 
point). So, the underlying motive for externalising qualia, and employing the brain as 
a machine capable of representing this external content, is one of avoiding the 
difficulty of internally explaining qualia by reductively identifying it with the brain, 
and, as a result, reductive internalism is denied even more swiftly than qualia 
externalism. As such, this leaves the reductive representationalist with very few 
options other than to deny the metaphysical possibility of Pautz’s argument (see Tye 
& Bryne 2006). However, as we have explored, this in itself seems insufficient.  
 
With this established, I move on to address, what I deem to be, the most fundamental 
issue underpinning the representational externalist framework, namely: the problem of 
accounting for the phenomenal experiences that seem to be beyond encapsulation 
within external properties, and, in turn, seem wholly non-representational.  The 
contemporary debates in this area focus upon the non-representational nature of 
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moods and pains, and, in the remainder of this chapter, I shall posit that these non-
representational phenomena imply a unified intuitive, subjective awareness of ‘what it 
is like’, which is entirely distinct from the objective, sensory phenomenal information 
that seems to be the focus of representational externalism. Meaning that, even if we 
were to forego Pautz’s (2006/2010) convincing dismissal of qualia externalism, the 
reductive representationalist would still fail to truly capture the fundamental nature of 
phenomenal character.  
 
Thus, I contend that the strongest reason for denying the adequacy of representational 
externalism is found upon positing qualitative content as containing something 
beyond the purely sensory experience that accompanies our representations of 
intentional objects. Here, I am referencing the sort of subjective content that seems to 
be most evident upon being experientially aware of a tranquil pleasant mood, or a 
particularly dull and persistently unpleasant pain, as it is experiences of these kinds 
that seem entirely irreducible to representational content. Indeed, it is these seemingly 
non-representational experiences of qualitative content that present a deep threat to 
the reductive representationalist framework, resulting in us asking questions such as: 
if all phenomenal content is accounted for externally, what is my ubiquitous 
awareness of debilitating anxiety representative of? Such questions seem to reveal the 
fundamental issue with reductive representationalism, as whilst Tye (1995) and 
Dretske (1995) may argue that the physical black properties of these letters account 
for my phenomenal experience of ‘blackness’, it seems clear that these representations 
of external properties can in no way account for my being phenomenally aware. I 
argue that the more standard responses to this issue, such as, for example, that 
physical pains may represent damage to body tissues; or that anxiety is more akin to a 
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propositional attitude; or perhaps that anxiety is representative of chaos, all fail to 
provide befitting explanations for how represented, informational content makes the 
transition to content that we are subjectively, and internally, experientially aware of. 
Indeed, if the representationalist response to this particular problem is to simply fall 
back on the notion that the phenomenal quality experienced during anxiety is itself 
reducible to external, informational content, then it seems that the phenomenal quality 
involved in the subjective awareness of undergoing anxiety is lost, or ‘morphed into 
something else’ (Smith 2011, p. 361) that is itself an explanation for something other 
than the subjective phenomenal character that the representational account is 
attempting to explain.   So, we are left with the troublesome problem of explaining 
how the chaotic representations, which perhaps may account for anxiety, are 
themselves capable of bridging the divide between objective, represented content and 
subjective states in which we are aware of undergoing this representational content. 
And so, we need an explanation for how representational content explains its 
experiential capacity without first providing an account of the experiencer for whom 
this represented content becomes experiential. Indeed, in this respect, I argue that 
upon positing an explanation for phenomenal experience, we must provide an 
explanation for both how experiential content arose, and an explanation for how we 
exist as experientially aware experiencers of this represented content26. As Strawson 
(1994) attests: ‘A subject of experience…is something that must exist whenever there 
is experience, because experience is necessarily experience-for’ (p. 133). This 
distinction seems of particular importance, because we know that conscious 
experience exists not because of the qualities of representations, but because we are 																																																								
26 The standard anti-physicalist responses avoid this issue by positing that a phenomenal property is 
experiential in such a way that whenever we posit an experience, we simultaneously posit an 
experiencer for whom the attribute of awareness may be posited (See Strawson 1994 for a deeper 
articulation of this point).  
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directly aware of our experiences, and, as a result, a theory of conscious experience 
must account for the subjective, experiential awareness that has allowed us to 
articulate the hard problem.   
 
Hence, at foundation, the representational externalist faces the problem of accounting 
for how a purely physical, reductive representational framework, predicated upon 
externalising phenomenal content, may account for our subjective, experiential 
awareness of ‘what it is like’ to undergo a given representation as a unified 
experiencer. This distinction between phenomenal experience, construed as an 
experientially unified awareness of ‘what it is like’, and phenomenal content, 
construed as an objective, sensory, representational quality, is typified eloquently by 
Gibson (1979): 
 
‘Direct perception is what one gets from seeing Niagara Falls, say, as distinguished 
from seeing a picture of it. The latter kind of perception is mediated. So when I assert 
that perception of the environment is direct, I mean that it is not mediated by retinal 
pictures, neural pictures, or mental pictures. Direct perception is the activity of 
getting information from the ambient array of light. I call this a process of 
information pickup that involves the exploratory activity of looking around, getting 
around, and looking at things. This is quite different from the supposed activity of 
getting information from the inputs of the optic nerves, whatever they may prove to 
be.’ (p. 139) 
 
For the most part, the reductive representationalist fails to recognise the importance of 
this distinction between mediated, objective, physically reducible sensory information 
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and unmediated, subjective states of awareness. Often simply contending that 
‘producers and consumers’ of representations are required in order to organise and 
causally unify potentially disparate representational content (Millikan 1990, p. 156), 
but offering very little explication for how the unified locus of experiential awareness, 
which seems implicit to this ‘consumer’ of representations, can be accounted for 
within the framework of reductive representationalism.  Indeed, as I explicated in 
chapter 2 of this thesis, a capacity for unification of this kind seems to only be 
achieved upon positing a phenomenally unified, awareness of ‘what it is like’ to 
undergo these potentially disparate representations. This, of course, leaves us asking: 
how can a purported physically reductive solution to the ‘hard’ problem of 
consciousness be upheld without accommodating for the phenomenal awareness that 
seems so fundamentally implicit to a common-sense depiction of what consciousness 
actually is.  
 
Tye (1995) seems to recognise this problem, and attempts to employ his notion that 
phenomenal states are Poised, Abstract, Non-conceptual, Intentional Content 
(PANIC) in an attempt to account for the transition from unconscious, represented 
content to a subjective state of conscious awareness. Whilst this move emboldens his 
representational externalism by qualifying the abstract, non-conceptual nature of his 
intentional content (thus avoiding issues of hallucinations and the issues faced by 
Sellars 1963, see chapter 2), the true importance of PANIC lies in Tye’s (1995) notion 
of ‘poise’. As, it is this appeal to ‘poised’ content that enables Tye to unite his 
externalism with a functionalism, which, he argues, allows him to bridge the gap 
between a representational mental state and a phenomenally conscious mental state. 
Tye (2000) describes the condition of being ‘poised’ as follows: 
	 97	
 
‘This condition is essentially a functional role one. The key idea is that experiences 
and feelings, qua bearers of phenomenal character, play a certain distinctive 
functional role. They arise at the interface of the nonconceptual and conceptual 
domains, and they stand ready and available to make direct impact on beliefs and/or 
desires. For example, how things phenomenally look typically causes certain 
cognitive responses—in particular, beliefs as to how they are if attention is properly 
focused. Feeling hungry likewise has an immediate cognitive effect, namely the desire 
to eat. In the case of feeling pain, the typical cognitive effect is the desire to protect 
the body, to move away from what is perceived to be producing pain. And so on. 
States with nonconceptual content that are not so poised lack phenomenal character.’ 
(p. 62) 
 
So, the contention is that representational content becomes conscious upon being 
integrated into a functional cognitive system that is ‘poised’ to produce beliefs and 
desires as a result of this represented content. As Byrne (2002) puts it: ‘a pang of 
hunger, say, is poised just in case it stands “ready and available to have a direct 
impact” on some beliefs and/or desires’ (p. 11). The problem with this, however, is 
that whilst Tye (1995) attempts to strengthen the case for representational externalism 
and functionalism by combining the virtues of both, his framework must ultimately 
still confront the problem of explaining how this ‘functional-representationalism’ may 
account for the transition from objective, external properties to our ubiquitous, 
subjective awareness of ‘what it is like’ to be this given subject (this problem is also 
noted by Wheeler 2010, p. 266 and Chalmers 2004, p. 163).  Such an explanation, I 
argue, shall forever elude Tye (1995), as his reductive representationalism demands 
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that phenomenal content be entirely contained in the properties of external objects, 
which means that Tye is entirely reliant upon his ‘poised’ functional state in order to 
convert this external, phenomenal content into internal, phenomenal awareness. A 
transition of this kind unequivocally overstretches functionalism, however, as our 
ubiquitous awareness of ‘what it is like’ encompasses something beyond that which is 
accountable within purely functional terms (this is the ‘zombie argument’ espoused 
by Chalmers 1996, see chapter 1.1), and so, at best, all Tye (1995) can maintain is that 
‘poise’ somehow exists as a prerequisite for phenomenal content, but in no way acts 
as an explanation for phenomenal awareness.  
 
Thus, the disparity between representational content and phenomenal awareness 
seems to persist, and Tye is left unable to explain how this external content may 
produce the internal states of ‘being aware of a general sense of buoyancy, of 
quickened reactions, of somehow being more alive’ (Tye 2002, p. 144) that Tye 
(2002) himself acknowledges as ‘experienced qualities of oneself’ (p. 144). Simply, 
Tye’s framework is left incapable of establishing a convincing argument for why 
functionalism may be used to explain how external content produces states of internal 
awareness, as it seems in order to explain these states Tye must posit an internal, 
experiential awareness of ‘what it is like’ that seems entirely incompatible with 
functionalism and reductive representationalism, or indeed any physicalist account.  
 
As a result, Tye’s thesis offers no distinct explanatory value to the problem of 
conscious experience, by virtue of ultimately failing to overcome the issue of 
explaining phenomenal awareness in purely representational terms. Further, this 
failure to capture the fundamental nature of phenomenal experience seems to neatly 
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typify the issues underpinning all reductive representationalist accounts, as all such 
frameworks seem predicated upon an attempt to massage phenomenal character in 
order to fit the reductive, physicalist framework. As I have attempted to explicate 
within this chapter, these attempts to manipulate phenomenal experience in order to 
explain its reduction to physical, external properties result in highly counter-intuitive 
conclusions that seem to either contravene our understanding of evolutionary theory, 
or fail to capture the locus of experiential awareness that seems so implicit to 
phenomenal experiences. As such, contrary to its intention of providing a physicalist 
account of phenomenal content, the explanatory failures of reductive 
representationalism leave us looking to anti-physicalism as a potential remedy to the 
issues of misrepresentation that arise upon attempting to place phenomenal awareness 
within the framework of physical reductivism.  
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Chapter 5 
The Phenomenal Concept Strategy 
 
As my account of the physicalist solutions to the problem of consciousness draws to a 
close, we witness a common pattern emerging amidst the failed attempts to 
reductively account for phenomenal experience. All of which seem to acknowledge 
the difficulty of fully accounting for experiential qualities, and so attempt to massage 
our conception of what phenomenal experience actually is in order to produce a 
framework in which this warped depiction of quasi-consciousness is purportedly 
physically explained. As I have explicated throughout, all such theories ultimately fail 
precisely because any misrepresentation of phenomenal experience leaves the 
ontological gap underpinning the hard problem wholly intact, which, as I explained in 
the previous chapter, leaves us looking to anti-physical metaphysical frameworks 
capable of fully accounting for the identity of experiential qualities.  
 
In response to these failings, contemporary proponents of physicalism have attempted 
to save their framework by positing that this apparent ontological gap underpinning 
physical and phenomenal content can be avoided upon establishing that the ‘hard’ 
problem is nothing beyond an epistemic disparity between physical and phenomenal 
concepts. Thus, proponents of the ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ (see Loar 1990/9 
Carruthers & Veillet 2007, Balog 2009/12, Papineau 2002) contend that if the 
conceptual, epistemic problems underpinning the hard problem can be solved in a 
manner compatible with physicalism, then ‘sufficient doubt’ has been cast unto the 
‘the anti-physicalist arguments that link semantic/epistemic gaps with ontological 
gaps’ (Balog 2012, p. 9). An analysis of this attempt to avoid the metaphysical issue 
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of accounting for the ontology of non-spatial experiential phenomena, and in turn, 
uphold an appeal to monistic physicalism via reducing the problem of consciousness 
to a problem within our epistemic/conceptual frameworks, shall act as the focus of 
this chapter. I begin with a brief explication of the recognitional and constitutional 
formations of the strategy, before concluding that, if, as explicated in chapter 2, the 
‘easy’ problem of epistemic justification cannot be disentwined from the ‘hard’ 
problem, then any conceptual strategy must ultimately fall back on a metaphysical 
dualism that leaves the ontological gap wholly intact (similar arguments are employed 
by various philosophers of mind, see Livingston 2013, Tartaglia 2015, Furst 2008). 
By the end of this chapter, I hope to have compounded my case for dismissing 
physicalistic monism, and re-affirmed the need for an anti-physicalist solution to the 
hard problem that is capable of accommodating the troublesome nature of the 
ontological gap.  
 
As my starting point, I employ Chalmers’s (2010) elucidation of the phenomenal 
concept strategy, or, what he terms, ‘type B materialism’: 
 
‘Proponents put forward a thesis C (the phenomenal concept strategy) attributing 
certain psychological features — call these the key features — to human beings. They 
argue (i) that C is true, i.e. that humans actually have the key features; (ii) that C 
explains our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness, i.e. that C explains why 
we are confronted with the relevant distinctive epistemic gaps; and (iii) that C itself 
can be explained in physical terms, i.e. that one can (at least in principle) give a 
materialistically acceptable explanation of how it is that humans have the key 
feature.’ (p. 311) 
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Thus, the arguments underpinning attempts to employ phenomenal concepts in order 
to strengthen the case for physicalism seem best elucidated as follows:  
 
If we experience an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal concepts, and 
 
1. All cognitive states are physical states. 
2. Phenomenal and physical concepts are states of cognition. 
3. Thus, both physical and phenomenal concepts must, as states of cognition, 
ultimately reference physical states. 
 
Then, there must be an explanation, which is consistent with physicalism, for why we 
experience a conceptual and epistemic gap. 
 
So, as distinct from type A materialism, which appeals to an illusionism of the kind 
explicated within chapter 3 of this thesis, type B materialism attempts to ‘locate the 
gap in the relationship between our concepts of physical processes and our concepts 
of phenomenal processes’ (Chalmers 2010, p. 305) so as to explain why many 
philosophers ostensibly mistakenly conclude that the explanatory gap at the core of 
the hard problem is an ontological gap. Thus, the central contention underpinning the 
phenomenal concept strategy (henceforth referenced as the ‘PCS’) is that the 
purported ‘hardness’ of the hard problem is accounted for entirely by the dualistic 
nature of our concepts, not the dualistic nature of reality. Meaning that our tendency 
to conclude that our phenomenal experience of ‘what it is like’ to experience pain is 
ontologically distinct from pain identified as physical ‘C-fibre stimulations’, or our 
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capacity to conceive of our physical duplicate being devoid of phenomenal 
experience, arise solely because our phenomenal concepts are epistemologically 
isolated from our physical conceptualizations. Thus, the PCS, as a physicalist 
strategy, appeals to conceptual dualism (phenomenal concepts exhibit certain features 
that epistemologically isolate them from physical concepts) whilst firmly maintaining 
ontological monism.  
 
This framework is underpinned by an appeal to disentwine our concepts of 
phenomenal properties from the properties themselves. So that, our concept of 
phenomenal experience (Q) is nothing beyond the way in which we conceptualize and 
think about Q, which is distinct from the properties of Q that exist isolated from said 
thoughts and conceptualizations. Thus, whilst the concept of Q I have employed 
throughout this thesis is one of Q existing as a unified, intuitive awareness of ‘what it 
is like’; proponents of the PCS (see Loar 1990, Carruthers & Veillet 2007) highlight 
that, ultimately, all this conveys is that I hold certain physically reducible cognitive 
tools that allow me to infer concepts pertaining to the properties of Q, not that these 
concepts in any way reveal the fundamental nature of the properties of Q. Thus, the 
PCS employs an appeal to the epistemic primacy of our concepts, as, upon employing 
phenomenal concepts, our cognitive tools purportedly inhibit our capacity to truly 
know the properties of Q as a fundamentally physical structure devoid of the 
conceptualizations we employ. If this is upheld, advocates of the PCS conclude that 
the explanatory gap underpinning the hard problem is accounted for by disparities 
within our physical and phenomenal concepts, not necessarily by disparities within 
physical and phenomenal properties, so that the problem is immediately reduced to an 
issue of accounting for this conceptual, not ontological, dualism. Hence, Loar (1990-
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9) and Carruthers & Veillet (2007) contend that this enables us to uphold an appeal to 
monistic physicalism, as the apparent ontological gap underpinning the hard problem 
is immediately reduced to an epistemic disparity within our conceptualizations that is 
entirely consistent with physicalism. As Loar (1990) attests: disentwining our 
concepts of Q from the properties of Q that exist independently of our 
conceptualizations leaves the anti-physicalist only able to affirm an epistemic 
disparity in our conceptualizations, and provides no basis from which to argue for an 
ontological distinction between phenomenal and physical properties (p. 203).  
 
It is this move to supplant the ontological problem with an epistemological problem 
that is the strength of the PCS as a physicalist framework. As, upon reducing the 
problem to a disparity in our concepts, the physicalist avoids having to account for the 
ontology of non-physical experiential properties, and instead is able to uphold an 
appeal to monistic physicalism, via reducing the hard problem to the problem of 
epistemic isolation that occurs upon attempting to plot our concepts of phenomenal 
properties alongside our concepts of physical properties. This appeal to the epistemic 
isolation of phenomenal concepts seems implicit to all attempts to bring physicalism 
in line with PCS, with all contending that phenomenal concepts necessarily contain 
certain ‘special features’ (Tye 1999, p. 707) that are both largely overlooked by the 
anti-physicalist movement and wholly account for the explanatory gap that underlies 
the hard problem.  Further, according to Loar (1990), once our understanding of the 
special epistemic isolation of phenomenal concepts is established, we will glean a 
means from which to ‘take the phenomenological intuition at face value, accept 
introspective (phenomenal) concepts and their conceptual irreducibility, and at the 
same time take phenomenal qualities to be identical with physical-functional 
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properties of the sort envisaged by contemporary brain science’ (p. 196). Thus, at 
foundation, the PCS rests upon an attempt to cast ‘sufficient doubt’ (Balog 2012, p. 9) 
unto the anti-physicalist appeal to account for the explanatory gap in ontological 
terms, via upholding the central claim that iff the epistemic isolation underlying the 
disparity between phenomenal and physical concepts can be accounted for in a 
manner compatible with physicalism, then the hard problem is solved without having 
appealed to an ontological gap.  
 
As such, the efficacy of the PCS as a physicalist strategy seems to rest entirely upon 
its capacity to explain why we witness the ‘special features’ (Tye 1999, p. 707) that 
account for the epistemic isolation of phenomenal concepts, and, more importantly, 
how the epistemic disparity between phenomenal and physical concepts arose if, at 
foundation, all concepts reference the same physically reductive properties. Indeed, it 
is a cogent account of how and why this conceptual dualism arose alongside a 
monistic physicalism that motivates all physicalist phenomenal concept strategies. 
Further, an explanation of this kind seems particularly pressing for the physicalist, 
especially in light of the intuitive anti-physicalist contention that if we endorse 
monistic physicalism, and uphold the claim that all concepts must be 
epistemologically consistent with their referent, then it seems intuitive that all 
conceptualisations must be as epistemologically monistic as the physically monistic 
properties they reference. Such that, if all concepts are referential of certain physical 
qualities, and these qualities are all that exist, then there should be no means of 
explaining how the distinguishing ‘special features' of phenomenal concepts, which 
purportedly account for the disparity between our physical and phenomenal 
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conceptualisations, arose, and, as such, no means from which to explain the epistemic 
gap without appealing to an ontological gap.  
 
Advocates of the PCS invoke an array of accounts to explain how monistic 
physicalism gives rise to this disparity in our epistemic framework. However, due to 
the limited scope of this thesis I intend to focus upon the most widely held of these, 
namely, the recognitional (see Loar 1990, Carruthers & Veillet 2007) and 
constitutional (see Balog 2012, Papineau 2002) accounts. The first of these, Loar’s 
(1990) recognitional strategy, attempts to explain conceptual dualism as a natural 
corollary of the distinction between theoretical concepts that reference the referent 
physically, and ‘first-order’ demonstrative-recognitional phenomenal concepts that 
directly ‘recognise’ certain neurological states: 
 
‘Phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts that pick out certain internal 
properties; these are physical-functional properties of the brain. They are the 
concepts we deploy in our phenomenological reflections; and there is no good 
philosophical reason to deny that, odd though it may sound, the properties these 
conceptions phenomenologically reveal are physical-functional properties -- but not 
of course under physical-functional descriptions.’ (Loar 1990, p. 202)  
 
In this account, then, there is a distinction between our physical concepts, which 
conceptualise the mediated, second-order physical structures and functions of a 
referent, and phenomenal concepts, which conceptualise the same referent through an 
unmediated ‘direct process of recognition’ (Chalmers 2010, p. 182). Further, Loar 
(1990) maintains that these two distinct modes of conceptualisation confer equally 
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distinct ‘modes of presentation’ (p. 204), which he employs to explain the epistemic 
isolation of phenomenal concepts. By means of explication for this point, let us 
consider the concepts of C-fibres firing and phenomenal pain. Loar’s contention is 
that the physical concept of C-fibres firing holds a distinct ‘second-order’ indirect 
mode of presentation to the ‘first order’ direct mode of presentation that accompanies 
the phenomenal concept of pain, and it is these disparities in modes of presentation 
that confer disparities in the way in which we come to recognise the phenomenal and 
physical concepts that are, at foundation, reducible to the same physical referent. So 
that the physical mode of presentation presents the referent as the mediated, 
neurological process of C-fibre stimulation, whilst the phenomenal mode of 
presentation presents the neurological substrate of C-fibre excitation as an 
unmediated, direct recognition of pain. Thus, the phenomenal mode of presentation 
confers no means from which to know a priori that there is any physical concept of C-
fibre excitation to accompany their direct phenomenal concept of pain, and the 
physical mode of presentation confers no means from which to know a priori that 
there is any phenomenal concept of pain to accompany the physical concept of C-
fibre excitation.  
 
In line with this, Loar (1990) maintains that, as it is not true a priori that C-fibres 
firing is pain; we can discern no a priori link between our physical and phenomenal 
concepts27. So, it is this combination of our inability to link these concepts a priori, 
																																																								
27 It is of interest to note here that Loar’s (1990) argument is strikingly similar to the identity theory 
espoused by Smart (1959). The primary difference is that Smart (1959) rejects the notion of direct 
phenomenal concepts, and instead maintains that the mental concept of pain is nothing beyond the 
designator of a specific functional role, so that our concept of pain does nothing more than to pick out a 
specific physical-functional property, which is a property of the brain (i.e. the brain state). Thus, whilst 
Smart (1959) maintains that, ultimately, mental concepts are functional concepts, and employs the 
notion that we can use the functional concept without knowing which brain state plays the function, in 
order to establish the lack of an a priori link between mental and physical concepts, Loar (1990) relies 
	 108	
and the distinct and direct nature of phenomenal ‘modes of presentation’ that, 
according to proponents of the recognitional framework, account for the epistemic 
isolation of phenomenal concepts. Thus, the central move in Loar’s framework is an 
attempt to rely upon the ‘special, direct features’ of phenomenal concepts to explain 
why ‘the idea that one picks out the phenomenal quality of cramp feeling by way of a 
particular feeling of cramp…is hardly incompatible with holding that the phenomenal 
quality is a physical property’ (Loar 1990, p. 205). Indeed, proponents of this strategy 
contend that employing distinct modes of presentation provides a sufficient means to 
explain how distinct concepts arise from the same referent, and provides a grounding 
to appeal to the primacy of monistic physicalism, via explaining cases such as: 
 
Phenomenal Pain (Y) = Neurological stimulation (X) 
 
As, the concepts for Y and X both ultimately derive from the same referent (the 
neurological brain state), but simply deploy distinct modes of presentation that 
consequently confer distinctions in how we come to recognise said referent. So, 
Loar’s (1990) basic thesis is that phenomenal pain (Y) does not provide any 
information about the fundamental physical structures of the neurological referent 
(X), but instead simply picks them out through unmediated, direct reference. 
 
The strength of this thesis, and arguably the reason of its lasting appeal, rests within 
this notion that our phenomenal concepts directly denote brain states. As, it is this that 
granted Loar (1990) a framework with the potential to solve the Kripkean (1980) 
																																																																																																																																																														
upon the ‘directness’ of phenomenal concepts to establish the same thing. Thus, we witness two very 
similar means of avoiding any a priori link between physical and mental concepts. Smart’s (1959) 
thesis shall be covered in more detail shortly. 
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argument for identity that had so plagued Smart’s (1959) appeals to functionalism. In 
what follows, I shall provide a brief explication of these arguments, in the hope that, 
in so doing, I may facilitate a deeper elucidation of the strengths of Loar’s 
recognitional account.  
 
Smart’s (1959) attempt to maintain a mind-brain type identity theory, and Kripke’s 
subsequent objections, take foundation within Frege’s (1948) thesis that the same 
referent can confer two distinct ‘senses’ that equally confer two distinct concepts, or 
terms, which can be used to denote the same referent. This contention is most 
famously captured within Frege’s (1948) notion that ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is true, 
even though such a conclusion may seem unintuitive to those who only know that the 
concept ‘Phosphorus’ references the red hue of a ‘morning star’ and the concept 
‘Hesperus’ references the blue hue of an ‘evening star’ (p. 215). This confusion, as 
Frege highlights, arises as a result of both ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ both denoting 
the same referent (the planet Venus) but simply connoting this referent amidst 
different ‘senses’, or, what Loar (1990) might term, different ‘modes of presentation’ 
(p. 203). So, the concept ‘Hesperus’ references Venus indirectly amidst the ‘blue hue’ 
mode of presentation that occurs upon Venus appearing in the evening, and 
‘Phosphorus’ references Venus indirectly amidst the ‘red hue’ of the morning. Thus, 
as Frege (1948) points out, we glean a means from which to explain how two senses 
may arise from the same referent, and how these senses may ‘indirectly’ (p. 212) 
connote two different senses, whilst simultaneously denoting the same reference.  
 
For Smart (1959), this notion of indirect reference was enough to ground his 
functional theory of identity, in which he attempted to argue that, upon referencing 
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‘pain’, we do nothing beyond connoting a function, which subsequently denotes a 
brain state with that function. So, for Smart (1959), just as both Hesperus and 
Phosphorus denote Venus, but fail to capture the fundamental features of this referent 
by virtue of denoting it indirectly amidst the red/blue hue mode of presentation, our 
concept of pain denotes the underlying property of the brain which is identical to pain, 
but fails to connote the fundamental physical features of this neurological referent. 
Thus, Smart’s (1959) central contention is that, upon, for example, referencing a 
phenomenal experience of ‘pain’, we are directly connoting the function of a 
neurological property, and, in so doing, are indirectly denoting the neurological bearer 
of this function, whilst leaving the fundamental physical nature of this property 
conceptually unrecognised. So, at foundation, just like in the Hesperus/Phosphorus 
case, these indirect references ultimately denote a singular referent, which, as far as 
Smart (1959) is concerned, must be the physical brain.   
 
The problem with this, as Kripke’s (1980) anti-physicalist objection points out, is that 
unlike in the Hesperus = Phosphorus case, in which both concepts ‘pick out’ their 
referent indirectly, phenomenal concepts must necessarily ‘pick out’ their referent 
directly as the very phenomenal property they are referent to, as: 
 
‘To be in the same epistemic situation that would obtain if one had a pain is to have a 
pain; to be in the same epistemic situation that would obtain in the absence of 
pain is not to have a pain…. Pain … is not picked out by one of its accidental 
properties; rather it is picked out by its immediate phenomenological quality…. If any 
phenomenon is picked out in exactly the same way that we pick out pain, then that 
phenomenon is pain.’  (Kripke 1980, p. 152–53) 
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With this established, we reveal the strength of Loar’s (1990) notion that phenomenal 
concepts ‘directly’ reference brain states. As, in positing this, Loar successfully 
avoids Kripke’s (1980) convincing objection to Smart (1959), via firmly maintaining 
that our phenomenal concept of ‘pain’ does not connote anything, and instead simply 
directly denotes the neurological referent that is pain. Indeed, according to Loar 
(1990) it is the ‘direct’, first-person relationship between physical, cognitive brain 
states and physical, neurological referents, which confers the ‘directness’ of our 
phenomenal concepts and, in turn, confers the ‘phenomenal mode of presentation’ 
that accounts for the disparity between phenomenal and physical concepts. So, as 
distinct from Smart’s (1959) thesis, Loar (1990) maintains that, upon applying the 
phenomenal concept of ‘pain’, we hold a special, direct relation to the neurological 
referent that is pain, which is distinct from the relation we hold to second-order, 
physical concepts that attempt to theoretically ‘pick out’ and analyse the structure of 
this neurological referent.  
 
So, Loar’s thesis hinges upon this distinction between mediated, second-order 
physical concepts, which present the referent physically via theoretically and 
structurally analysing the underlying physical structures of said neurological referents, 
and unmediated, direct first-order phenomenal concepts which present these 
neurological referents directly and phenomenally in a way that confers the directness 
of our physically constituted cognition to these neurological referents, but does not 
structurally analyse the underlying physicality of said neurological referent. Thus, it is 
Loar’s insistence that phenomenal concepts directly reference neurological structures 
that has allowed him to simultaneously avoid the issues faced by Smart (1959), whilst 
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providing a befitting explanation for how the hard problem may be reduced to a 
difference in how our concepts come to present the same fundamentally physical, 
neurological referent.  
 
With the strengths of Loar’s (1990) thesis established, I shall briefly devote some time 
to a particular area of confusion, which has caused certain anti-physicalists (see 
Horgan & Tienson 2001) to misrepresent Loar’s (1990) contentions, before 
concluding that, even upon correcting the arguments that arise as a result of said 
misrepresentations, Loar (1990) must still account for how phenomenal modes of 
presentation arise from purely neurological referents.  In order to explicate such 
claims, I begin with the confusion that arises upon attempting to delineate what 
exactly is meant by the claim that the ‘phenomenal mode of presentation’ for ‘pain’ 
confers a phenomenal concept that directly references neurological structures 
(physically), whilst failing to reveal the fundamental physical nature of these 
structures (in this case C-fibre stimulation).  It is this notion of phenomenal concepts, 
and in turn phenomenal modes of presentation, ‘directly’ denoting a neurological 
referent whilst seemingly not being reliant upon the fundamental, physical nature of 
this referent in order to ‘directly’ reference pain, which has caused a confusion amidst 
some philosophers of mind, and has led to certain philosophers misconstruing Loar’s 
(1990) contentions. This is especially prevalent in Horgan & Tienson (2001), who 
seem to espouse that if Loar (1990) contends that phenomenal concepts reveal this 
phenomenal mode of pain ‘directly and essentially’ (p. 199), in a way that ‘captures 
the essence’ (p. 203) of ‘phenomenal modes of presentation’ (or phenomenal 
properties) as ‘things-in-themselves’ without ever appealing to physical properties, 
then the recognitional account ‘deconstructs’ itself: 
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1. ‘When a phenomenal property (P) is conceived under a phenomenal concept 
(C), this property is conceived otherwise than as a physical-functional 
property. 
 
2. When a phenomenal property is conceived under a phenomenal concept, this 
property is conceived directly, as it is in itself. 
 
3. If (i) a property P is conceived, under a concept C, otherwise than as a 
physical-functional property, and (ii) P is conceived, under C, as it is in itself, 
then P is not a physical-functional property. 
 
Hence,  
 
4. Phenomenal properties are not physical-functional properties.’  
(Horgan & Tienson 2001, p. 310) 
 
Thus, Horgan & Tienson (2001) argue that if a phenomenal property confers a 
phenomenal mode of presentation that distances our phenomenal concept from its 
neurological referent, so that when referencing ‘pain’ we conceive of the concept ‘as 
it is in itself’ purely phenomenally (as distinct from the physical referent of C-fibre 
excitation), and, under Loar’s own admission, this concept confers no understanding 
over the physical-functional structures of the brain, then is it not intuitive to conclude 
that the physical-functional referent is superfluous to an explanation of these 
phenomenal properties, and, in turn, conclude that phenomenal properties encompass 
a distinct phenomenal ontology which, crucially, is not reducible to ‘physical-
functional’ properties? The problem with this account, as Sundstrom (2011) 
formulates, is that Horgan & Tienson (2011) seem to misrepresent Loar’s (1990/9) 
framework in their formulation of premise 2, as it is not clear that ‘capturing the 
essence’ of something necessarily confers revealing its inner nature as a ‘thing-in-
itself’, indeed, as Sundstrom (2011) highlights, Loar explicitly distinguishes between 
two opposing uses of ‘capture the essence of’: 
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‘On one use, it expresses a referential notion that comes to no more than 'directly 
rigidly designate'. On the other, it means something like 'be conceptually 
interderivable with some theoretical predicate that reveal the internal structure of the 
designated property.’ (Loar 1990, p. 203) 
 
According to Sundstrom (2011), and I would agree, ‘Loar only ever acknowledges 
that phenomenal concepts "capture the essence" of phenomenal qualities in the former 
sense’ (p. 276). Upon shedding this clarity unto Loar’s account, we see that Horgan & 
Tienson (2001) fall foul to misrepresenting Loar (1990) by virtue of maintaining that 
phenomenal concepts ‘reveal the internal structure of the designated (phenomenal) 
property’ (Loar 1990, p. 203).  This seems to be something Loar must necessarily 
deny in order to maintain his appeal to physicalism, and as such, phenomenal 
concepts must simply ‘directly rigidly designate’ (Loar 1990, p. 203) a phenomenal 
property without revealing anything about the fundamentally physical, neurological 
‘internal structure’ of phenomenal properties.  
 
Whilst this articulation seems to save the recognitional account from the 
deconstruction espoused by Horgan & Tienson (2001), I argue that it is possible to 
reformulate the argument of Horgan & Tienson (2001) in a manner that avoids the 
issue highlighted by Sundstrom (2011), by simply not committing ourselves to the 
claim that ‘capturing the essence’ of a referent should necessarily imply that we 
reveal its structure. In this regard, the argument could be reframed by contending that, 
upon maintaining that phenomenal concepts ‘directly rigidly designate’ their 
fundamentally neurological referents whilst failing to reveal the ‘internal structure’ of 
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this referent, Loar must still account for how the phenomenal modes of presentation, 
which are our ‘direct’ experiences of pain, simultaneously arise from, and distance us 
from, the underlying neurological structures of their referent. As, if phenomenal 
concepts directly refer to neurological referents ‘as they are in themselves’, but the 
phenomenal mode of presentation causes us to conceive of this referent 
phenomenally, in a way that hinders our capacity to recognise the fundamentally 
physical neurological structures of the referent, then we must ask how a 
neurologically constituted phenomenal mode of presentation (or phenomenal 
property) can be a phenomenal experience, and, in turn, must ask how this 
‘phenomenal mode of presentation’ can distance us from this neurological referent, 
without itself being something beyond a neurological structure. As Perry (2001) 
formulates Max Black’s argument for property dualism: 
 
‘Even if we identify experiences with brain states, there is still the question of what 
makes the brain state an experience, and the experience it is; it seems like that must 
be an additional property the brain state has…There must be a property that serves as 
our mode of presentation of the experience as an experience.’ (p. 101) 
 
So, in highlighting this failure to account for how this phenomenal mode of 
presentation arose from a purely neurological referent, this argument seems to lead 
the recognitional account back to the very ontological distinction it is attempting to 
deny. Indeed, as I shall explore later in this chapter, the need to fall back on 
ontologically distinct experiential properties seems to be a recurring theme for 
proponents of the PCS.   
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As such, the recognitional account seems to face a problem. However, prior to 
establishing any further issues with this account, it seems prudent to first elucidate a 
further conceptual strategy, the constitutional account `(see Papineau 2002, Balog 
2012), that has the potential to provide further detail to the explanatory power of the 
recognitional account. Like the recognitional account, this framework employs the 
‘special nature’ of phenomenal concepts to explain the explanatory gap, so that: 
 
‘From [the perspective of the referent constitution view], the puzzle that the 
explanatory gap presents is rather a trick the mind plays on itself as a result of the 
peculiar cognitive architecture involved in first-person phenomenal thought.’ (Balog 
2012, p. 31) 
 
Thus, in essence, this account attempts to further explain Loar’s (1990/9) appeals to 
‘phenomenal modes of presentation’, and in turn explain the ‘directness’ of 
phenomenal concepts appealed to within the recognitional account, via bringing ‘first-
person phenomenal thought’ in line with the neurological ‘trick’ of the mind that 
accompanies our phenomenal concepts. Such that, upon holding a phenomenal 
concept, the brain constitutes a token experience, representative of the neurologically 
constituted experiential type the concept is referent to, which enables us to match the 
referent of this concept to future token experiences of this concept. Further, it is this 
token experience that produces the ‘phenomenal mode of presentation’, or ‘trick of 
the mind’, that accounts for the ‘directness’ of our phenomenal concepts, and, in turn, 
accounts for the explanatory gap. Tye (2009) describes Balog’s thesis as follows: 
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‘Phenomenal concept C, as used by subject S, refers to a phenomenal property or type 
P if, were S confronted with any token of P, she would judge that that token is a token 
of the same kind of experience as this token of P, where this token is an experience 
that S is undergoing and that thereby partly constitutes S’s token of C.’ (p. 48) 
 
So, upon employing the phenomenal concept of pain, ‘an instance of the referent is 
literally (physically) present in the concept, therefore there will be always something 
it is like to token the concept in those applications’ (Balog 2012, p. 7). Meaning that, 
in the course of introspecting about pain, we employ a phenomenal concept that 
produces a neurologically constituted token experience that represents ‘what it is like’ 
to actually undergo pain. Papineau (2002) explains this token experience in terms of 
an imaginative act, in which the concept of pain is constituted in the neurological 
states that produce the token experience of pain required to imaginatively employ pain 
as a referent (p. 116-120). This, according to Balog (2012), occurs because the neural 
constitution of the brain ‘matters for reference, both in terms of reference fixing, and 
in terms of how the concept cognitively presents its reference’ (p. 7), thus, upon 
remembering a phenomenal concept, the brain constitutes that concept neurologically 
so as to produce a ‘first hand’ token experience that represents the experience type 
‘pain’ the concept references. Further, it is these neurologically constituted 
‘recreations’ of token experiences that allow us to match the ‘sameness’ of one 
phenomenal concept to another, so that we may effectively assimilate the 
informational content of a referent and fix it to an appropriate phenomenal concept.  
 
As Crane (2005) typifies, it is our neurological capacity to ‘recreate, stimulate or 
otherwise involve referents’ (p. 156) that enables Papineau and Balog to explain why 
	 118	
anti-physicalist philosophers often conclude in favour of ontological dualism. The 
argument goes that because these phenomenal concepts neurologically constitute 
token representations of the type of experiential states they are referent to, and 
physical concepts do not, then it is relatively easy to see why philosophers conclude 
that these concepts must be referencing distinct ontological properties. Thus, at 
foundation, the constitutional account just adds further explanatory weight to the 
recognitional account provided by Loar (1990/9), with both ultimately contending that 
the explanatory gap is accounted for by the ‘trick of the mind’ that occurs upon 
employing a phenomenal concept, and, crucially, maintaining that it is the special, 
direct nature of this ‘trick’ that seems to epistemologically isolate these concepts from 
their physical counterparts.  
 
The problem with this strategy, as Tye  (2009, p. 48) very briefly highlights, is that 
Balog must account for our capacity to judge between distinct experiential tokens 
arising from the same type of referent, and in order to do this, it seems the 
constitutional account would need a concept of phenomenal character. As it seems 
clear that in order to account for our capacity to judge the ‘sameness’ or distinctness 
of disparate tokens of experience, the constitutional account must posit a concept of 
phenomenal character that infers a unified experiencer, capable of judging ‘what it is 
like’ to hold different token experiences through time. This, I argue, is intuitive, as in 
order to identify one token experience as the same as another, this ‘sameness’ must be 
constituted in the unified, intuitive awareness of ‘what it is like’, so that ‘phenomenal 
sameness becomes a sameness of phenomenal character’ (Tye 2009, p. 48) that allows 
us to judge experiences as another of this or that kind. Without this, as Tye (2009) 
formulates, we would lose our capacity to demarcate different token intensities of 
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pain, leaving us unable to delineate between the dull, incessant pain of an ache, and 
the intense pain of burning. The problem with this, of course, is that as soon as the 
constitutional account admits reliance upon this experientially unified phenomenal 
character, then it seems to be positing a distinct ontology beyond that of a purely 
physical-functional iteration that frequently falls foul to conceptual ‘tricks of the 
mind’.  
 
Moreover, whilst Tye’s articulation of this problem ends with his denouncement of 
the constitutional account, I posit that this inability to account for phenomenal 
character, construed as I have throughout as a unified intuitive awareness of ‘what it 
is like’, presents a deeper problem for all those who attempt to employ the PCS as a 
framework capable of saving physicalism from the ontological gap.  The fundamental 
problem is that recognitional and constitutional accounts both rely upon a capacity to 
recognise or ‘fix’ referents to their appropriate concepts. However, I argue that, in 
taking this capacity for ‘reference fixing’ (Balog 2012, p. 7) as a given, the advocates 
of the PCS rest their framework upon the faulty premise that purely physical-
functional cognitive tools necessarily confer the capacity to appropriately and causally 
unite a referent to a concept.  
 
So, the fundamentals of this problem re-affirm the contentions I put forth in chapter 2 
involving the difficulty of establishing concept formation without first positing a 
phenomenal unity capable of uniting disparate sense data experientially and non-
conceptually. As such, my contention is that the tendency for conceptual strategies to 
infer that we recognise, or fix, a concept to a referent, and then neurologically recreate 
said referent in every instantiation of the concept, must first be predicated upon an 
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explanation of how we can account for the non-conceptual unification required to 
‘ground’, and in turn recognize/conceptualize a referent, in the first place. And, as, at 
present, there is no convincing physical explanation for how concepts are grounded in 
this way, I maintain that we remain reliant upon phenomenal properties in order to 
solve the ‘concept-grounding problem’ (see Floridi 2012 and chapter 2 of this thesis 
for a deeper examination of this problem).  
 
In order to effectively elucidate the intricacies of this position, let us return to the 
depiction of concept formation as outlined in chapter 2. This formation attempts to 
highlight the issue of physically explaining how we come to recognise, link, or judge 
referent A as corresponding to concept B without first positing an explanation for how 
we come to be in the state of neurological unity that allows for this link to be ‘picked 
out’. As explicated in chapter 2, the theory that currently holds the most promise in 
explaining this capacity is a theory of experiential parts in conjunction with the unity 
thesis espoused by Chalmers & Bayne (2003), in which we may account for 
experiential unity by initially positing sense data A/B as experiential parts of a wider 
experiential whole, which subsume into a ‘conjoint phenomenology for both states’ 
(Chalmers & Bayne 2003, p. 37). Without this, a purely physical-functional depiction 
of the brain faces the inevitable struggle of accounting for how the informational 
differences necessary for the formation of concepts may be ‘picked out’, without 
either falling foul to Papineau’s (1993) issue of granting the brain an already fully 
realised set of concepts (and thus facing the issue of explaining how concepts arose 
initially), or first positing a ‘conjoint phenomenology’ capable of unifying potentially 
diffuse and chaotic sense data and/or brain states. 
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This contention reaches to the core of my aims in chapter 2, in which I attempt to link 
the ‘easy’ problem of epistemic justification to the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness. 
Here, I maintain that the lack of a physical solution to the ‘easy’ problems leaves us 
potentially entirely reliant upon phenomenal properties in order to bring unity to an 
otherwise disparate and chaotic ‘outer world’ with the potential to confer equally 
disparate and chaotic sense data, and maintain that, without such properties, we are 
left with no convincing explanation for how the conceptualisations that underpin our 
‘power to judge’ (McDowell 2008, p. 10) are produced. So, it seems that, without a 
physical explanation for both how concepts arise from purely physical properties, and 
why epistemic justification and conceptual formations seem to be experience-
dependent, the explanatory success of the PCS, in the first instance of concept 
formation, remains reliant upon this non-conceptual phenomenal unity28, which seems 
entirely irreducible to any form of ‘trick of the mind’, to explain our capacity to link 
that initial referent to that initial phenomenal concept. Further, I argue that if we 
accept the possibility that this initial phenomenal state ‘grounds’ concepts29, then this 
initial state necessarily avoids the issues of neurological, conceptual ‘tricks’ or 
‘misrepresentations’ relied upon by the PCS to explain the explanatory gap, as such 
tricks can only occur after the first phenomenal concepts have been produced by this 
																																																								
28 Here I am referencing the phenomenal model of concept acquisition outlined in chapter 2 (see page 
50), in which it is argued that without phenomenal properties we would (currently) be devoid of an 
explanation for how we achieved the capacity to form an inner locus in which referent R is matched 
with competing referents that are ~ R, and, subsequently, would lose both our capacity to explain how 
we extract (or ‘pick out’) information about R, as well as our capacity to explain how we form a 
concept to denote R. Moreover, as our current epistemic framework seems predicated upon our ability 
to produce conceptualisations, and as ‘what it is like’ sensations are epistemologically and conceptually 
blank (in relation to R or ~ R or indeed any referent) prior to extracting information about the nature of 
these referents within unified experiences, I argue that, in lieu of an adequate physical explanation for 
how concepts are initially formed, we are right to consider the possibility that this unified, experiential 
awareness of ‘what it is like’ is both, at least partially, epistemologically fundamental and, initially, 
entirely non-conceptual. 
29 In line with my contentions throughout chapter 2, I argue that without a physical solution to the 
symbol-grounding problem, the physicalist must accept the possibility that concepts are grounded 
phenomenally.   
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initial, non-conceptual experiential state. So, it seems the fundamental problem with 
the PCS is that without an adequate physical account of concept formation, it either 
becomes grounded within an, as yet unarticulated, adequate physical theory of 
concept acquisition (but in so doing recognises that the viability of the PCS as a 
solution to the ‘hard’ problem is entirely questionable until this future physical theory 
of concept acquisition has been articulated), or relies upon non-conceptual experience 
to account for the later conceptual ‘tricks’ that lull us into the mistaken belief that 
there is an ontological gap, but fails to explain how this initial non-conceptual 
experience, which seems entirely ontologically distinct from physical properties, 
arose in the first place. Ultimately, then, it seems that the extent to which we should 
accept the PCS is dependent upon the extent to which we accept that there will 
(eventually) be a physical solution to Chalmers’ (1995) purportedly ‘easy’ problems. 
However, as articulated (see chapter 2), it is not, at present, convincing that such 
problems will ever be physically solved, and, as a result, the PCS is potentially left 
reliant upon, but entirely unable to physically account for, experiential qualities. As a 
result, it seems the PCS, as a purported solution to the ‘hard’ problem, cannot be 
taken seriously without being substantiated by an (as yet unarticulated) adequate 
physical theory of concept acquisition.  Without this, not unlike reductive 
representationalism and eliminativism, we are left with a physicalist strategy that 
necessarily fails to convincingly incorporate experiential properties into the 
physicalist metaphysic.   
 
So, as we reach the end of this chapter, and indeed the end of my examination of 
some of the major physicalist responses to the hard problem, we see that the two best 
means of reductively accounting for the ontology of phenomenal experience 
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(eliminativism and representationalism) fall foul to the problem of misrepresenting 
the problem of consciousness, and the best means of avoiding the ontological gap, via 
reframing it in epistemic terms, must incorporate phenomenal experience into its 
account of conceptual formation. Thus, whilst my account of the physical solutions to 
the hard problem is not exhaustive, we do witness that the ontological gap presents a 
metaphysical and epistemic void that some of the most championed contemporary 
physicalist frameworks are failing to accommodate for. In line with this, in my 
subsequent, and final, chapter I shall explore the most widely held contemporary anti-
physicalist frameworks, which champion a shift in our metaphysic from the 
physicalistic monism that has predominated much of contemporary philosophy and 
science, to an ontological dualism that has the potential to provide a metaphysic 
capable of accommodating the ontology of experiential qualities.  
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Chapter 6 
Towards a paradigm shift: supplanting monistic physicalism with 
ontological dualism 
 
‘Scientists [and philosophers] are like those levers of knobs or those boulders 
helpfully screwed into a climbing wall. Like the wall is some cemented material made 
by mixing knowledge, which is a purely human construct, with reality, which we can 
only access through the filter of our minds. There’s an important pursuit of objectivity 
in science [and philosophy] and nature and mathematics, but still the only way up is 
through the individual...In the end it’s personal, as much as we want to believe it’s 
objective.’ 
(Levin 2016, p. 189) 
 
So, like the scientist’s, the philosopher’s capacity to pursue truth is ultimately 
predicated upon a synthesis of our experiential capacity to measure reality and our 
capacity to produce knowledge as result of said measurements. Once this knowledge 
is assimilated, we begin to form a metaphysical ‘wall’ that provides an epistemic map 
of our reality, and propels the scientist forward; providing grounding from which to 
link one epistemic breakthrough to the next, with each breakthrough both 
compounding the efficacy of this metaphysical ‘climbing wall’, and streamlining the 
route to future epistemic advancement. However, as I have attempted to explicate 
throughout this thesis: in our creation of the wall, the contemporary mainstream have 
presupposed a physicalist metaphysic that, ultimately, inevitably, hinders the climb. 
We, amidst the naivety of our early epistemic breakthroughs, discounted the property 
that made the creation of the wall possible in the first place. We forgot experience. 
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And now our metaphysic is found lacking; its epistemic foundation crumbling under 
the weight of that which it can’t explain. So, we now face the consequence of our 
failure to incorporate experiential properties into our metaphysical ‘wall’ at the outset. 
Leaving science and philosophy hindered by the early evidential successes of the 
metaphysical ‘climbing wall’ of monistic physicalism, and now unable to reconcile 
the ontological commitments of physicalism alongside a befitting explanation of those 
non-physical, experiential properties, which make enquiry possible in the first place.  
 
And so, we reach the point of epistemic stagnation the philosophical and scientific 
disciplines face today, in which we confront this ‘hard’ problem and inevitably return 
to the question hinted at within the introduction of this thesis: can the experiential, 
observational property, which confers our means of measurement, employ purely 
physical-functional quantifications in order to effectively measure itself in entirety? 
The answer to this, in light of chapters 1, 3, 4 and 5, is, I hope, now clear. As, in order 
to maintain the coherency of physicalism, the physicalist arguments must persistently 
manipulate and misrepresent what conscious experience actually is in order to make it 
consistent with their metaphysic.  
 
Thus, far from providing a coherent physicalist explanation of experiential qualities, 
these arguments only serve in affirming our inability to rely upon physical-functional 
arguments or quantifications to effectively ‘measure’, or in any way comprehensively 
explain, that which provides our means of measurement. Nor, I argue, should we 
expect consciousness to physically account for itself; indeed, just as a ruler cannot be 
employed to effectively measure itself, we should not expect ourselves, as conscious 
beings, to physically quantify our way out of the hard problem. So, I contend the most 
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obvious solution is to simply posit that physical-functional explanations, in their 
attempts to massage our depiction of consciousness in order to fit a physicalist 
framework, will never fully account for the fundamental experiential properties that 
are necessarily antecedent to any physical-functional theory. Thus, I ask, just as we 
take physical properties to be fundamental, why do we not take the experiential 
property that epistemologically illuminates these physical properties to be equally 
fundamental? This is the question that, I contend, we must pose to those advocates of 
physicalism, and indeed it is this question that has underpinned all my attacks on the 
physicalist attempts to discount the hard problem by reductively accounting for 
experiential properties.  
 
Further, as I have attempted to explicate throughout this thesis, these physicalist 
‘solutions’ consistently fail to reconcile phenomenal experience in its entirety, and, by 
virtue of this failure, ultimately only serve in highlighting the inability for physicalism 
to accommodate for the epistemic and metaphysical weight of the hard problem. As 
such, and as a result of the failings explicated in chapters 1, 3, 4 and 5, it seems to me 
that the most cogent means of escaping the metaphysical and epistemic quandary 
posed by the hard problem is to champion a form of dualism predicated upon the 
contention that both physical and experiential properties exist as ontologically 
fundamental components of our reality. In line with this, and in an attempt to maintain 
the steady march of our scientific, philosophical and, ultimately, epistemic climb, I 
devote this final chapter to an examination of those anti-physicalist philosophers of 
mind who attempt to offer metaphysical alternatives to the zeitgeist of monistic 
physicalism, which has so failed to accommodate for experiential properties.  
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Throughout this chapter, I explicate the details of the most widely held of these anti-
physicalist frameworks, with a particular focus upon Swinburne’s (1986-2013) 
substance dualism, Strawsonian (2006) panpsychism and Chalmers’s (1996) notion of 
naturalistic dualism/ monistic property dualism.  I begin with an examination of 
Swinburne’s substance dualism, before concluding that such a thesis ultimately fails 
to provide a sufficiently cogent metaphysical framework. From here, I outline the 
virtues of panpsychism and property dualism, before arguing that monistic property 
dualism confers a metaphysic with the capacity to not only solve the problem of 
consciousness, but also be neatly reconciled alongside some of the most fundamental 
physical laws underpinning our understanding of reality.  
 
6.1 Swinburne’s Substance Dualism 
 
Appeals to ontological dualism are strewn across the history of philosophical enquiry. 
The most widely communicated of which is the Cartesian (1641/4) notion of 
substance dualism, which states that our reality is constituted upon two entirely 
ontologically distinct entities that exist independently of one another: mental 
substances (non-physical thinking things) and physical substances (spatially extended 
things)30. Whilst this early metaphysical claim has faced fierce resistance throughout 
much of the contemporary philosophical literature, Swinburne (1986-2013) has very 
recently attempted to ignite a resurgence of this long admonished metaphysical 
commitment.  Like Descartes (1644) before him, Swinburne (2009) maintains that as 
we can logically disentwine our experiential mind or ‘non-physical soul’ from our 
underlying physical body, we are right to conclude ‘that each of us on Earth consists 																																																								
30 This is distinct from a neutral monism that leads to property dualism, which states that physical and 
mental properties are ontologically distinct, but are ultimately bound to a singular substance. This 
framework shall be explicated in detail shortly. 
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of two parts, a physical body and a non-physical soul’ (p. 501). This appeal to our 
capacity to exist as something more than our physical body acts as the cornerstone for 
substance dualism, and takes foundation within the Cartesian (1644) notion that:  
 
‘While we (can) thus reject all of which we can entertain the smallest doubt, and even 
imagine that it is false, we easily indeed suppose that there is neither God, nor sky, 
nor bodies, and that we ourselves even have neither hands nor feet, nor, finally, a 
body; but we cannot in the same way suppose that we are not while we doubt of the 
truth of these things; for there is a repugnance in conceiving that what thinks does not 
exist at the very time when it thinks. Accordingly, the knowledge, I think, therefore I 
am is the first and most certain that occurs to one who philosophizes orderly.’ (p. 30) 
 
Thus, this early substance dualism was predicated upon the notion that whilst we may 
logically doubt that we have a body, we cannot, in the act of doubting, logically doubt 
that we exist, and, therefore, we must conclude that the experiential doubter, the ‘I’, is 
not a body. This argument is reflective of Descartes’ essence argument, which I 
formulate as follows:  
 
For any existing substance X or Y, if I can understand the essence of X without 
employing an understanding of the essence of Y, then I may conclude that X and Y 
hold distinct essences, and, therefore, conclude that X and Y are ontologically distinct 
substances.  
 
Here Descartes (1644) is employing the notion of ‘essence’ as the ‘principal property 
of substance…on which all others depend’ (p. 240), so that this property is essential 
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to the existence of X or Y. Hence, the argument follows that if I can understand the 
essence of my body (Y) as a substance with the essential properties of being 
physically spatially extended, and I can understand the essence of myself (X) as an 
entirely distinct, experiential substance with the essential properties of sensation, 
awareness and conscious thought, then I can formulate a complete understanding of 
the essence of X without ever needing to appeal to the essence of Y, and, as this is 
possible, there must be a duality of existing substances to account for this duality in 
essences. Thus, Descartes maintains that as it is true that we can understand the 
essences of X and Y separately, then it must equally be true that bodies are in no way 
essential to the existence of the mind, as the essence of Y (the physical properties of 
the spatially extended body) can be logically excluded (or doubted) without ever 
hindering our understanding of the essence of X (the experiential properties of the 
non-spatial conscious mind). Indeed, as Descartes famously formulated, we can bring 
all things into doubt other than that which is itself essential to doubt (the mind). 
Meaning that, as the physical essence of Y can be logically excluded from our 
understanding of the experiential essence of X in a way that neither violates the 
existence of X, nor hinders our understanding of X, then we should conclude that the 
physical properties of the body are not essential properties of the mind, and therefore, 
should conclude that the experiential mind, the ‘I’, is ontologically distinct from the 
physical body. 
 
Like Descartes, Swinburne (2013) upholds the notion that the only logically essential 
component of this ‘I’ are the mental properties essential to our mental substance, 
which confers our ‘disposition to have sensations or thoughts or form intentions’ (p. 
141), and, like Descartes, maintains that a physical substance can never be logically 
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essential to my continued existence, as ‘a physical substance [is] one for which the 
possession of mental properties is not essential’ (p. 141). Thus, both philosophers 
maintain the distinction between those mental substances, which confer the mental 
properties that are logically essential to my being, and those physical substances, 
which confer the non-mental properties that are logically not essential to my being. 
With this distinction as their foundation, Swinburne (1986-2013) and his fellow 
Cartesians conclude that if my existence is logically and essentially predicated upon a 
mental substance exclusively containing mental, non-physical properties, then the ‘I’ 
must be capable of existing devoid of the body, as the mental substance, which is 
essential to my existence, is predicated upon immaterial properties, which, by their 
very nature, are not ontologically, or logically, dependent upon the physical properties 
that underpin the physical substance of the body. Hence, Swinburne and Descartes 
maintain that my continued existence is essentially constituted upon the continued 
existence of a mental substance, which is, in itself, not essentially constituted upon the 
continued existence of physical substances. Meaning that the soul/the mind/the ‘I’ 
must encompass a distinct mental substance that persists beyond the demise of our 
physicality, and therefore, must be ontologically independent of the physical body. As 
such, it is this Cartesian argument for the logical possibility of a mind/body separation 
that both underpins the core of Swinburne’s (1986) work and provides the theoretical 
core for his resurgence of substance dualism, he lays the foundation for his thesis 
within his interpretation of the Cartesian framework as follows: 
 
‘The crucial point that Descartes and others were presumably trying to make is not 
that (in the case of men) the living body is not part of the person, but that it is not 
essentially, only contingently, part of the person. The body is separable from the 
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person and the person can continue even if the body is destroyed. Just as I continue to 
exist wholly and completely if you cut off my hair, so, the dualist holds, it is possible 
that I continue to exist if you destroy my body. The soul, by contrast, is the necessary 
core which must continue if I am to continue; it is the part of the person which is 
necessary for his continuing existence.’ (p. 145) 
 
So, as reflective of the interpretation I explicated above, Swinburne (1986) champions 
a reading of Descartes as a ‘compound dualist’ (Olson 2001, p.73), positing that 
whilst both the body and the soul constitute a contingent part of the ‘I”, it is only the 
soul (or the mind) that is truly essential to the ‘I’31, so that whilst one may outlive the 
death of the body, one may never outlive the death of the soul. Indeed, it is a 
compound dualism of this kind that underpins much of Swinburne’s (1986-2013) 
appeal to substance dualism, and it is this Cartesian argument for the logical 
possibility of a mind/body separation that lays the foundation for Swinburne’s 
contentions that such a separation is not just logically feasible, but also 
metaphysically realistic. Thus, centrally, Swinburne aims to improve upon Descartes, 
and instigate a resurgence of substance dualism, via showing that if it is logically 
possible to posit the mind/soul as distinct from the body, then it is logically and 
metaphysically necessary that the mind/soul32 is ontologically distinct from the body. 
 
Much of Swinburne’s (2009/13) attempt to sharpen the link between logical 
possibility and metaphysical necessity takes foundation within his notion of 																																																								
31 It is of interest to note here, in line with Olson (2001), that this is distinct from ‘pure dualism’, 
which posits that whilst a physical body confers our capacity to perceive the physical world and is 
intimately connected to the ‘I’, it is not a part of the ‘I’. Compound dualism, in contrast, entails that the 
body is a contingent part of the ‘I’, but that this part is not essential to the continued existence of the 
‘I’. 		
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‘informative designators’ (Swinburne 2009, p. 512). These designators, Swinburne 
(2013) maintains, informatively designate a given property or substance Y so as to 
‘pick out’ the essential qualities of Y, which, in turn, must rigidly designate the 
properties/substances that are metaphysically necessary to Y’s essential existence. So, 
upon employing an informative designator, the existence of the referent is 
metaphysically necessary to the concept used to designate said referent. Meaning that, 
if I informatively designate the concept of ‘I’ so as to capture its underlying essential 
non-physical experiential essence, then the application of the concept must rigidly 
designate those non-physical experiential properties, which are metaphysically 
necessary in order to constitute the essential existence of ‘I’. Swinburne uses this 
notion of informative designators to delineate the distinction between experiences of 
colour and physical wavelengths of light, and elucidate ‘why physics is unable to 
explain how the brain-events to which the impinging light gives rise, in turn give rise 
to sensation of blueness’ (Swinburne 1986, p. 182). He posits that, upon experiencing 
colour, we employ mental predicates to rigidly designate the mental properties that 
give rise to this experience, and these predicates are quite distinct from the physical 
predicates that rigidly designate physical wavelengths of light. Consequently, as both 
predicates are informative designators that logically capture the essential essence of 
their respective referents without reference to their counterpart, then we should 
conclude that the reason physical science fails to explain our experience of ‘blueness’ 
by appealing to wavelengths of light is because these predicates necessarily designate 
two ontologically distinct properties; one of which is the physically quantifiable 
wavelength, and the other is the non-physical, experiential property that is beyond the 
sort of thing physics deals in (Swinburne 1986, p. 182).  
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So, to simplify, Swinburne is maintaining that, upon informatively designating the 
essence of a substance Y, we simultaneously rigidly designate the existence of the 
metaphysical constituent that is implicit to Y. Thus, if our informative designation of 
wavelengths and colour experiences capture the distinct essences of these two 
referents, we must conclude that these referents contain distinct ontologies. With this 
established, Swinburne (2009) employs his argument for informative designation to 
convey that upon positing the concept of ‘I’, we necessarily know the fundamental 
nature of the referent, and, therefore, upon informatively designating the non-
physical, experiential essence of this ‘I’, we simultaneously necessarily posit the 
metaphysical existence of the non-physical mental substance that this ‘I’ actually is. 
So that: 
 
‘ ‘I’ or ‘Richard Swinburne’ as used by me… seem to be informative designators. If I 
know how to use these words, then… I can’t be mistaken about when to apply them.  
My knowledge of how to use ‘I’, like my knowledge of how to use ‘green’ and 
‘square’ means that I know the nature of what I am talking about when I use the 
words. Mere a priori reflection will show what my existence involves and with what it 
is compatible. Hence [as] there is no possibility that what I am picking out by ‘I’ has 
an underlying essence which requires me to be embodied… it follows that my existing 
does not involve my body existing; I am therefore a pure mental substance, essentially 
a soul.’  (Swinburne 2009, p. 513) 
 
Meaning, if I necessarily know the essence of ‘I’ upon employing the word, and, as 
Swinburne (2009) does, I informatively designate it as a substance containing 
experiential properties which confer an experiential essence that is non-physical, then 
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this ‘I’ must necessarily exist as an ontologically distinct, non-physical substance. 
Whilst Swinburne (2009/13) takes this as proof for his claim that we necessarily exist 
as ‘pure mental substances’, I posit that the immediate problem with this framework is 
that it seems impossible for Swinburne to maintain that his privileged epistemic 
access to ‘I’ confers a capacity to implicitly know the fundamental ontological nature 
of the constituents underpinning this ‘I’. Indeed, if his contention is that he knows the 
nature of this ‘I’ by virtue of the mental properties employed amidst his informative 
designation of said ‘I’, then, at foundation, all Swinburne has shown is that mental 
properties are essential properties, not that the essence of this ‘I’ is indubitably a non-
physical, mental substance. Thus, if it is only the properties themselves that are 
essential to this informative designation, then it seems equally feasible that the idea of 
a distinct non-physical, mental substance is superfluous to requirement, as it remains 
entirely possible that such mental properties may simply inhere within a singular 
substance, such as the brain, which seems capable of simultaneously containing 
physical and mental properties (this is the contention upheld by the frameworks of 
panpsychism and property dualism, and shall be returned to shortly). 
 
By means of substantiating his appeal to substance dualism, Swinburne (1986) 
employs a number of further arguments to portray that a separation of mental and 
physical substances is a logically possible, and in turn metaphysically realistic, 
proposition. All such arguments seem to rest upon the contention that: iff it is 
logically possibility for my existence to continue even after my physical body has 
perished, then it is metaphysically necessary that I already contain a non-physical 
experiential substance, or soul, that is ontologically distinct from my physical body. 
In order to reach this conclusion, Swinburne (1986) employs the following argument 
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in an attempt to logically establish that the soul continues to exist upon the destruction 
of the body: 
 
Iff:  
 
p = “I am a conscious person and I exist in 1984.” 
q = “My body is destroyed in the last instant of 1984.” 
r = “I have a soul in 1984.” 
s = “I exist in 1985.” 
~ = Not 
x = All consistent propositions compatible with (p&q) and describing 1984 state of 
affairs 
◊ = It is logically possible that 
 
And: 
1. p 
2. (x) ◊ (p & q & x & s) 
3. ~ ◊ (p & q & ~r & s) 
 
Then: 
p → r 
 
This can be simplified as follows: 
 
1. I am a physically embodied conscious person and I exist in 1984. 
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2. It is logically possible that I exist as a physically embodied person P1 at time 
T1 (1984), and I remain the same existing person as P1 at T2 (1985) whilst 
being devoid of the physical embodiment that occurred at T1.  
 
3. It is only logically possible for my existence to continue at T2 if my essential 
existence is predicated upon a non-physical mental substance, or soul; which 
would also imply that my existence is predicated upon this very same non-
physical soul during T1 (1984). 
 
Therefore, my conscious existence in 1984 confers my existence as a non-physical 
soul. 
 
This, as combined with the argument for informative designators espoused above, 
represents the core of Swinburne’s (1986-2013) contention that we must separate the 
non-physical mental substance/soul, which is both logically and metaphysically 
essential to the continued existence of this ‘I’, from the physical brain, which is not 
logically or metaphysically essential to the continued existence of said ‘I’. With the 
core of Swinburne’s appeal to substance dualism explicated, we are now in a position 
to address the failings inherent within positing a metaphysic of this kind.  
 
The broadest objections to this thesis attempt to either attack the epistemic leap from 
conceivability to logical possibility (Zimmerman 1991), posit a violation of the laws 
of physics (Lycan 2002), or demand an explanation for how non-physical substances 
come to causally interact with their physical correlates (Kim 2009). Whilst these 
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arguments do present issues for the substance dualist, all such contentions have been 
objected to, and so, ultimately, the metaphysic has persisted, with contemporary 
proponents even positing that ‘there are no good objections to substance dualism’ 
(Gusmao 2014, p. 199). In line with this, my attack on substance dualism is predicated 
less upon an attempt to discount the theory entirely, and more upon an attempt to 
highlight its weaknesses so as to reveal the strengths of its metaphysical alternatives. 
Thus, I maintain that whilst substance dualism is nearly impossible to indubitably 
denounce, it is predicated upon a series of logical and metaphysical deficiencies 
which, upon being confronted, ultimately result in substance dualism giving way to a 
far more coherent metaphysical commitment: property dualism. In line with this, I 
present two issues for the substance dualism: the issue of physical/phenomenal 
interaction, and the issue of reconciling immaterial substances with evolutionary 
theory.  Such problems, I argue, appear insurmountable to substance dualism, but 
quite compatible with a property dualism predicated solely upon the claim that 
physical and phenomenal properties exist as ontologically distinct properties 
contained within a singular neutral substance: the brain.  
 
The first of these arguments rests upon the case for neural dependence espoused by 
Churchland (1984), which attempts to highlight that if substance dualism were true, 
there should be no evidence for neurological changes conferring changes in conscious 
states. This contention is explicated as follows:  
 
‘If there really is a distinct entity in which reasoning, emotion, and consciousness 
take place, and if that entity is dependent on the brain for nothing more than sensory 
experiences as input and volitional executions as output, then one would expect 
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reason, emotion, and consciousness to be relatively invulnerable to direct control or 
pathology by manipulation or damage to the brain. But in fact the exact opposite is 
true.’ (p. 32) 
 
Thus, Churchland (1984) highlights that, if the mind is truly an immaterial entity, then 
the qualities and dispositions contained within this entity should be impervious to 
change as a result of physical damage to the brain. This, however, as empirical 
science has revealed, is not the case, and, as a result, the substance dualist must 
account for how and why the purely physical brain may causally interact, or impact 
upon, the non-physical soul/entity if, as the substance dualist argues, this immaterial 
entity is itself wholly non-physical.  Further, this problem of interaction may be 
inverted so as to address the difficulty of accounting for how a non-physical, 
immaterial entity may causally interact with the material body. In this latter case, the 
problem can be reduced to an explanatory issue of accounting for how a non-spatially 
extended mind may interact with a spatially extended body so as to be the cause of 
spatial phenomena, and may be articulated as follows:   
 
1. If substance dualism is true, the non-spatial, mental properties of immaterial 
substances are the cause of mental events. 
2. These words are spatially extended effects of mental events. 
3. A spatially extended effect must be reducible to a spatially extended causal 
agent. 
4. Thus, either substance dualism is false or epiphenomenalism33 is true.  
																																																								
33 Epiphenomenalism is the theory that mental, phenomenal properties are nothing beyond causally 
inert, non-physical properties that are themselves entirely dependent upon purely physical functions for 
causal efficacy, but contain no causal efficacy in and of themselves.  
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Whilst this seems to leave us entrenched in the possibility of epiphenomenal 
substance dualism34, in which the substance dualist denies premise 2 on the grounds 
that mental events, and the mental properties that cause them, are causally inert in 
relation to the physical, we can further substantiate our case against substance dualism 
by denying the possibility of epiphenomenalism on the grounds of the ‘self-
stultification objection’ (De Brigard 2014). The objection highlights that, in any 
process of justifying a belief pertaining to the causal efficacy of the mental, 
phenomenal properties of immaterial substances, the belief must itself be predicated 
upon, and caused by, the mental properties of the substance in question, and, if this is 
so, the epiphenomenalist, amidst their act of justifying the claim that the immaterial, 
mental properties of immaterial substances are causally inert, must necessarily affirm 
the causal efficacy of immaterial properties. This argument may be articulated as 
follows: 
 
1. If epiphenomenalism is true, we hold some physically expressible knowledge 
about the nature of the properties of mind-like immaterial substances. 
2. In order for knowledge about the properties of mind-like immaterial 
substances to be justified, the referent (the mental, phenomenal properties of 
the mind) must act as the causal agent for knowledge about mental properties. 
3. If mental properties are not the cause of knowledge about the nature of mental 
properties, then beliefs about the nature of mental properties are unjustified. 
																																																								
34 Epiphenomenal substance dualism maintains that, as the mind is ontologically independent from the 
physical body, certain mental events may cause mental events, but would maintain that this causal 
efficacy does not extend from the non-spatially extended mind to the spatial-extension of the physical. 
In this sense, the epiphenomenal substance dualist must maintain that the properties of this immaterial 
substance (the mind) are causally inert in relation to the physical. 
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4. If mental properties are the cause of this knowledge, then mental properties 
are causally efficacious.  
5. Therefore, epiphenomenalism is either false or unjustifiable. 
 
Hence, we can affirm both that justified, true knowledge pertaining to the nature of 
phenomenal properties must derive from phenomenal properties (and therefore these 
properties must act as the cause), and that, any attempt to establish epiphenomenalism 
as anything beyond a mere unjustified belief must remain reliant upon the very mental 
content that is itself proof for the causal efficacy of the mental properties of the mind. 
With this established, we can now substantiate the former argument against substance 
dualism by adding an additional premise and a conclusion: 
 
1. If substance dualism is true, the non-spatial, mental properties of immaterial 
substances are the cause of mental events. 
2. These words are spatially extended effects of mental events. 
3. A spatially extended effect must be reducible to a spatially extended causal 
agent. 
4. Thus, either substance dualism is false or epiphenomenal substance dualism is 
true.  
5. Epiphenomenal substance dualism is not true. 
6. Therefore, substance dualism is false. 
 
As such, I argue that a coherent metaphysical framework must provide a unified 
theory that is capable of solving the ‘hard’ problem, whilst avoiding the issues of non-
physical/physical causal interaction faced by substance dualism. This notion of a need 
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for such a theory is compounded upon attempting to reconcile substance dualism with 
our understanding of evolutionary theory. The problem is that it seems nearly 
impossible to establish how the process of Darwinian natural selection could 
accommodate for, or give rise to, an immaterial substance. As Lycan (2013) points 
out: ‘nothing immaterial could possibly be adaptive’ (p. 541). So, it seems Swinburne 
(1986-2013) is, at foundation, asserting a metaphysic that completely foregoes any 
attempt at integration with the theories that underpin our understanding of the natural 
world. As such, I posit that the ultimate problem with substance dualism is that it 
distances us so far from the physical sciences that it becomes incredibly difficult to 
reconcile an immaterial soul with our current understanding of our reality, and, as 
such, instead of providing coherent solutions, substance dualism leaves us with more 
questions than answers. In line with this, I maintain that any successful formation of 
ontological dualism must successfully integrate itself into our understanding of the 
physical frameworks underpinning the natural sciences, so as to only embolden our 
understanding, and mend the epistemic and metaphysical gaps, in a way that does not 
contravene our otherwise robust worldview. As Nagel (2012) posits: 
 
 ‘Even if we conclude that the materialist account of ourselves is incomplete - 
including its development through evolutionary theory - it remains the case that we 
are products of the long history the universe since the big bang, descended from 
bacteria over billions of years of natural selection. That Is part of the true external 
understanding of ourselves. The question is how we can combine it with the other 
things we know – including the forms of reason on which that conclusion itself is 
based – in a worldview that does not undermine itself.’ (p. 30) 
.  
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As such, in the final section of this thesis, I offer an analysis of two metaphysical 
commitments with the potential to mend the gaps in our epistemic and metaphysical 
frameworks in a manner that does not completely undermine either our understanding 
of causation, or our current worldview.   
 
6.2 Monistic Property Dualism and Panpsychism: towards a potential solution to 
the Hard Problem 
 
Property dualism is the metaphysical claim that our reality is constituted upon two 
distinct properties: non-physical, mental properties and physical, non-mental 
properties. Here, in line with Goff (2011), I employ the notion of a phenomenal, or 
mental, property as the experiential property ‘of being a thing such that there’s 
something that it’s like to be that thing’ (p. 1), and, in line with Chalmers (2003), I 
posit physical properties as physical structures or functions, such as mass, size, shape 
etc, which are devoid of an ‘inner life’. With this established, this metaphysic can, in 
its most broad form, be explicated as follows: 
 
‘Fundamental property dualism regards conscious mental properties as basic 
constituents of reality on a par with fundamental physical properties, [such that] the 
existence of conscious mental properties is not ontologically dependent upon, nor 
derived from, any other properties.’ (Snider 2017, p. 59) 
 
Whilst all instantiations of property dualism adhere to this fundamental divide, I note, 
in line with Macpherson (2006), that the metaphysic can exhibit two distinct forms. I 
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reference these as type A and type B property dualism35. The first of which, type A 
property dualism, is arguably the sort held by Swinburne (1986-2013), and 
necessarily leads us to substance dualism via strictly maintaining that two distinct 
properties cannot inhere within the same substance, such that if we have an 
ontological duality of properties, we must have a duality in substances. The second 
form, type B, termed Fundamental Property Dualism, Naturalistic Dualism or 
Monistic Property Dualism (see Chalmers 1996), maintains a substance monism, 
whilst positing that physical and mental properties may simultaneously inhere within 
some iterations of this singular substance, so that the brain, for example, possesses 
both physical and mental properties whilst remaining a singular substance. Unlike the 
former iteration of type A property dualism, which inevitably seems to fall foul to the 
issues faced by substance dualism espoused in the previous section, this latter 
iteration (type B) seems to hold the potential to offer a unified solution to the hard 
problem, capable of, at least partially, avoiding the problems of causal interaction and 
the lack of a consistent worldview plaguing the substance dualist. Indeed, the virtue of 
monistic property dualism over its substance dualistic counterpart, which necessarily 
commits itself to the claim that mental properties are not spatially extended and so 
faces the issue of explaining how non-spatial substances may causally interact with 
their spatial counterparts, is that monistic property dualism appeals to a substance 
monism. This means that, whilst, according to the substance dualist, mental properties 
must be reducible to a non-physical substance that is entirely devoid of spatial 
extension, the property dualist may easily assert that phenomenal properties are 
spatially extended in the brain. This, I argue, gives us good reason to accept type B 
monistic property dualism over its type A substance dualistic counterpart, as upon 																																																								
35 Macpherson (2006) offers an excellent articulation of the divide between a property dualism that 
leads to substance dualism and a property dualism that does not.  
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locating phenomenal properties within the substance of the brain, we immediately 
grant them the spatial extension required to avoid the most pressing argument for 
causal interactionism erected against the substance dualist. However, whilst this does 
seem to present a viable reason to endorse type B property dualism over substance 
dualism, the objection may still be raised that the problem of accounting for precisely 
how phenomenal properties cause spatially extended effects remains unsolved. To 
this, in line with Chalmers (2010), I would maintain that the lack of a potential 
solution does not infer the impossibility of a potential solution. Indeed, just as 
‘Newtonian science reveals no causal nexus by which gravitation works’ (Chalmers 
2010, p. 126) at present, this does not imply that the causal nexus shall forever remain 
unknown to us, and, in line with this, we may infer that future research may provide 
an explanation for phenomenal-physical interaction. Thus, I argue that as monistic 
property dualism is both more resistant to the causal interaction objection than 
substance dualism by virtue of being able to account for spatial extension, and is not 
readily refuted by empirical objections, we have good reason to reject the type A 
property dualism that leads to substance dualism, and, instead, consider type B 
monistic property dualism as a potentially viable solution to the hard problem.  
 
In a not wholly dissimilar vein to B property dualism36, panpsychism, or 
panexperientialism, holds that phenomenal properties, in some form, exist 
ubiquitously so as to inhere in all iterations of the singular substance upon which the 
universe is constituted. Like property dualism, this metaphysic may be demarcated 
into three distinct types. Type A, constitutive panpsychism, holds that that whilst our 
reality is constituted upon only one substance, micro-phenomenal properties inhere in 																																																								
36 As shall be addressed later in this chapter, any similarities between the two are ultimately 
superficial.  
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all iterations of this substance, such that the macro-properties involved in animal and 
human consciousness are constituted upon the fundamental micro-phenomenal 
properties upon which the universe is constituted. This iteration may be juxtaposed 
alongside Type B, or non-constitutive panpsychism, in which the macro-properties of 
human and animal consciousness are not constituted upon any more fundamental 
micro-phenomenal properties, but are themselves examples of fundamental 
properties; as well as Type C panpsychism, or panprotopsychism (see Coleman 2016), 
which holds that only proto-phenomenal properties (properties that may ground 
phenomenal experience but are themselves not experiential in the same way as a 
phenomenal property) are fundamental. Thus, whilst property dualism maintains that 
the universe may be split into two opposing, but equally fundamental, properties, the 
panpsychist aims to extend the role of the physical so as to accommodate for more 
than the ‘narrow’ notion of physicality which can only account for the properties of 
spatial extension or function, and, instead, espouse a ‘broad’ notion of physicality that 
can accommodate for micro-phenomenal properties by maintaining that certain micro-
physical properties are micro-phenomenal properties. Chalmers (2013) attempts to 
explain this by inferring that such physical properties may be demarcated as 
‘quiddities’ that may account for ‘some phenomenal properties’ (p. 9), and suggests 
that ‘perhaps the property that plays the mass role is a certain phenomenal property 
(or better, as mass is really a quantity) the quantity that plays the mass role is a certain 
phenomenal property’ (p. 9). In this regard, panpsychism seems to avoid the problem 
of causal interaction even more readily than monistic property dualism by virtue of 
this assertion that phenomenal properties are physical.  
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Whilst this depiction of panpsychism seems to be prima facie coherent, and certainly   
holds well for both the non-constitutive (type B) and constitutive accounts (type A), 
this notion of phenomenal properties as physical properties requires a rigid definition 
of what a phenomenal property is, such that, in this case, we are discussing an 
experiential quality that may cohere with physical qualities so as to form Chalmers’ 
(2013) ‘quiddities’ (p. 9). However, type C panprotopsychism fails to provide such a 
rigid definition by virtue of maintaining that protophenomenal properties simply exist 
as a ‘potentiality’: a propensity to produce, or ground, experiential properties, but 
withholding no experiential qualities in and of themselves. This is troublesome for the 
panprotopsychist, as it seems to produce an ambiguity regarding the nature of 
panprotophenomenal properties that renders panprotopyschism, in its current form, 
beyond the scope of coherent inquiry. Indeed, without a more robust definition of 
what protophenomenal properties are, we are left either confronting the possibility 
that we may not hold the epistemic tools to delineate the nature of proto-phenomenal 
properties (see McGinn’s 1989 mysterianism in section 1.2 of this thesis), classifying 
panprotopsychism as indistinct from a form of reductive physicalism (Stoljar 2010), 
or halting our enquiry into panprotopyshism until a more robust definition of the 
nature of these non-experiential, yet not wholly physical, protophenomenal properties 
is articulated. As a result of this difficulty, for my purposes in this thesis, I shall be 
placing impetus unto the notions of Type A and B panpsychism, whilst avoiding any 
further detailed explication, or mention of, panprotopsychism.  
 
As such, in line with my avoidance of both Type A property dualism and Type C 
panpsychism, I devote what remains of this final section exclusively to a discussion of 
Type B monistic/naturalised property dualism, and Type A/B constitutive/non-
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constitutive panpsychism (which, due to their implicit similarities, I shall now be 
referencing simply as ‘panpsychism’37). I begin with an outline of monistic property 
dualism, and the inevitable similarities with panpsychism, before maintaining, 
contrary to the contemporary arguments put forth by Goff (2011), that the panpsychist 
(of either a constitutive or non-constitutive inclination) must endorse a monistic 
property dualism in order to advance a solution to the hard problem that ‘fits well 
with our ordinary picture of the world, as well as with the scientific picture’ 
(Benovsky 2015, p. 335). Thus, as distinct from Goff (2011), I not only maintain that 
monistic property dualism holds a metaphysical weight that is unmatched by 
panpsychism, but that, upon endorsing a property dualism of this kind, we glean a 
metaphysic that both solves the hard problem and neatly integrates itself into our 
worldview. 
 
Both monistic property dualism and panpsychism arose as attempts to mend the 
explanatory gaps inherent within physicalism and substance dualism by positing that 
whilst our reality is ultimately only constituted upon one type of substance, this 
substance holds the potential to contain experiential properties that are beyond 
reduction to physical properties, and, therefore, both these metaphysical commitments 
immediately circumvent the ‘hard problem’ by taking experiential properties to be 
fundamental constituents of our known reality. Indeed, the strength of both these 
metaphysical commitments implicitly rests in this appeal to establish experiential 
properties as ontologically fundamental constituents of a reality that, at foundation, 																																																								
37 For my purposes, a more detailed examination of the disparities between non-
constitutive/constitutive panpsychism is unnecessary. Instead, as both forms are discussing (some form 
of) experiential quality, I deem it acceptable to simply henceforth reference panpsychism as a 
metaphysic that posits the ubiquitous existence of experiential qualities. Further, I legitimize this lack 
of detail later in the chapter, because, as I shall show, any experiential quality, when posited 
ubiquitously, creates a problem for our understanding of thermodynamics.  
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only contains one substance, and it is this that enables us to reconcile physical 
properties alongside phenomenal experience without needing to posit ourselves as a 
substance that is entirely distinct from the brain, or warp our depiction of what 
phenomenal experience actually is in order to uphold a form of reductivism consistent 
with physicalism. As such, these metaphysical frameworks provide a neat means from 
which to save physicalism from the intractable problem of establishing how 
experience emerged from the brain, whilst avoiding the unsavoury case for a complete 
separation of mind/brain entailed within substance dualism, which, ultimately, only 
leaves us with an entirely fractured worldview. Thus, whilst substance dualism seems 
to distance us from an understanding of what we are by demanding that the ‘I’ exists 
as a corporeal entity wholly distinct from the body, and physicalism seems to entirely 
deny what we are by warping our depiction of what phenomenal experience is, 
property dualism/panpsychism posit phenomenal experience, which most 
fundamentally constitutes ‘what we are’, as fundamental, and attempts to reconcile 
this with our understanding of physical reality so as to leave us with a metaphysic 
capable of solving the hard problem whilst remaining consistent with our need for a 
scientifically consistent, unified worldview.   
 
Whilst I argue that, superficially, both these metaphysical commitments present viable 
solutions to the hard problem, my central contention throughout this final section shall 
be that the extent to which either metaphysic may be accepted is predicated upon the 
extent to which either metaphysic is capable of positing extra phenomenal properties 
in a manner that is consistent with our wider understanding of reality. In line with 
this, I posit that whilst both monistic property dualism and panpsychism appear highly 
similar, they remain predicated upon a variety of subtle differences, which result in 
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varying degrees of explanatory strength. Thus, in what follows, I attempt to delineate 
the fundamental differences between these arguably very similar frameworks. I begin 
with an explication of monistic property dualism. 
 
Monistic property dualism can be best explicated as follows: ontologically 
fundamental phenomenal properties exist alongside ontologically fundamental 
physical properties, and both properties inhere within one type of neutral substance, 
which is, in itself, neither wholly physical nor mental. Thus, this thesis maintains a 
substance monism whilst upholding the claim that ‘mental properties are fundamental 
properties of reality, …on a par with length, mass, electric charge, and other 
fundamental properties’ (Churchland 1984, p. 20). So that our brain, for example, 
contains both non-physical, phenomenally experiential properties, which confer our 
experiential capacity to know ‘what it is like’, and physical properties, which confer 
the physical ‘structures and functions’ quantified by the physical sciences. The 
primary advantage of this metaphysic lies within its potential to reconcile 
ontologically fundamental phenomenological properties within a monistic substance 
replete with physical properties, as it is this that provides us with a means from which 
to expand our metaphysic so that we may solve the hard problem, whilst also 
remaining consistent with a broadly naturalistic worldview predicated upon the notion 
that there is only one type of substance. Indeed, it is an attempt to solve the hard 
problem by ‘naturalising’ phenomenology in this way that underpins Chalmers’s 
(1996) appeal to ‘Naturalistic Dualism’. In line with monistic property dualism, this 
framework aims to maintain an appeal to substance monism, whilst providing a non-
reductive explanation for phenomenal experience by positing an ‘extra [ontological] 
ingredient (p. 10) that will ‘add new principles to  [but not violate] the furniture of the 
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basic laws of nature’ (p. 14), and enable a ‘bottom up’ explanation for phenomenal 
experience by positing fundamental experiential properties as constituents of our 
reality (p. 14). To achieve this, Chalmers (1996) predicates his metaphysic upon the 
notion of informational properties inhering within substances so as to create a dual-
aspect phenomenon, with phenomenal properties inferring internal informational 
states, and physical properties inferring external informational states. This is 
explicated as follows: 
 
‘The ontology that this leads us to might truly be called a double-aspect ontology. 
Physics requires information states but cares only about their relations, not their 
intrinsic nature; phenomenology requires information states but cares only about the 
intrinsic nature. This view postulates a single basic set of information states unifying 
the two. We might say that internal aspects of these states are phenomenal, and the 
external aspects are physical. Or as a slogan: Experience is information from the 
inside, physics is information from the outside.’ (Chalmers 1996, p. 305) 
 
So, for Chalmers, this ‘information state’ is the basic state of the neutral monistic 
substances underlying all of reality, and this state gives rise to both phenomenal and 
physical informational properties. This dual-aspect theory of information underpins 
the entirety of Chalmers’s metaphysic, and it is this appeal to the primacy of 
information that enables Chalmers to unify the otherwise entirely disparate ontologies 
of phenomenal and physical properties.  As, upon positing information as the 
neutrally monistic fundamental state of our reality, and positing phenomenal and 
physical properties as derivate from this initial state, Chalmers gleans a means from 
which to establish an ontological link between those phenomenal-informational 
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properties, which inhere within a substance so as to produce internal, phenomenally 
informational states, and those physical-informational properties, which inhere within 
a substance so as to produce external, spatially extended informational states. In this 
regard, Chalmers (1996) presents an elegantly simple notion of monistic property 
dualism, as the brain becomes the informational substance in which these two 
properties inhere, with physical informational properties conferring the external, 
physicality of this substance, and phenomenal informational properties conferring this 
substance’s inner experiential awareness of ‘what it is like’.  
 
As such, the informational substance of the brain unifies and contains these two 
ontologically disparate informational properties, and thus holds the potential to solve 
the hard problem, and account for the interaction between phenomenal/physical 
properties, whilst also remaining consistent with, and simultaneously expanding upon, 
the physical laws of nature. Therefore, this iteration of property dualism is, I argue, 
highly intuitive, as upon positing an extra phenomenal-informational property of this 
kind, we glean a means from which to explain property dualistic physical substances, 
such as the brain, in which dualistic phenomenal and physical properties seem to 
inhere, whilst also remaining consistent with our ‘common sense’ understanding that 
property monistic substances, such as chairs, exist, in which only one type of 
(physical) property seems to inhere. Indeed, the point to be laboured in this iteration, 
as distinct from the panpsychism I shall explore shortly, is that naturalised property 
dualism is non-committal on the extent to which phenomenal properties are 
ubiquitous, meaning all this property dualist upholds is that whilst our reality is 
constituted upon only type of informational substance, which, in order to be 
physically quantified by the natural sciences must necessarily contain physical 
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properties, some of these substances may contain further phenomenal properties.  
Thus, Chalmers (1996) is arguably successful in his attempt to naturalise 
phenomenology, as his notion of phenomenal-informational properties inhering 
within certain monistic informational substances seems to provide a metaphysic with 
the means of fully accounting for the intrinsic, internal nature of phenomenal-
informational states, whilst also remaining entirely compatible with a worldview 
constituted upon physical, natural laws. As Chalmers (1996) himself iterates:     
 
‘The world still consists in a network of fundamental properties related by basic laws, 
and everything is to be ultimately explained in those terms. All that has happened is 
that the inventory of properties and laws has been expanded [beyond the physical 
properties and laws].’ (p. 127) 
 
As such, monistic property dualism, and Chalmers’s (1996) Naturalistic 
Dualism/Neutral Monism, both simply maintain that: 1. The fundamental laws of 
nature are physical and a coherent metaphysic must remain consistent with said laws, 
and 2. physicalism is incapable of accounting for experience. Therefore, this 
metaphysical framework upholds the primacy of our physical sciences and natural 
laws by maintaining that physical properties inhere within only one type of substance, 
whilst also positing an extra phenomenal property that may inhere within some of 
these substances, so as to produce a property dualistic conception of reality that is 
capable of solving the hard problem without undermining the physical laws 
underpinning our worldview. Hence, Naturalistic Dualism/ Monistic Property 
Dualism seem to hold the potential to avoid the issues plaguing substance dualism and 
physicalism, via simply maintaining that whilst only one type of substance exists, 
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there are two types of properties (physical and phenomenal) that may inhere within 
this substance. However, at this stage, the extent to which this metaphysic should be 
championed over panpsychism remains unclear, and, as a result, I turn to an 
explication of panpsychism so to provide grounding from which to contrast the two 
metaphysics.  
 
Panpsychism is the claim that phenomenal experience is a ubiquitous property of 
nature. This metaphysic is championed by a number of contemporary philosophers 
and scientists (see Skrbina 2007, Goff 2011, Bohm 1990, Rosenberg 2004), however, 
due to the limited scope of this thesis, I devote much of my discussion to the 
Strawsonian (2006) notion of panpsychism, which I take to be a strong elucidation of 
the broader panpsychist movement. Simons (2006) provides us with an effective 
formulation of Strawsonian panpsychism as follows39: 
 
1. ‘We cannot deny the existence of experience. 
2. Experience appears to emerge from physical phenomena that are not 
themselves experiential 
3. Wholly non-experiential phenomena are not by their physical nature capable 
of giving rise to experience 
4. Therefore either experiences emerges magically from wholly non-experiential 
phenomena or the physical phenomenal from which experience emerge are in 
some way themselves experiential 
5. Magical or brute emergence is absurd 																																																								
39 I note here that Strawson (2006) himself attempts to liken his panpsychism to a form of physicalism 
by maintaining that phenomenal properties are encompassed within a broad ‘physiCAL’ notion of the 
physical. This has led certain commentators (see Macpherson 2006) to question whether Strawsonian 
panpsychism is closer to Russelian panprotopsychism, constitutive panpsychism or property dualism. 
However, my reading, and the one I shall be employing throughout this section, is that Strawson is a 
constitutive panpsychist, as he simultaneously appeals to a broad definition of the physical, whilst 
employing a strict definition of phenomenal properties as holding experiential qualities. Indeed, in 
defining phenomenal properties as such, Strawson is necessarily distanced from the vagaries of the 
panprotopsychist movement, which would explicitly deny the claim that ‘all phenomena are in some 
way experiential’ (Strawson 2006, p. 146).		
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6. Therefore the physical phenomena from which experience emerge are in some 
way themselves experiential (micropsychism) 
7. It is implausible to suppose that nature is so fragmentarily constituted that 
some physical phenomena are experiential while others are not 
8. Therefore all physical phenomena are in some way experiential 
9. But all phenomena are physical (physicalism) 
10. Therefore all phenomena are in some way experiential (panpsychism).’ (p. 
146) 
 
With this formation as our grounding, we witness the core of the panpsychist 
movement. Indeed, this argument typifies the contentions that have led to the 
contemporary resurgence of this ancient metaphysic, which, as Skrbina (2007) 
highlights, in its earliest iteration was espoused by the likes of Parmenides (545-460 
BC) and Plato (380 BC). This movement upholds the claim that whilst all phenomena 
are fundamentally physical, all such phenomena are, at foundation, also in some way 
experiential. Thus, not unlike the property dualist, panpsychism attempts to posit an 
experiential property into the fabric of our reality in a manner that is consistent with 
our physically monistic worldview. Strawson (2006) predicates this framework upon 
the contention that the ultimate nature of our reality is constituted upon ‘fundamental 
physical entities’ (p. 9), so that, at foundation, ‘the universe is spatio-temporal in its 
fundamental nature’ (p. 9), and, with this established, Strawson attempts to posits 
experience into this picture.  
 
His argument follows that if we employ the traditional notion that ‘physical stuff, in 
itself, in its fundamental nature, [is] something wholly and utterly non-experiential’ 
(Strawson 2006, p. 11), but we know that, upon combining this physical stuff into a 
substance akin to a brain like ours, we witness this substance regularly constituting 
	 155	
experiences like ours, then we must posit that, because brute emergence is false (see 
section 1.2 for my explication of emergence), our traditional notion of physical stuff 
is incorrect, and, therefore, we must posit that this physical stuff holds some further 
ontologically fundamental experiential property capable of accounting for our 
experiential qualities. Further, as this must be the case, and as there can only be one 
fundamental reality, this reality must be both experiential and physical all the way 
down, so that all of reality, all spatio-temporal physical substances, are in some way 
experiential (this is the fundamental claim underpinning panpsychism); thereby 
making the mind, in line with the contentions of the classical panpsychist’s, truly 
ubiquitous. Skrbina (2006) exemplifies Strawson’s (2006) thesis as follows: 
 
1.‘There is one ultimate reality to the universe, which encompasses all real and 
concrete phenomena [physical monism] 
2. Mental (experiential) phenomena are a part of this monistic reality, and hence are 
‘physical’ (as distinct from ‘physicSal’, i.e. reality as described by modern physics) 
3. ‘Radical Kind’, or brute emergence is impossible, i.e. mental phenomena cannot 
arise from any purely non-mental stuff (which exhibits only shape-size-mass-charge-
etc. phenomena). 
4. Therefore, the one reality is inherently experiential.’ (p. 153) 
 
As Skrbina (2006) highlights, this approach is very similar to the ‘dual aspect 
monism’ espoused by the likes of Spinoza (1632-77): The world is constituted upon a 
singular substance that ‘exhibits two faces’ (p. 153), producing mental properties 
from the inside and physical properties from the outside. Skrbina (2006) goes on to 
mention that this dual aspect monism ‘strongly urges one’ to the panpsychist claim 
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that phenomenal properties are ubiquitous, as it seems difficult to reconcile ‘how such 
a world could exclude mind from any part of reality’ (p. 154).  
 
Here, I highlight most starkly the distinction between monistic property dualism and 
panpsychism, as property dualism makes no such claim as to the ubiquitous nature of 
experiential properties. Thus, whilst panpsychism is predicated upon the notion that 
the one fundamental physical reality must be inherently experiential, and therefore, all 
physical substances must contain phenomenal properties ubiquitously; property 
dualism is predicated simply upon the notion that whilst two ontologically 
fundamental phenomenal and physical properties exist, and our known reality is 
ultimately constituted upon only one type of neutral substance such that we may 
witness brain-like substances containing experiential and physical properties 
simultaneously, it is not necessarily true that all iterations of this substance must 
contain phenomenal properties. Indeed, for the property dualist, it seems relatively 
simple to maintain that certain iterations of this substance contain no phenomenal 
properties what-so-ever40.  In line with this, I posit that monistic property dualism 
immediately presents a more coherent metaphysic, as it seems highly intuitive that not 
all substances must necessarily hold experiential qualities, and highly counter-
intuitive to champion the panpsychist position that all substances, such as chairs or 
rocks, are experiential. In line with this, Chalmers (1996) flirts with the idea that ‘if 
experience is truly a fundamental property, it seems natural for it to be widespread’ 
(p. 297), however, ultimately, he remains unconvinced by the ubiquitous nature of the 
mind entailed by panpsychism, and so champions the property dualistic notion that 
only some substances hold experiential properties: 																																																								
40 The monistic property dualist may potentially explain this by maintaining that phenomenal-
informational properties only arise within systems at a certain level of organization or function.   
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‘I do not think it is strictly accurate to say that rocks (for example) have 
experiences…although rocks may have experiences associated with them… 
Personally, I am much more confident of naturalistic dualism than I am of 
panpsychism.’ (Chalmers 1996, p. 299) 
 
Contrary to this attempt to espouse the virtues of monistic property dualism as distinct 
from panpsychism, certain contemporary philosophers of mind (see Goff 2011), have 
attempted to fundamentally denounce the property dualist’s ‘common sense’ notion 
that some but not all ‘macroscopic objects’ (p. 1) are conscious, and instead attempts 
to show that, contrary to our common sense intuitions, all property dualists must 
endorse a panpsychim that posits all objects as fundamentally experiential.  Goff 
(2011) begins his enquiry with an elucidation of the property dualist’s common sense 
notion that only certain objects are conscious, he elucidates this as follows: 
 
‘Commonsense Assumption: Lot’s wife is conscious and a pillar of salt is not 
conscious.’ (p. 17) 
 
The problem with this, Goff argues, is that in order for the property dualist to 
maintain this common sense assumption, he must employ an argument for 
‘phenomenal precision’, meaning that the ‘cut off point’ between an object being 
conscious/not conscious must be phenomenally precise in order to avoid the property 
dualist relying on a ‘vague notion of whether or not a given thing is conscious’ (p. 2). 
Goff maintains that this notion of phenomenal vagueness must be avoided by the 
property dualist (and I would agree), as it seems consciousness is necessarily 
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transparent in a way that anything with consciousness must indubitably know that it is 
conscious without any room for vagueness.  However, according to Goff (2011), if the 
property dualist attempts to avoid vagueness and uphold phenomenal precision by 
positing, for example, that a slight adjustment to a fundamental particle confers a 
difference in conscious, then he faces an ‘implausible consequence’:  
 
‘Implausible Consequence: The fundamental psycho-physical laws which specify the 
physical conditions nomologically sufficient for consciousness are utterly precise, in 
the sense that the slightest adjustment to the smallest particle can make the difference 
between whether or not a macroscopic object is conscious.’ (p. 17) 
 
So, Goff’s central contention is that this need for phenomenal precision makes 
consciousness entirely arbitrary, as it reduces the distinction between conscious/not 
conscious to a (potentially) miniscule adjustment to an arbitrarily precise solitary 
particle. This, Goff argues, distances us from the plausible notion that general laws 
underpin consciousness, and entrenches us within the highly implausible notion that 
consciousness is conferred by the minutiae of particles.  In order to convey the 
implausibility of this, he employs the notion of a ‘random fact’: 
 
‘Random Fact: When a blue balloon is made from three specific kinds of elastic, A, B 
and C, such that there is 42% of A, 38% of B, and 20% of C, and has a certain 
thickness, 1 9 precise to 1,000,0000,000th of a millimetre, and is blown up such that 
its diameter has a certain length, precise to 1,000,000,000th of a millimetre, the 
balloon turns pink.’ (p. 18) 
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Goff (2011) maintains that, if such a random fact were true to the extent that it 
encompassed a ‘basic law of nature’ (p.19), then ‘we would be extremely reluctant to 
take it as a fundamental law, and would try to find a way of explaining its obtaining in 
terms of more general laws, ones which did not involve such arbitrarily precise 
values’ (p. 19). But, this is precisely the consequence entailed by the notion of 
phenomenal precision, and, therefore, Goff (2011) falls back on this charge of 
implausibility as a means from which to reject property dualism in favour of 
panpsychism, contending that if something is ‘extremely theoretically implausible…it 
is rational to avoid such a hypothesis if at all possible’ (p. 12). Thus, Goff concludes: 
‘The property dualist should forget about common sense, and embrace conscious 
pillars of salt’ (p. 30). 
 
The problem with this argument is twofold, firstly, under Goff’s own admission, ‘it is 
not inconceivable’ (p. 12) that consciousness is phenomenally precise, and, secondly, 
as I shall show, panpsychism is a far more theoretically and scientifically implausible 
hypothesis than its property dualistic counterpart. In order to make this point, I begin 
with an elucidation of the second law of thermodynamic theory, before attempting to 
logically plot the contentions of panpsychism alongside this scientifically robust, 
‘basic law’ of reality. From here, I show that panpsychism is entirely inconsistent 
with our understanding of equilibrium systems and thermodynamic theory, whilst 
monistic property dualism is not.  
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The second law of thermodynamics, simply iterated, dictates that ‘the entropy41 of the 
(physical) universe tends to a maximum’ (Clausius 1867, p. 365) until thermodynamic 
equilibrium is reached. So that, if we were to take water at room temperature (a 
temperate which is at thermodynamic equilibrium with its environment), and exert 
energy so as to produce ‘thermodynamic work’42 capable of bringing this water to a 
boil (and thus changing its temperature so that it is now at disequilibrium with its 
environment), then, upon no longer exerting energy on this boiling water (or the water 
itself no longer being able to convert energy into thermodynamic work), the second 
law of thermodynamics dictates that we should expect the tightly compacted, 
‘ordered’ heat energy contained within this boiled water to, over time, disperse into its 
environment so as to become more disordered, or more ‘entropic’, until it returns to a 
state of equilibrium.  
 
Whilst my analogy of boiling water may seem relatively innocuous, this law is 
arguably the most fundamental law underpinning our understanding of the natural 
world; with its explanatory value extending from ourselves, as human systems 
working at thermodynamic disequilibrium, to the thermodynamic reactions involved 
in the formation of stars (and every exchange of energy in-between). So, this law is 
arguably the most fundamental law underpinning all of our reality, and it suggests, 
simply, that all physical energy becomes more entropic (more disordered) over time, 
so that we witness two opposing states in which physical things exist: states of (at or 
close to) equilibrium, in which energy is no longer being converted into 
thermodynamic work, and equilibrium with the wider environment is either reached 																																																								
41 Here entropy is defined as the levels of disorder in a system, as Jorgensen & Svirezhev (2004) 
assert: ‘it is obvious that entropy is a measure of disorder in a system’ (p. 10).  
42 Here thermodynamic work is used to denote the process of energy transferal or change, either within 
a system, or from one system to another.  
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or in the process of occurring (these states are the sort witnessed in what we may term 
to be ‘lifeless’ inanimate objects, such as rocks, salt etc), and states of disequilibrium, 
in which energy is converted into thermodynamic work so as to maintain the system 
in a non-equilibrium state (these are the states witnessed within ourselves, and life 
more broadly).43  
 
Whilst this formation of the second law is incredibly brief and arguably very basic, 
the crucial point here, and the point to be laboured in my attempt to reconcile 
panpsychism/property dualism with thermodynamic theory, is that a system may 
remain at disequilibrium with its environment as long as the potentially entropic 
energy bombarding that system may be converted (or be changed) so as to produce 
useful (internal) thermodynamic work. Meaning that, if we take A (human beings) 
and B (a grain of salt), we witness that A is able to (internally) circumvent the second 
law by sustainably converting potentially entropic, external, disordered energy into 
useful (internal) energy capable of performing thermodynamic work (this is most 
obviously realised in the process of consuming food), whereas B (the salt) is unable to 
avoid the decline into a state of maximum entropy, as it contains no means from 
which to convert external energy into (internal) work. As Schrödinger (1967) 
highlights: 
 
‘How does the living organism avoid decay [thermodynamic equilibrium]? The 
obvious answer is: By eating, drinking, breathing and (in the case of plants) 
assimilating. The technical term is metabolism. The Greek word means change or 
exchange.’ (p. 71) 																																																								
43 It is crucial to note here that such non-equilibrium systems do not violate the second law, as 
ultimately (internal) entropy reduction still produces an increase in (external) entropy.  
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So, we see that the crucial difference between life and non-life, or disequillilbrium 
(life) and non-life (equilibrium) is this capacity to convert (or change/exchange) 
potentially entropic energy into useful internal work, so that, as Munster (1970) 
attests: ‘a system is at thermodynamic equilibrium when, in the system, no changes of 
state are occurring’ (p. 70), whereas a system is at thermodynamic disequilibrium 
when internal changes are occurring. With this established, we are in a position to 
highlight the issues for panpsychism, whilst keeping in mind the crucial notion that an 
internal change or conversion in a system necessarily implies thermodynamic 
disequilibrium.  
 
In Goff’s formation we witness salt (a system at thermodynamic equilibrium) and a 
human, conscious being (a system at thermodynamic disequilibrium), and, according 
to panpsychists, both systems must contain (at least some form) of the same 
fundamentally experiential property. This means that, if this is so, we should expect 
that, upon being bombarded with the energy implicit within the wider environment, 
both systems should experience at least some form of ‘what it is like’ sensation that 
gives rise to a spontaneous conversion of this potentially entropic external energy into 
some form of internal, phenomenally constituted information pertaining to ‘what it is 
like’ to have undergone this confrontation with energy. Meaning that, upon both being 
confronted with heat energy, for example, both should (internally) convert this energy 
into the sort of experiential information, which confers ‘what it is like’ for these 
system to undergo heat energy, and, as both systems are necessarily (internally) 
changing and converting energy in this process, we must infer that both systems are 
performing  (internal) thermodynamic work, and are, therefore, in the strictest sense, 
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exhibiting thermodynamic disequilibrium. Further, as panpsychism entails that every 
interaction with the wider environment necessarily produces this ‘what it is like’ 
sensation which converts energy into information, then we should expect to see both 
systems continuously (internally) changing as they produce (internal) thermodynamic 
work, and, as a result, we should expect to witness two systems with the potential to 
avoid the immediate decline into maximal entropy, and maintain a state of 
thermodynamic disequilibrium, by sustaining the conversion of (potentially) entropic 
energy into (ordered) information. However, as we know, in relation to salt, this is 
simply not the case. Indeed, quite contrarily, the scientific method has demarcated a 
system that exhibits none of the qualities for self-sustaining thermodynamic work or 
energy conversion that we associate with non-equilibrium systems, and all of the 
qualities associated with a system that has reached maximum entropy at a state of 
(near) changeless thermodynamic equilibrium.  
 
Whilst this alone seems to present a contradiction for the panpsychist, we can take 
this argument further, because, if salt and human beings do contain the same 
phenomenal property, and this property goes ‘all the way’ down so as to permeate 
every atom, quark and photon underpinning our physical reality, then we should not 
experience the degree of thermodynamic equilibrium we do; indeed we should not 
bear witness to systems such as salt at all. As, if all such fundamental particles contain 
phenomenal properties, and all such properties are subject to the same laws of nature, 
then we should expect these particles, upon forming wider physical systems, to 
maintain themselves away from equilibrium by constantly converting potentially 
entropic energy into useful (internal) information capable of (useful) thermodynamic 
work, and, as such, we should not expect physical systems, such as salt, in which no 
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conversion of energy into thermodynamic work is evident, to ever occur. Thus, it 
seems, upon taking panpsychism to its logical conclusion, and attempting to 
incorporate this metaphysic into our understanding of thermodynamics, we inevitably 
face the issue of attempting to reconcile a ubiquitous, fundamental phenomenal 
property, with the potential to convert physical energy into (internal) information so 
as to maintain all of reality in a state of disequilibrium, alongside an account of how 
we come to witness innumerable physical systems at (or moving towards) a state of 
thermodynamic equilibrium, which, if panpsychism were true, should be a wholly 
improbable state of reality.  
 
This point is strengthened by the early findings of Sziilard (1929) and Maxwell 
(1888), who established that upon positing an informational component into a 
thermodynamic system, said system is able to sustain itself away from 
thermodynamic equilibrium. Further, Szillard’s findings have recently been 
corroborated by the very contemporary work of Vidrighin et al (2016), which 
empirically proved that, upon a system holding a capacity for information, said 
system is able to both convert energy into information, and, crucially, convert 
information into energy so as to produce (useful) thermodynamic work. Arguably, 
this empirically justifies my contentions, as these theorists posit information 
acquisition as nothing beyond a ‘measurement process’ (Leff & Rex 1990, p. 28), 
which, in some way, extracts useful information from potentially entropic energy. 
This, I argue, is something that a fundamental phenomenal property simply could not 
avoid, as every interaction with the energy of the wider environment would confer 
some sort of ‘what it is like’ sensation that seems to necessarily, in some way, 
‘measure’ this energy and convert it into information.  
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Thus, centrally, I contend that if we, as human beings, fundamentally contain the 
same phenomenal, informational properties as physical systems such as salt, then we 
should expect to witness both systems constantly converting energy into information, 
and thus, we should see two systems maintaining themselves at a state of non-
equilibrium. However, as we implicitly know that physical systems at thermodynamic 
equilibrium, such as salt, do not exhibit any of the self-sustaining, energy conversion 
properties implicit to non-equilibrium physical systems, such as human beings, then I 
contend this gives us good reason to reject panpsychism. The core of this argument 
can be iterated as follows: 
 
1. Panpsychism posits that all physical systems contain a phenomenal property.  
2. All systems containing phenomenal properties must convert entropic 
(external) energy into ordered (internal) information. 
3. Any physical system capable of this conversion must be at, and capable of 
sustaining, thermodynamic disequilibrium. 
4. If all physical systems contain this phenomenal property, then all physical 
systems are capable of this conversion. 
5. Therefore, according to panpsychism, all physical systems must be at 
thermodynamic disequilibrium. 
6. Only some physical systems are at thermodynamic disequilibrium. 
7. Thus, Panpsychism is false. 
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As such, I argue we must reject panpsychism44, and posit a form of monistic property 
dualism that is able to maintain coherency with our understanding of equilibrium 
states and thermodynamics by simply positing that only some systems contain 
fundamental phenomenal properties (indeed, I demarcate this combination of 
thermodynamic theory with property dualism as a potentially interesting area for 
future research). In championing property dualism in this way, I argue we remain 
entirely coherent with the fundamental laws of thermodynamics, whilst also 
remaining consistent with the common sense, and empirically verified, notion that we, 
as conscious experiential human systems, are alive and able to sustain ourselves away 
from equilibrium in a way physical systems, such as salt, are not.   
 
Thus, I bring this section, and indeed this thesis, to a close, with the contention that 
whilst both panpsychism and monistic property dualism present viable solutions to the 
hard problem, in a way physicalist theories fundamentally do not, the strength of these 
metaphysics is ultimately predicated upon their capacity to be neatly reconciled 
alongside the fundamentally physical laws that underpin our reality, and, in this case, 
it seems there is only one metaphysic capable of such a reconciliation: monistic 
property dualism. This is not to say, however, that property dualism is free from 																																																								
44	I reiterate here that I am exclusively discussing type A and B panpsychism, and highlight that this 
particular argument is not an effective refutation for panprotopsychism. However, I do note, in line 
with my previous articulation of ‘Type C’ panpsychism’ (panprotopsychism), that this metaphysic rests 
upon an ambiguity that, at present, hinders earnest enquiry.  Thus, in order to avoid my argument 
against Types A and B panpsychism, one must rest upon panprotopsychism, however, in order to do 
this, one must first delineate a robust definition of protophenomenal properties, as without this, we are 
left turning to a potential solution that produces more problems than it solves. I also note here that, 
alternatively, the panpsychist might coherently defend their metaphysic by providing a robust solution 
for what I dub the ‘inverted culmination problem’ (see Basile 2010, p. 98-99 for a detailed elucidation 
of the problem), and, in so doing, must explain how micro experiences do not necessarily produce 
macro experiences. This would take much of the sting out of my formulation of the thermodynamic 
argument against panpsychism, as this particular problem seems to be most troubling for those 
panpsychist that uphold the possibility of ubiquitous macro experience. However, in line with Basile 
(2010), I note that there is currently no convincing panpsychist theory that explains how certain micro 
experiences avoid becoming macro experiences, and, as a result, I maintain that, without such a theory, 
my argument remains intact.  	
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experiential gaps, the most pressing of which is a problem that would demand an 
entire thesis in and of itself in order to coherently explain and potentially solve, and 
requires an explanation for how disparate, experiential parts culminate so as to form 
the unified bed of experiential awareness we experience today (this is the culmination 
problem espoused by James 1895 and is equally troubling for panpsychism).  
 
Whilst such a problem is undeniably something that must be accounted for by the 
property dualist, due to the limited scope of this thesis, I do not deem it necessary to 
elucidate this explanatory gap in any great depth here.  Instead, as I have done 
throughout, I devote this thesis to a more general examination of the hard problem, 
and an examination of some contemporary anti-physicalist solutions that are arguably 
worthy of future research; not a detailed examination of one particular problem 
(although I do highlight here that a potential area of future research may look into 
combining thermodynamic theory and property dualism as a means from which to 
solve this problem). Thus, I demarcate the fundamental contention underpinning this 
thesis as follows: Physicalism is shown to be false by virtue of failing to solve the 
hard problem, and whilst monistic property dualism is not indubitably the solution to 
this problem, this metaphysic does present certain explanatory advantages over 
physicalism, and does, therefore, present a solid grounding for future philosophical 
research by typifying a neat solution to the hard problem that is wholly consistent 
with some of our most fundamental physical laws. 
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Conclusion 
 
What are we? This is the fundamental question underpinning the entirety of this 
thesis: what are the metaphysical constituents that create the bed of experiential 
awareness we hold? My central contention throughout has been that the phenomenal, 
experiential awareness, which fundamentally typifies ‘what we are’, confers an 
ontological identity that is beyond physical reduction. It cannot be posited as an 
emergent property of entirely non-experiential matter, eliminated or posited as an 
illusion, it cannot be massaged so as to fit a functional-representationalist framework, 
nor can it be explained away as a conceptual ‘trick’ that occurs upon the brain 
referencing itself. It is, at foundation, something we cannot deny; it is the experiential 
capacity that typifies the core of what we are, and, as I have attempted to exemplify, it 
is beyond encapsulation within the scientific physicalism that so predominates the 
current zeitgeist of organized philosophical and scientific thought.  
 
So, my central contention has been that far from continuing down this path of 
attempting to maintain a faulty metaphysic by consistently misrepresenting 
experience and reducing ourselves to mechanistic, mindless, deterministic 
automatons, we must instead capture the distinct, fundamental ontology of 
experiential properties, and account for experience in its entirety, by overthrowing 
physicalism and once more positing ourselves as mindful, free, experiential beings. In 
doing this, as I have attempted to argue in chapter 6, we not only liberate ourselves 
from the epistemic stagnation of physicalism, but also project this mental property 
into our reality, so as to re-discover an experiential cosmos, which is quite distinct 
from the mindless, deterministic machine depicted by the physicalist movement.  
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Due to the ambitious scope of this thesis, and the inevitable limitations that arise upon 
explicating the virtues of a metaphysical paradigm shift of this kind, it seems almost 
unavoidable that the research evidenced herein gives rise to a range of potential 
shortcomings, most notable of which is my inability to accommodate for the 
culmination problem (James 1895) as briefly espoused within the final section. This 
problem highlights that, for any panpsychist or property dualist movement, the anti-
physicalist must accommodate for how potentially disparate, experiential properties 
culminate so as to form a singular, experiential conscious being. This problem is, 
arguably, one of the most pressing issues facing the anti-physicalist movement, and 
would require a thesis with a degree of specificity in order to explicate it in any great 
deal. As I mentioned in 6.2, a thesis of this kind is fundamentally distinct from the 
broader, more general elucidation of the physicalist and anti-physicalist solutions to 
the hard problem that has been the focus of the research evidenced herein.  
 
However, within the same section, I did offer a very brief hint that a potential solution 
to this culmination problem may be found upon combining the theories of 
thermodynamics and property dualism. Such a combination seems intuitive; as in 
order to account for the culmination of disparate experiential properties, it seems we 
must first posit the existence of these disparate properties into a singular physical 
system, so as to confer shared experiences amongst these otherwise disparate 
properties. Such shared experience, I argue, would be easily accounted for by 
thermodynamic theory. As, if all such experiential properties inhere within a system 
so as to produce a state of non-equilibrium, and this system is being bombarded by the 
same external energy, then it seems only natural to infer that, over time, this 
potentially entropic energy would be converted into a highly unified, internal 
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informational state, in which the once disparate, disordered and entropic ‘what it is 
like’ sensations of these experiential properties have been unified into a singular 
‘what it is like’ informational state of the kind we experience today.  So, simply, just 
as we expect to witness highly ordered, low entropy (internal) physical states of a 
non-equilibrium system, I posit that so too should we expect the phenomenal, 
informational (internal) states of such a system to exhibit low entropy. Thus, despite 
the scope of this thesis ultimately precluding me from a detailed formulation of the 
culmination problem and its subsequent potential solution, I do think that a 
culmination of property dualism and thermodynamic theory offers an interesting 
means of solving this problem, and indeed, offers an interesting area for future 
research in the wider field of philosophy of mind.  
 
Whilst the scope of my research inevitably gives rise to certain flaws; it is within this 
scope that a great many of the virtues of this thesis lie. Chief of which is my detailed 
elucidation and synthesis of both the purported virtues, and, ultimate failings, of those 
physicalist strategies which have been most championed in the contemporary 
philosophical literature. Amidst this synthesis, I was able to highlight the fundamental 
issue with those physicalist strategies, which attempt to maintain their metaphysic in 
light of the hard problem, and, in turn, I was able to coherently synthesize the failings 
of a long-established physicalist metaphysical commitment. This fundamental issue, 
as I have argued throughout, is one of categorically misrepresenting phenomenal 
experience so as to maintain a physicalist metaphysic. The problem with this is that, 
in this misrepresentation, the physicalist strategies that have seen the most 
contemporary success inevitably only serve in both distancing us from a coherent 
solution to the hard problem, and starkly highlighting the explanatory inadequacies of 
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the metaphysic that has so predominated much of the contemporary philosophical and 
scientific zeitgeist.  
 
In line with these failings, in my final chapter I expanded the explanatory scope of my 
research by exploring the anti-physicalist alternatives, which attempt to posit 
phenomenal experience as a fundamental constituent of our reality. This final chapter 
placed impetus upon the need to reconcile any anti-physicalist metaphysical 
commitments with the physical laws underpinning our understanding of nature, so as 
to maintain a degree of coherency that does not fracture our otherwise robust 
worldview. As a result, I attempted to reconcile panpsychism with thermodynamic 
theory, before concluding that, ultimately, as we can only conclude that some physical 
systems are working in a state of non-equilibrium, we must, therefore, reject 
panpsychism and endorse a monistic property dualism, which maintains that only 
some physical systems contain a phenomenal property.  
 
Thus, I have tried to present a thesis that not only synthesizes the epistemic and 
metaphysical issues that arise upon endorsing physicalism, but also offers an analysis 
of a metaphysic, monistic property dualism, which provides a means of coherently 
solving the mystery of ‘what we are’, whilst neatly integrating itself with our 
scientific worldview.  
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